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This chapter proposes three different definitions for the market power in the antitrust case, such as dynamic monopoly power, static monopoly power and market power.

The chapter presents simple economic models to analyse which definition of the three market powers is consistent with predatory pricing or tying.

The prerequisite market power is simply market power in the predatory pricing case or static monopoly power in the tying case.

Dynamic monopoly power defined as the market power from an antitrust perspective by the Antitrust Modernization Commission should not be the prerequisite market power in the case of the abuse of dominance or the violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

A possession of substantial market power or monopoly power is typically understood as a prerequisite in abuse of dominance in Korea and EU or violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the United States. However, the antitrust law does not clearly indicate the meaning of market power or monopoly power. This chapter proposes three different definitions for the market power in the antitrust case and analyses which definition of the three market powers is consistent with predatory pricing or tying.

Attempts to discover an internal logic in the high‐speed events taking place in the former Soviet Union. In addressing the problems of the country′s disintegration, examines the issue in its socioeconomic, political and territorial‐administrative aspects. Analyses, for this purpose, the nature of Soviet society prior to Gorbachev′s reforms, its present transitional stage and its probable direction in the near future.

This paper aims to clear whether the monopoly structure of the internet industry has produced market power and discussed the welfare change of the internet industry monopoly.

By using new empirical industrial organization methods and taking the e-commerce market as an example, the authors measured market power and economies of scale of the internet platform companies.

Internet platform enterprises have formed scale economy, but it has not had market power, and the industry still maintains high levels of competition; also, the emergence of large enterprises may increase the welfare of consumers.

The conclusion of this paper clarified actual competition status of internet industry and provided a new foothold for regulation and ideas for the traditional industry to crack the Marshall Conflict.

Allyn Young′s lectures, as recorded by the young Nicholas Kaldor, survey the historical roots of the subject from Aristotle through to the modern neo‐classical writers. The focus throughout is on the conditions making for economic progress, with stress on the institutional developments that extend and are extended by the size of the market. Organisational changes that promote the division of labour and specialisation within and between firms and industries, and which promote competition and mobility, are seen as the vital factors in growth. In the absence of new markets, inventions as such play only a minor role. The economic system is an inter‐related whole, or a living “organon”. It is from this perspective that micro‐economic relations are analysed, and this helps expose certain fallacies of composition associated with the marginal productivity theory of production and distribution. Factors are paid not because they are productive but because they are scarce. Likewise he shows why Marshallian supply and demand schedules, based on the “one thing at a time” approach, cannot adequately describe the dynamic growth properties of the system. Supply and demand cannot be simply integrated to arrive at a picture of the whole economy. These notes are complemented by eleven articles in the Encyclopaedia Britannica which were published shortly after Young′s sudden death in 1929.

Major concern over monopolies and trusts was one of the distinguishing marks of the American Economic Association from its foundation and lasted well into the early 1900s (Coats, 1960). The failed merger attempt of the Northern Securities Company and the subsequent panic of 1902–1903, the 1907 financial crisis and its aftermath, as well as the ostensibly illegal financial practices of many conglomerates, all contributed to keep the trusts issue alive on academic circles. But it was only after the 1911 Court decisions that the debate on the trust problem and the necessary measures to amend the existing antitrust legislation acquired new vigor and incisiveness.³

In the discussion groups subjects will be taken up which are not dealt with in the lectures. The subjects to be taken up in the discussion groups of each week and the assignments relating thereto will be announced well in advance of the meetings.

Aims to examine the issue of industrial strategy (IS), paying particular attention to the case of Britain. Sets out to assess the possibility and nature of an industrial strategy for Britain, in Europe, and within the global scene, taking into account the world we live in as we see it. Accordingly, the perspective is driven and shaped by a quest for a realistic, feasible and sustainable industrial strategy. In order to achieve these objectives, first examines the theoretical arguments behind much of British, and more generally, Western industrial policies. Following this, outlines and assesses British industrial policy post‐Second World War then compares and contrasts British industrial policy with that of Europe, the USA, Japan and the newly industrialized countries. Then examines recent developments in economics and management which may explain the “Far Eastern” miracle, and points to the possibility of a successful, narrowly self‐interested, IS for Europe and Britain, based on the lessons from (new) theory and international experience. To assess what is possible, develops a theoretical framework linking firms in their roles as consumers and/or electors. This hints at the possibilities and limits of feasible policies. All these ignore desirability which, in the author′s view, should be seen in terms of distributional considerations, themselves contributors to sustainability. Accordingly, discusses a desirable industrial strategy for Britain in Europe which accounts for distributional considerations, and goes on to examine its implications for the issue of North‐South convergence. Concludes by pointing to the limitations of the analysis and to directions for developments.

To compare the profitability and technical efficiency of firms in a monopoly industry, airports, operating with different degrees of market power and under differing regulatory regimes, minimalist in New Zealand and interventionist in Australia.

Unlike previous privatisation studies, this study measures efficiency and profitability separately. Using data envelopment analysis (DEA), the technical efficiency of privatised airports is assessed, and this independent measure is used in regression analyses to determine whether efficiency, regulation or privatisation is related to airport profitability.

For firms with monopolistic characteristics operating under minimalist regulation, profitability is related to market power, not efficiency improvements. For firms operating in a regulated environment, profitability is related to regulation, which constrains market power but does not impede efficiency.

This study is limited by its small sample size and its generalisability due to its single industry and regional focus. However, the findings support assertions that the impact of privatisation cannot be assessed independently of industry structure and regulation.

Policy makers considering SOE privatisation in non‐competitive markets should introduce either competition or regulation if firm efficiency is a desired outcome.

Academics and policy makers should be aware that privatisation and competition are not only complementary, as per the extant literature, but they are essential bedfellows. In the absence of competition, regulation is required to control for market power.

In this paper, we analyze power in five modes of social organization, as can be found in Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Specifically, we analyze Smith’s presentations of pre‐capital accumulation and private appropriation of land; feudalism; a system of perfect liberty; late eighteenth century England; and the American colonies, and examine how wealth power, monopoly power, employer power, and political power is manifested within each. We conclude, as does Smith, that modes of social organization can neither be found nor analyzed separately from power.