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Allyn Young′s lectures, as recorded by the young Nicholas Kaldor, survey the historical roots of the subject from Aristotle through to the modern neo‐classical writers. The focus throughout is on the conditions making for economic progress, with stress on the institutional developments that extend and are extended by the size of the market. Organisational changes that promote the division of labour and specialisation within and between firms and industries, and which promote competition and mobility, are seen as the vital factors in growth. In the absence of new markets, inventions as such play only a minor role. The economic system is an inter‐related whole, or a living “organon”. It is from this perspective that micro‐economic relations are analysed, and this helps expose certain fallacies of composition associated with the marginal productivity theory of production and distribution. Factors are paid not because they are productive but because they are scarce. Likewise he shows why Marshallian supply and demand schedules, based on the “one thing at a time” approach, cannot adequately describe the dynamic growth properties of the system. Supply and demand cannot be simply integrated to arrive at a picture of the whole economy. These notes are complemented by eleven articles in the Encyclopaedia Britannica which were published shortly after Young′s sudden death in 1929.

Previously, there have been few attempts to explore fully the concept of monopoly as it existed prior to the eighteenth century. The concept of monopoly as presently defined, namely that situation where there exists only one seller in the market, could not be applied evenly to monopolies existing in sixteenth and seventeenth century Great Britain. As Joseph Schumpeter pointed out, there existed the “tendency to extend the concept of monopoly beyond the case of a single seller.” In addition, monopoly as a tool of public policy proved to be ineffective. Not only was the Crown inconsistent in its treatment of monopoly, but public opinion was against any policy that appeared to impinge upon the rights of Englishmen as defined by Common Law.

With the increase of state capital, corporate total factor productivity (TFP) has a tendency to jump up at first and then slowly decrease. Generally, no significant “productivity paradox” can be observed in China’s manufacturing industry. With the increase of export density, corporate TFP also shows a trend of initial jump growth and subsequent slow decline. This paper aims to discuss these issues.

Using the 1996–2013 China Industrial Enterprise Database, this paper studies the monopolistic behavior of Chinese manufacturing enterprises through the measurement of TFP and corporate monopoly power.

Results show that China’s manufacturing monopoly enterprises are generally innovation-oriented rather than rent-seeking. However, there are certain differences between diversified types of monopoly enterprises: the ones with state capital are more inclined to innovate than those without, whereas the ones with export delivery value are more inclined to seek rent than those without.

Therefore, the government should implement differentiated policies for diversified types of monopoly enterprises, and do so in a targeted manner fully reflecting the containment of rent-seeking and the encouragement of innovation.

The theory of monopoly price was originally formulated by Carl Menger at the inception of the marginalist revolution in 1871 and represented the dominant theoretical approach to monopoly until the 1930s. Despite its impeccable doctrinal pedigree and lengthy dominance, the theory abruptly disappeared from the mainstream neoclassical literature after the Monopolistic Competition Revolution, to be revived and reformulated after World War II by Ludwig von Mises. The present paper describes the theory as it was offered in its most sophisticated pre‐war form by American economist Vernon A. Mund, who published an unjustifiably neglected volume on monopoly theory that appeared in the same year as the classic works by Joan Robinson and Edward Chamberlain. This paper then attempts to draw out the critical implications of Mund’s formulation of the theory for the current neoclassical orthodoxy in monopoly and competition theory, including the elasticity of demand curves facing individual producers under competition, the time perspectives that are most relevant in analyzing the pricing process, the proper role of long‐run equilibrium in this analysis, and the misapplication of the marginal revenue and marginal cost concepts. Finally, the paper suggests a number of reasons why the theory was swept aside in the aftermath of the Chamberlain/Robinson Revolution with almost no resistance from its most prominent exponents.

Using the team performance‐club profit framework, a formal model is developed of the determination of the transfer fees paid by football clubs when players are traded for cash. It is argued that transfer fees can involve monopoly rents; the selling club extracts a share of the nonnegative differential between its reservation price and the buying club’s maximum bid‐price. It is shown that a necessary condition for the presence of monopoly rents can be established by testing whether buying‐club characteristics are jointly significant determinants of transfer fees after controlling for player characteristics, time effects and selling‐club characteristics. Using a sample of 1,350 English professional football transfer fees covering the period June 1990 to August 1996, it is found that monopoly rents may exist but the degree of monopoly rents may differ with the size of the transfer fee.

The Norwegian retail market for alcoholic beverages is controlled by a state monopoly. Wine and other alcoholic beverages above 4.75 per cent alcohol, can only be bought in government stores called The Wine Monopoly (Vinmonopolet in Norwegian) or consumed in hotels, restaurants, bars, pubs, or catering firms. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the Norwegian wine market and present some of the major opportunities and constraints facing foreign producers.

The objective of this article is twofold: first, to explain the role of the actors in the Norwegian wine market and second, to identify the market opportunities for Italian and other foreign producers. The organisation of the monopoly, the strategies wine producers may use to introduce new wines into the market, and the marketing levers that can be used to utilise the market opportunities are of special interest. The key informant techniques as well as official statistics are used.

Comparing the outcome of the authors' field research, done during the winter of 2010, with government statistics on wine consumption, it is clear that the competitive environment evolves daily. Consumers' tastes and perceptions play a crucial role in this dynamism.

There have not been many studies of the effects of the alcohol monopoly on the Norwegian market. Therefore, it is of particular interest to investigate the organisation of the Norwegian alcohol monopoly and how wine producers may successfully introduce new wines into this market. This paper makes a positive contribution to the literature in this field, giving some promotion strategies which could be achievable and could work in the Norwegian wine market.

Attempts to discover an internal logic in the high‐speed events taking place in the former Soviet Union. In addressing the problems of the country′s disintegration, examines the issue in its socioeconomic, political and territorial‐administrative aspects. Analyses, for this purpose, the nature of Soviet society prior to Gorbachev′s reforms, its present transitional stage and its probable direction in the near future.

The anti‐monopoly law (AML) of the People's Republic of China (PRC), which had undergone ten years of debate among the whole spectrum of China's society, was finally issued on August 30, 2007 and took effect on August 1, 2008. This paper seeks to assess the impact of these new laws.

Through an examination of the latest anti‐monopoly cases since the AML came into force, this paper seeks to study the goals and regulations of the AML, and attempts to foresee features of those foreign‐invested enterprises (FIEs) who are most risky under the new Law.

The new AML, called by some scholars a “landmark of China's economic reform” and “a great achievement of international cooperation” has given birth to mass legal subjects and far‐reaching influence to business circle both explicitly and potentially(Wang, 2008). The new Law attracts concerns from many foreign companies, especially those MNCs and tycoons having business interests in China. Many foreign commentators take the Law as a positive sign for their future investment in China, whereas complaints about the uncertainties of some outstanding issues doubtless persist.

The study provides an insight into antitrust changes in China and signals areas of concern for potential competitors

In the West, at least, monopolies are generally thought to be threatening. An illustration of this concern about the potential consequences of a dominant presence in a market is the fact that most Western countries have introduced anti‐monopoly legislation. Rightly or wrongly, the presence of a monopolist suggests to many that the purchaser of goods or services from such an organisation will not get value for his money. It is often argued that the monopolist will seek to make unnecessarily large profits, or that he will be inefficient and in turn that this will result in his selling prices being higher than they ought. Little attention is usually paid in such discussion to what the economists call “non‐price variables”. However, by implication at least, in this respect too, the seller is thought to perform at a lower level than he might under competition (for example, specification, delivery and service).

To realise the shared development of the digital economy, people need to transcend the capital logic and advocate the logic of cooperative development, i.e. “co-construction, benefit-sharing and co-governance”. This study aims to discuss the aforementioned statement.

Platform economy is a new economic form produced by the transformation of the social production patterns in the era of digital capitalism. In the neo-imperialist stage, a new stage of capitalist development, capital logic promotes the global expansion of the platform economy and influences its development process, organisational form, contradictions and dilemmas and internal transcendence. Having the spatiotemporal chain of capital circulation repaired, the globalisation of the platform economy is reshaping how the means of production are combined with labour, affecting the local changes in the general relations of production and “international relations of production”.

In the accumulation of digital capitalism, the social contradictions and fundamental contradictions in the capitalist world have been further intensified, making exploitation, income distribution gap, monopoly and other problems increasingly severe. The imbalance and inequality in the global development of the digital economy are increasingly prominent.

Regarding the global governance of the digital economy, China, as a major responsible country, will strive to encourage all countries to co-build a community with a shared future in cyberspace. In the new international development pattern of digital economy globalisation, China must take effective measures to actively safeguard its national security and development interests to meet specific challenges.