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Past studies show that companies’ connection with the government (or politically connected companies (PCCs)) contributed negatively to their financial performance. The grabbing hand theory suggests that political connection demand companies to serve political and social obligation that exhaust companies’ financial resources. The purpose of this paper is to extend the previous studies by examining the role of monitoring mechanisms, specifically corporate governance mechanism and institutional ownership (IO), whether they weaken or strengthen the financial performance of PCCs in Malaysia.

The sample consists of all companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia (previously known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) for the year of 2004-2007. The time periods were chosen because there were no significant economic and political events that could possibly distorted the financial and non-financial data.

The findings show that companies’ political connection (the presence of political figure or government representative as members of board of director) has consistently showing negative relationship with performance. The result is consistent with the grabbing hand theory that argues that companies’ connection with government would actually destroy companies’ value. The monitoring role of corporate governance as measured by the percentage of independent board members does not have any significant effect on firm’s performance. The monitoring role of corporate governance as measured by the composition of independent board members have shown a positive significant effect on the company’s performance. However the second monitoring mechanism, the percentage of institutional investors, have a tendency to weaken the company’s performance.

The findings of this study provide an additional understanding of the consequence of government intervention on companies’ performance. This study also highlights the role of monitoring mechanism (independence board members and IO) in strengthening or weakening the performance. The findings suggest that the proper appointment criteria for board members should be seriously considered to ensure better corporate governance structure. Therefore, the formation of the nomination committee as suggested by the current Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance play an important contribution to ensure candidates nominated as board members have proper credentials and qualifications to carry out responsibilities as board members.

In this paper the authors aim to argue that the existence of a strong corporate governance mechanism (a formal credibility-enhancing mechanism) and the presence of a more trustworthy-looking CEO (an informal credibility-enhancing mechanism) are substitutes.

By using machine-learning-based facial-feature-point detection technique, the authors construct a proprietary facial-trustworthiness database for a large-scale of CEOs in the US listed companies. First, the authors manually search for qualifying CEO image from websites and annual reports. Second, by following the neuroscience and psychology literature, the authors use the machine-learning-based face detector to identify the facial features in the CEO photos to calculate a rich and reliable set of facial-trustworthiness measures. The authors then construct a composite facial-trustworthiness index for each CEO. After obtaining accounting data, the authors’ final sample comprises 16,201 firm-year observations for 3,186 CEOs in the sample period of 2000-2018.

The results of the authors’ regression analyses show a negative association between board monitoring intensity and CEOs' facial trustworthiness, indicating that board directors may factor CEOs' facial trustworthiness into their monitoring decisions. Moreover, the authors find that these results are mainly driven by CEOs whose tenure is below the third quartile (i.e. eight years). The authors further find stronger results for externally hired CEOs than internally promoted CEOs. Finally, the authors’ results remain robust when using change models or subsample of CEO photos in recent years.

First, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that adopts a large sample to provide systematic evidence on the directors' use of facial trustworthiness. This study extends the literature by documenting the impacts of CEOs' individual characteristics on the board monitoring intensity. Second, the results of this study emphasized the important role of perceptions based on executives' facial appearance in firm valuation, executive compensation and audit fee, and by presenting empirical evidence that CEOs' facial trustworthiness affects board monitoring intensity. Third, this study responds to the call for research on personalized trust by Hsieh et al. (2020).

The purpose of this paper is to present findings from face-to-face interviews undertaken with 16 care and nursing home managers employed in homes situated in two English local authorities. The research sought to explore managers’ perceptions of the role of contract monitoring in the prevention of abuse.

Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with 16 care and nursing home managers.

Though personnel employed by the local authority who conducted contract monitoring were generally thought of positively by care home managers on a personal level, their effectiveness was perceived to be limited as a result of their lack of experience and knowledge of providing care, and the methods that they were required to use.

Though the research draws upon the experiences of only 16 care and nursing home managers in two local authorities, data suggest that current contract monitoring activity is of limited utility in determining the true nature of care and the presence of abuse.

Unusually, the paper explores care and nursing home managers’ perceptions of contract monitoring processes in terms of how they perceive their effectiveness in preventing abuse.

This paper examines how board structure influences real earnings management and the interaction effect of CEO narcissism on board structure-real earnings management relationship.

The authors used panel data derived from secondary sources from publicly listed firms in Kenya during 2002–2017. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.

The results indicate that board independence, board tenure and size have significant negative effect on real earnings management, while CEO duality positively affects real earnings management. Further, the interaction results show that CEO narcissism moderates the relationship between CEO duality and real earnings management.

The results suggest that real earnings management reduces when boards are independent, large and comprising of long-tenured members. However, when the CEO plays dual role of a chairman, real earnings management increases. The authors also find that when CEOs are narcissists, the monitoring role of the board is compromised.

The study adds value to the understanding of how board structure and CEO narcissism influence the monitoring role of the board among firms listed at Nairobi Securities Exchange.

The study empirically investigates whether the board of directors' expertise in the focal firm's industry has implications for innovation input. Additionally, it explores how this relationship is shaped by the CEO's educational level and background in the technology area.

The article tests the hypothesized relationships through the Arellano–Bond generalized method of moment estimators, proxying innovation input by R&D to total sales. Moreover, it analyses a sample of privately-held Italian medium and large high-tech companies observed over four years by relying on a unique hand-collected dataset.

The research documents an inverted U-shaped relationship between board industry expertise and innovation input and shows that such curvilinear effect is moderated by the CEO's educational level and technology background. Specifically, while the curvilinear slope is less steep for highly educated CEO, it becomes steeper in the presence of technology trained CEO.

The paper recommends how to shape the board human capital as a meaningful driver of board effectiveness and innovation. Additionally, it calls the managerial attention towards the interaction and the interplay between board industry expertise and CEO education as able to influence the above-mentioned outcome.

While previous studies have focused on the linear and positive effect of board industry expertise on innovation, this research advances current knowledge in innovation management literature by testing the presence of a curvilinear relationship. Moreover, by exploring the moderating effect of CEO education, the paper provides a comprehensive picture on the interplay among board industry expertise, CEO educational training and innovation input.

Credit Default Swap (CDS) trading alters equilibrium interactive monitoring of external corporate monitors due to a possible change in private lenders' incentive to monitor client firms. This study explores how audit fees change in response to CDS trade initiation on client firms and how this effect is moderated by investor protection.

With 6,052 cross-country firm observations, the author conducts estimations in the systems dynamic general methods of moments framework.

The author documents that audit fees rise on average after CDS trade initiations with and/or without investor protection. Meanwhile, change in auditors' risk perception result in increased audit costs when CDS trade initiation and investor protection interact. The effect of CDS trading on audit fees remain after controlling for firm, audit, and auditor features are robust to different proxies of audit cost.

The need for firms in high investor protection jurisdictions to initiate CDS trade to implement policies in order to maximize their gains from investor protection activities to lessen the overall impact of any increased audit cost that may arise. Furthermore, CDS regulation may be strategically targeted to lessen the effect of increased audit costs on firms after initiation. This would ensure that the resulting increase in audit cost may not materially impact the cash or profitability position of such firms.

This study is distinct from previous ones by focusing on variation in private lenders incentive to monitor after CDS trade initiation after controlling for possible monitoring by short-term creditors. Given that monitoring is not costless for private lenders and CDS trading on their borrowers causes a change in this cost structure, the author documents how auditors react to such changes in incentive to monitor.

信用違約互換交易會改變外部監督機制的均衡互動監測，這是因為私人貸款者去監控客戶公司的激勵可能有所改變。本研究擬探究審計費用如何改變，以應對向客戶公司進行的信用違約互換交易啟動;研究亦探討投資者保障、如何緩和上述的影響。

我們透過6,052個穿越全國的企業觀察，進行了對系統動力廣義矩估計體系的估測。

無論投資者保障存在與否，信用違約互換交易啟動必帶來審計費用一般的平均升高，我們已把這關聯記錄下來。同時，當信用違約互換交易啟動和投資者保障兩者互相影響時，審計員的風險認知的改變，是會導致審計費用增加的。若拔除公司和審計的影響，信用違約互換交易對審計費用的影響會保持不變;而且，就各個不同的審計費用代理權而言，審計員特點是牢固的。

本研究的結果，確定了若公司屬高投資者保護管轄權的類別，則有需要去啟動信用違約互換交易來實施政策，其目的為能從投資者保障的行動中取得最大的收益，從而減弱審計費用的增加所帶來的全面影響。再者，信用違約互換的管理或許可戰略性地訂立目標，俾能減弱於啟動後，審計費用的上昇對公司帶來的影響;這或會確保審計費用的增加、不會對有關公司的貨幣頭寸或盈利狀況產生重大的影響。

本研究有別於從前的研究，因它的焦點在於短期債權人可能的監督的影響給拔除的情況下，在信用違約互換交易啟動後，以監督為目的私人貸款者激勵的變化。鑒於對私人貸款者來說，監督不是不需要成本的;而且，為他們的借貸者的信用違約互換交易會為這個成本結構帶來變化，我們記錄了審計員如何對以監督為目的的激勵的有關改變作出回應。

The aim of this paper is to provide additional insights on the association between real earnings management (REM) and crash risk, particularly from the perspective of an emerging market economy. It also examines the moderation role that internal and external corporate governance may play in this area.

Relying on archival data from the RESSET and CSMAR databases over a timeframe from 2010 to 2018 of China listed company, the authors test the hypotheses by regressing common measures of crash risk on the treatment variable (REM) and crash risk control variables identified in the prior crash risk literature. The authors also introduce monitoring proxies (internal controls as an internal governance and institutional ownership as an external governance) and assess how effective internal and external governance moderate the relation between REM and stock price crash risk.

The results suggest firms with higher REM have a significantly greater stock price crash risk, and that this association is mitigated by external monitoring. That is, greater institutional ownership, particularly pressure insensitive owners, mitigates the impact of REM on stock price crash risk. However, internal control does not mitigate the association between REM and stock price crash risk.

Following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act, prior research has documented an increase in the use of REM and a positive association between REM and cash risk. The authors demonstrate that they persist in one of the largest emerging markets where institutional regulations, market conditions and corporate behaviors are different from those in developed markets. Also, the assessment of the moderation effect of internal and external governance mechanisms could have meaningful implications for investors and regulators in Chinese and other emerging markets.

The use of digital technologies in the financial service industry has brought new complexities to the corporate governance in banks. Relying on the agency perspective of the shareholder, debtholder and societal governance in banks, this research examines the impact of financial technology innovation (FinTech) on banks' performance by enlightening the monitoring role of female independent directors.

Relying on a sample of Italian banks observed during the period 2016–2020, the authors hand-collected data on the use of FinTech by considering (1) the in-house provisions of FinTech solutions, (2) the collaboration with external FinTech firms and (3) a combination of both measures. The authors run a panel data regression analysis with fixed effects, measuring bank performance through bank competitiveness and bank riskiness.

The authors find that FinTech increases bank competitiveness in gathering money from depositors and that independent women on board mitigate the negative relationship between FinTech and the riskiness of banks' assets, ameliorating the conflicting interests among shareholders, debtholder and societal governance.

This study emphasizes the complexities of bank governance when dealing with FinTech in the wider perspective of equity governance, debt governance and the societal governance spotlighting the importance of appointing female directors in independent positions to enhance the bright sides of financial innovation. The authors enrich the literature on FinTech with a finer understanding of the drivers and implications of in-house provisions of FinTech solutions versus the collaboration with external FinTech firms.

Boards presently are considered the most critical component in improving corporate governance (CG). Board diversity is increasingly being recommended as a tool for enhancing firm performance. Academic research and regulatory action regarding board diversity are focussed mainly on gender and ethnic composition of boards. However, the perspective of board members on board diversity and its impact is mostly missing. Moreover, while strategic leadership perspective suggests that a broader set of upper echelon’s characteristics may shape their actions, empirical evidence investigating the impact of less-explored attributes of diversity is almost non-existent. While the research on the input–output relationship between board diversity and firm performance remains equivocal, an intervening relationship between board diversity and board effectiveness needs to be understood. The purpose of this paper is to address all three limitations and explore the subject from board members’ perspective.

The paper presents the findings of qualitative, exploratory research conducted by interviewing 42 board members of FTSE 350 companies. The data are analysed thematically.

The findings of the research suggest that board members of FTSE 350 companies consider the diversity of functional experience to be a critical requirement for boards’ role-effectiveness. Functionally diverse boards manage external dependencies more effectively and challenge assumptions of the executive more efficiently, thus improving CG. The findings significantly contribute to the literature on board diversity, as well as to strategic leadership theory and other applicable theories. The research is conducted with a relatively small but elite and difficult to approach set of 42 board members of FTSE 350 companies.

The paper makes a unique and significant contribution to praxis by presenting the perspective of practitioners of CG – board members. The findings may encourage board nomination committees to seek board diversity beyond the gender and ethnic characteristics of directors. The findings may also be relevant for policy formulation, as they indicate that functionally diverse boards have improved effectiveness in a range of board roles.

Board diversity is about building a board that accurately reflects the make-up of the population and stakeholders of the society where the company operates. The aim of board diversity is to cultivate a broad range of attributes and perspectives that reflects real-world demographics as boards need to continue to earn their “licence to operate in society” as organisations have a responsibility to multiple constituents and stakeholders, including the community and the wider society within which they exist. Building social capital through diversity has value in the wider context of modern society and achieving social justice.

The paper makes an original and unique contribution to strategic leadership theory by strengthening the argument of the theory. The paper explores beyond widely researched attributes of gender and ethnicity on boards and explores the impact of a less-researched characteristic of directors – their functional experience. Moreover, the paper opens the “black box” of CG – boards, and presents the perspectives of board members. The findings indicate that board members in FTSE 350 boards define diversity more broadly than academics and regulatory agencies often do.

CEOs’ (chief executive officer) term of office may explain discretionary accruals as a result of opportunistic behavior arising during certain periods of the term of office. Therefore, CEOs, in their early years of office, have incentives to report results that meet market expectations. In turn, CEOs in their senior year may be motivated to use discretionary accruals to gain private benefits. In this scenario, corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in monitoring relationships. Hence, the purpose of this study is to verify the influence of monitoring mechanisms on the relationship between CEOs’ term of office and discretionary accruals.

Descriptive statistics, multiple cross-sectional regression to estimate the accruals and regression of panel data to test the hypotheses were used. The sample comprised 195 companies listed on BM&FBovespa.

The results indicated that CEOs’ long term of office has a negative impact on the level of discretionary accruals, and thus, Brazilian CEOs with a longer term of office tend to establish a certain reputation in the stock market. On the other hand, it is concluded that CEOs’ intentions, in the first years of term, are positively related to the use of accruals and that the monitoring mechanisms can minimize these CEOs’ opportunistic practices.

The results broaden the literature on corporate governance, pointing that different systems of variable remuneration may influence CEOs’ willingness to manage results in their last year of term.