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We investigate how different methods of instructor-led reviews for an introductory accounting exam may affect student achievement. We compare two review groups: students who review for the exam by playing Monopoly versus those engaged a more traditional review. We also include a third group (no formal review). We conducted an experiment by examining students’ test scores on an accounting cycle exam. The students were placed into three groups: those who played Monopoly to review for the exam, those who participated in a more traditional exam review, and those who did not participate in any formal review. Our results indicate that, as expected, reviewing for an exam significantly improves students’ exam scores when compared to peers that did not review. However, this result is driven by the students in the Monopoly condition. Students in the traditional review did not score statistically significantly higher than those in the control (no review) group. Also, we did not find that students playing Monopoly as a review scored significantly higher than students actively working in a more traditional review. This study contributes to the literature by informing professors about the efficacy of using Monopoly to review the accounting cycle. This is the first paper to directly test the effects of using Monopoly on student achievement.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

Allyn Young′s lectures, as recorded by the young Nicholas Kaldor, survey the historical roots of the subject from Aristotle through to the modern neo‐classical writers. The focus throughout is on the conditions making for economic progress, with stress on the institutional developments that extend and are extended by the size of the market. Organisational changes that promote the division of labour and specialisation within and between firms and industries, and which promote competition and mobility, are seen as the vital factors in growth. In the absence of new markets, inventions as such play only a minor role. The economic system is an inter‐related whole, or a living “organon”. It is from this perspective that micro‐economic relations are analysed, and this helps expose certain fallacies of composition associated with the marginal productivity theory of production and distribution. Factors are paid not because they are productive but because they are scarce. Likewise he shows why Marshallian supply and demand schedules, based on the “one thing at a time” approach, cannot adequately describe the dynamic growth properties of the system. Supply and demand cannot be simply integrated to arrive at a picture of the whole economy. These notes are complemented by eleven articles in the Encyclopaedia Britannica which were published shortly after Young′s sudden death in 1929.

Previously, there have been few attempts to explore fully the concept of monopoly as it existed prior to the eighteenth century. The concept of monopoly as presently defined, namely that situation where there exists only one seller in the market, could not be applied evenly to monopolies existing in sixteenth and seventeenth century Great Britain. As Joseph Schumpeter pointed out, there existed the “tendency to extend the concept of monopoly beyond the case of a single seller.” In addition, monopoly as a tool of public policy proved to be ineffective. Not only was the Crown inconsistent in its treatment of monopoly, but public opinion was against any policy that appeared to impinge upon the rights of Englishmen as defined by Common Law.

With the increase of state capital, corporate total factor productivity (TFP) has a tendency to jump up at first and then slowly decrease. Generally, no significant “productivity paradox” can be observed in China’s manufacturing industry. With the increase of export density, corporate TFP also shows a trend of initial jump growth and subsequent slow decline. This paper aims to discuss these issues.

Using the 1996–2013 China Industrial Enterprise Database, this paper studies the monopolistic behavior of Chinese manufacturing enterprises through the measurement of TFP and corporate monopoly power.

Results show that China’s manufacturing monopoly enterprises are generally innovation-oriented rather than rent-seeking. However, there are certain differences between diversified types of monopoly enterprises: the ones with state capital are more inclined to innovate than those without, whereas the ones with export delivery value are more inclined to seek rent than those without.

Therefore, the government should implement differentiated policies for diversified types of monopoly enterprises, and do so in a targeted manner fully reflecting the containment of rent-seeking and the encouragement of innovation.

The theory of monopoly price was originally formulated by Carl Menger at the inception of the marginalist revolution in 1871 and represented the dominant theoretical approach to monopoly until the 1930s. Despite its impeccable doctrinal pedigree and lengthy dominance, the theory abruptly disappeared from the mainstream neoclassical literature after the Monopolistic Competition Revolution, to be revived and reformulated after World War II by Ludwig von Mises. The present paper describes the theory as it was offered in its most sophisticated pre‐war form by American economist Vernon A. Mund, who published an unjustifiably neglected volume on monopoly theory that appeared in the same year as the classic works by Joan Robinson and Edward Chamberlain. This paper then attempts to draw out the critical implications of Mund’s formulation of the theory for the current neoclassical orthodoxy in monopoly and competition theory, including the elasticity of demand curves facing individual producers under competition, the time perspectives that are most relevant in analyzing the pricing process, the proper role of long‐run equilibrium in this analysis, and the misapplication of the marginal revenue and marginal cost concepts. Finally, the paper suggests a number of reasons why the theory was swept aside in the aftermath of the Chamberlain/Robinson Revolution with almost no resistance from its most prominent exponents.

This chapter proposes three different definitions for the market power in the antitrust case, such as dynamic monopoly power, static monopoly power and market power.

The chapter presents simple economic models to analyse which definition of the three market powers is consistent with predatory pricing or tying.

The prerequisite market power is simply market power in the predatory pricing case or static monopoly power in the tying case.

Dynamic monopoly power defined as the market power from an antitrust perspective by the Antitrust Modernization Commission should not be the prerequisite market power in the case of the abuse of dominance or the violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

A possession of substantial market power or monopoly power is typically understood as a prerequisite in abuse of dominance in Korea and EU or violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the United States. However, the antitrust law does not clearly indicate the meaning of market power or monopoly power. This chapter proposes three different definitions for the market power in the antitrust case and analyses which definition of the three market powers is consistent with predatory pricing or tying.

Industrial feudalism is a socioeconomic formation that the Polish Marxists Ludwik Krzywicki and Oskar Lange associated with monopoly finance capital. Industrial feudalism arises in a socially static capitalism where mobility between hierarchically defined social strata is restricted. Krzywicki's account predates Hilferding's Finance Capital and outlines the functioning of the capital market-based finance capital that has become more common in capitalism. Seemingly unaware of Krzywicki's pioneering articles, Oskar Lange then presented his own account of monopoly finance capital in the United States with similar social consequences in the early 1940s with state support for monopolies. Krzywicki's work on monopoly finance capital was discovered in the 1950s by Tadeusz Kowalik.

This paper explores how firms within the audience measurement industry, specifically its radio and television markets, have navigated myriad market and nonmarket challenges. The market strategies and the nonmarket forces that constrain those strategies are largely defined by two features: the delineation of its geographic markets by political boundaries and markets that have natural monopoly characteristics. While the pre-monopoly stage or periods of competition may be comparatively short-lived, they are still telling. Monopolists undertake market strategies designed to ensure that they are not supplanted and nonmarket actions geared to avoiding undesirable constraints and reputational damage. Depending on their legal and regulatory environment, customers of the measurement services have used both market and nonmarket actions to mitigate the market power of the audience measurement firms. This paper focuses primarily on the U.S. radio and television audience measurement markets that Arbitron and Nielsen, respectively, have dominated for decades. Non-U.S. markets, which frequently feature America’s foremost firms, illustrate alternatives to America’s largely laissez-faire approach.