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With the increase of state capital, corporate total factor productivity (TFP) has a tendency to jump up at first and then slowly decrease. Generally, no significant “productivity paradox” can be observed in China’s manufacturing industry. With the increase of export density, corporate TFP also shows a trend of initial jump growth and subsequent slow decline. This paper aims to discuss these issues.

Using the 1996–2013 China Industrial Enterprise Database, this paper studies the monopolistic behavior of Chinese manufacturing enterprises through the measurement of TFP and corporate monopoly power.

Results show that China’s manufacturing monopoly enterprises are generally innovation-oriented rather than rent-seeking. However, there are certain differences between diversified types of monopoly enterprises: the ones with state capital are more inclined to innovate than those without, whereas the ones with export delivery value are more inclined to seek rent than those without.

Therefore, the government should implement differentiated policies for diversified types of monopoly enterprises, and do so in a targeted manner fully reflecting the containment of rent-seeking and the encouragement of innovation.

To realise the shared development of the digital economy, people need to transcend the capital logic and advocate the logic of cooperative development, i.e. “co-construction, benefit-sharing and co-governance”. This study aims to discuss the aforementioned statement.

Platform economy is a new economic form produced by the transformation of the social production patterns in the era of digital capitalism. In the neo-imperialist stage, a new stage of capitalist development, capital logic promotes the global expansion of the platform economy and influences its development process, organisational form, contradictions and dilemmas and internal transcendence. Having the spatiotemporal chain of capital circulation repaired, the globalisation of the platform economy is reshaping how the means of production are combined with labour, affecting the local changes in the general relations of production and “international relations of production”.

In the accumulation of digital capitalism, the social contradictions and fundamental contradictions in the capitalist world have been further intensified, making exploitation, income distribution gap, monopoly and other problems increasingly severe. The imbalance and inequality in the global development of the digital economy are increasingly prominent.

Regarding the global governance of the digital economy, China, as a major responsible country, will strive to encourage all countries to co-build a community with a shared future in cyberspace. In the new international development pattern of digital economy globalisation, China must take effective measures to actively safeguard its national security and development interests to meet specific challenges.

This paper aims to clear whether the monopoly structure of the internet industry has produced market power and discussed the welfare change of the internet industry monopoly.

By using new empirical industrial organization methods and taking the e-commerce market as an example, the authors measured market power and economies of scale of the internet platform companies.

Internet platform enterprises have formed scale economy, but it has not had market power, and the industry still maintains high levels of competition; also, the emergence of large enterprises may increase the welfare of consumers.

The conclusion of this paper clarified actual competition status of internet industry and provided a new foothold for regulation and ideas for the traditional industry to crack the Marshall Conflict.

As a crucial institutional form established since the Chinese economic reform, the system of competitive local governments has been shaping the characteristics of China's socialist market economy to a considerable degree.

This study not only adopts the view of existing studies that attribute the economic motive of local governments to rent and consider land public finance as a means through which local governments carry out strategic investment but also attempts to further develop the view within a Marxist analytical framework.

As a result, the local governments have helped to maintain an incredibly high investment rate over a considerable period of time, facilitating the continuous, rapid growth of the Chinese economy.

This study concludes that China's local governments function as the productive allocator and user of rent in the strategic investment based on land public finance and thereby embed themselves in the relative surplus-value production initially arising from competition amongst enterprises, forming the dual structure of relative surplus-value production unique to China's economy.

Since the 2010s, market conditions for container shipping companies have been deteriorating owing to decreasing container cargo trade and increasing supply capacity. This study aims to contribute to the empirical literature on the container shipping industry market structure. Specifically, this study aims to investigate the extent of market competition.

This study analyzes the market structure and evaluates the market power of shipping companies through a non-structural test.

The H-statistic for the entire period of 2004–2018 was 0.37, which is significantly different from zero. This indicates the absence of monopoly pricing throughout the entire period. For the time-phased estimates, the H-statistic between 2004 and 2008 is 0.15, which is not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, the H-statistic from 2009 to 2018 was 0.40, which differs significantly from zero.

As the Far East Freight Conference had released tariffs and charge rates by item for container shipping routes, monopolistic pricing is said to have appeared until the European Union abolished the European Economic Community (No. 4056/86) in 2008, before the economic crisis. However, this study indicates that pricing in the container shipping industry has been distinctly non-monopolistic; further, competition seems to have intensified since 2008. Industry competitiveness is of interest not only to academics but also to practitioners, including policymakers, especially when considering competition policies.

We consider a domestic monopolist who is protected by an import quota on the product he produces. He faces a domestic demand curve which is characterized by a constant price elasticity. He is unable to export and has an upward sloping marginal cost curve. We demonstrate that in this case his employment of labor rises with the import quota until imports rise to a fraction lie of domestic output where e is the elasticity of domestic demand. Thus, the employment maximizing quota sets permissible imports at a fraction of domestic output which is at least as high as the reciprocal of the elasticity of demand. We also make a case for liberalizing all the way right away, "cold turkey liberalization. "

We study here the effects of FTA on demand, consumer surplus, dealer profit, and tariff revenue depending on the degree of substitution between two goods and import competition structure in a two country’s static model. We consider monopolist dealer, and perfect competition in imports market. The base model is with a positive tariff and we compare the equilibrium with a zero tariff under FTA. The rankings in the consumer utility are such that it is i) the highest under perfect competition with FTA or without FTA, ii) second highest under monopoly with FTA, and iii) the lowest under monopoly without FTA.

This study aims to identify institutional work mechanisms that public actors employ in market shaping.

The paper uses an abductive theorizing process, combining a literature review with an empirical exploration of three different market-shaping contexts.

The study identifies 20 granular mechanisms of institutional work that market-shaping public actors employ. These mechanisms are all potentially employable in creating, maintaining or disrupting markets. Institutional work vis-à-vis individual institutions may differ in direction from the institutional work vis-à-vis the market system. Public actors are not a homogeneous group but may have different values and support competing institutional logics even when operating in the same market.

The empirical data were limited to three cases in three small open economies. Data collected from other markets and with other methods would provide more rigorous insight into market-shaping public actors.

The findings revealed institutional work mechanisms that public actors can use to shape markets. Companies wanting to engage public actors in market shaping should be aware of the values and institutional logics that influence market-shaping public actors.

The paper unites and expands on the scattered knowledge regarding institutional work in market shaping. It illuminates and dissects the role of public actors in market shaping, challenging the reactive stance that is often assigned to them. The study provides a better understanding of how conflicting market views affect markets. It also brings insights into the interplay between market-shaping actions and the multiple levels of market systems.

Since the core issue of Chinese economics is to elucidate the logical relationship between socialism and the market economy, it necessitates a robust foundation for microeconomic analysis to uncover the behavioral patterns and characteristics of microeconomic agents in a socialist market economy and identify the conditions and methods for the functioning of market mechanisms.

The core issue of microeconomics with Chinese characteristics is to identify the economic logic of how market mechanisms play a decisive role in resource allocation under the basic socialist economic system based on China's reform.

The core issue in building the foundation of microeconomic analysis of Chinese economics is addressing the compatibility issue between SOEs and a market economy.

In the author’s view, this can be achieved under the logic of classified reform so as to build the microeconomic foundation for the effective functioning of a socialist market economy.

Aiming at the lack of explanatory power of traditional industrial organization theory in cross-border competition, by introducing the idea of ecological niche, the authors aim to explore the competitive situation of platform-based enterprises when they operate in multiple fields.

With the help of ecological niche theory, construct the niche width and niche overlap index of typical enterprises in the platform economy, and find out the advantages and the intensity of competition through comparative analysis.

In an environment of cross-border competition, large enterprises have significant competitive advantages, and the fierce competition is concentrated among medium-sized enterprises.

The conclusions of this paper not only provide new insights for explaining the phenomenon of cross-border competition in the platform economy, but also provide theoretical reference for the anti-trust enforcement practice in the platform economy.