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The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of salespersons' attributions about managerial e‐monitoring on salespersons' customer orientation.

Hierarchical linear modeling was used to test the six study hypotheses. A main effects model was used to test the first two hypotheses, with a comparison of regression models used to identify pure modifiers.

The results of this study found informing attributions enhance customer orientation. This effect, however, can be weakened under highly bureaucratic organizational cultures. Similarly, the ability of controlling attributions to hamper customer orientation is less pronounced in cultures described as more bureaucratic.

Building on self‐determination theory (SDT), the authors' study provides an explicit test of e‐monitoring and examines the nature and effects of information and controlling attributions. Given a low variance extracted value attained for bureaucratic culture, future research investigating the underlying dimensions of bureaucratic cultures is warranted. Likewise, more tests of the cognitive mechanisms behind salespersons' attributions are needed to further extend SDT.

Managers seeking to improve customer orientation through the use of e‐monitoring might be best served by encouraging a salesperson's informing attributions. This might be accomplished by clearly communicating the purposes of the e‐monitoring to members of the salesforce.

By investigating the positive and negative effects of e‐monitoring on salesperson customer orientation, this study offers concrete implications for researchers and practitioners on a topic that previously has been examined in the literature only via speculative post hoc analysis.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the certification and monitoring motivations of third-party underwriting and its effects on credit spreads and earnings management of bank issuers.

Ordinary least squares is used to examine the certification and monitoring effects of third-party underwriting. Furthermore, the Heckman two-stage estimation method is used in controlling the endogeneity of sample selection.

The authors find that financial bonds underwritten by third-party underwriters bear lower credit spreads due to their credibly ex ante certification and effectively ex post monitoring compared with self-underwriting. Moreover, the certification of third-party underwriters can help to select good quality bond issuers with lower earnings management, and the monitoring function also plays an essential role in constraining the behavior of earnings management after the bond issues.

The findings in this study suggest that underwriting types (third-party underwriting) will affect financial bond yields and bank issuers’ earnings management.

On the one hand, the authors should encourage third-party underwriters to actively promote the certification and monitoring functions. For example, given commercial banks the chance to be underwriters when the bond issuers are investment banks, which is not allowed now in China’s financial bond market. On the other hand, the authors should cut off the quid pro quo relations within third-party underwriting because such relations will reduce the certification and monitoring effects of third-party underwriters.

This is the first study to distinguish the certification and monitoring effects by using unique data from China’s financial bond market. And the authors further investigate the adverse effects of quid pro quo relations (hiring each other as lead underwriters) on the certification and monitoring effects of third-party underwriters.

The aim of this study is to explore possible contingent variables that might explain these twin contradictory effects of marketing channel governance. Franchisors govern their systems to limit opportunism and enhance performance. However, the exact opposite often occurs.

This paper develops an integrative conceptual model of franchisor governance of its franchisees. This model is tested empirically with data collected from 197 Australian franchisees.

Under strong relational norms, goal congruence and outcome monitoring limit franchisee opportunism; compliance enhances franchisee performance, while opportunism reduces it. With weaker norms, outcome monitoring facilitates compliance, and goal congruence boosts franchisee performance, as does franchisee opportunism. However, norms fail to mitigate behavioral monitoring’s negative impact on opportunism.

This research confirms the positive and negative effects of franchisor governance. It also shows that norms can reverse the positive link between franchisee opportunism and performance. It additionally illustrates how goal congruence and compliance can limit opportunism and boost performance. Future research should refine this study’s measures, incorporate additional constructs into the conceptual model and test the generalizability of these findings in lesser-developed economies.

This research shows that monitoring has both positive and negative effects on franchisee opportunism and performance. To avoid monitoring’s adverse effects, franchisors are advised to enhance goal congruence, boost franchisee compliance and develop strong relational norms.

This paper shows that goal congruence, as well as franchisor outcome monitoring, can mitigate the negative effects of franchisor behavioral monitoring on franchisee opportunism, as do relational norms.

This study examines the contextual variables that can curb the negative effects of role conflict on job satisfaction and enhance the positive effect of job satisfaction on creativity and service performance. More specifically, adopting the job demands-resources theory, the authors explore the interactive effect of frontline employee (FLE) self-monitoring and FLE-manager trust on the relationship between role conflict and job satisfaction. Extending this line of inquiry, the authors adopt social identity theory and analyze the moderating effect of FLE-manager identification on the relationship between job satisfaction and creativity and between job satisfaction and service performance.

Dyadic data utilizing 122 responses from FLEs and their managers were obtained from FLEs working with a major financial services firm in India. Structural equation modeling and PLS were used to assess the hypothesized relationships.

The negative relationship between role conflict and job satisfaction is reduced at higher levels of FLE self-monitoring and FLE-manager trust. Furthermore, FLE manager identification accentuates the effect of job satisfaction on creativity and service performance.

Organizations should invest in developing FLEs' personal and job-related resources to reduce the deleterious effects of role conflicts on FLEs' job outcomes. Specifically, managers should hire FLEs who are high in self-monitoring while enhancing FLE-manager trust and FLE-manager identification.

Role conflict is inevitable in a service job and can have serious negative downstream consequences. Hence, the study explores the important contextual factors that can help an organization develop policies to reduce the negative effects of role conflict.

We present a model of organizational monitoring that integrates organizational justice and information privacy. Specifically, we adopt the position that the formation of invasiveness and unfairness attitudes is a goal-driven process. We employ cybernetic control theory and identity theory to describe how monitoring systems affect one's ability to maintain a positive self-concept. Monitoring provides a particularly powerful cue that directs attention to self-awareness. People draw on fairness and privacy relevant cues inherent in monitoring systems and embedded in monitoring environments (e.g., justice climate) to evaluate their identities. Discrepancies between actual and desired personal and social identities create distress, motivating employees to engage in behavioral self-regulation to counteract potentially threatening monitoring systems. Organizational threats to personal identity goals lead to increased invasiveness attitudes and a commitment to protect and enhance the self. Threats to social identity lead to increased unfairness attitudes and lowered commitment to one's organization. Implications for theory and research on monitoring, justice, and privacy are discussed along with practical implications.

Drawing on transaction cost economics (TCE) theory and organizational information processing theory (OIPT), this study investigates how the alignments between the characteristics of service (i.e. task complexity and measurement ambiguity) and governance mechanisms (i.e. contract specificity and monitoring) can affect service performance.

The paper uses a rigorously designed survey to collect data from professionals who manage service outsourcing contracts in various industries. The respondent pool consists of randomly selected members of the Institute of Supply Management (ISM). The authors’ research question is analyzed using 261 completed and useable responses. Structural equation modeling is adopted to examine the data and test the proposed hypotheses.

The authors find that both contract specificity and monitoring have a positive impact on supplier performance. Further, for high task complexity services, contract specificity is more effective than monitoring, and for high measurement ambiguity services, the opposite is true. Moreover, the effect of contract specificity is mediated by monitoring.

Service outsourcers should use both contract specificity and monitoring in governing outsourced services and know that the former depends on the latter during execution. Facing resource constraints, they can prioritize crafting detailed contract provisions over implementing monitoring for highly complex services but consider monitoring as the primary governance tool in services whose outcomes are difficult to measure.

This study is the first to couple TCE with OPIT and consider the nature of outsourced services in the choice of governance mechanisms and empirically test the simultaneous effects of contract specificity and monitoring in the context of service outsourcing.

The purpose of this paper is to describe a completed audit cycle of the assessment and documentation of antipsychotic side effects reported by patients in a secure hospital setting.

The initial audit was carried out in 2012. As a result of the findings clinicians were recommended to use a brief structured side effect monitoring guide (the Glasgow Antipsychotic Side-Effect Scale (GASS-m)). The audit was repeated in 2015.

Of the 41 patients notes included in the initial audit, for only one (2.4 per cent) was there evidence of a systematic and structured approach to monitoring antipsychotic side effects. In the repeat audit this figure (and use of the GASS-m) had increased to 21/45 (46.7 per cent). For all patients where the GASS-m had been used (n=21) the overall severity of side effects was in the “mild” range (0-21).

Sample size was modest and the study was conducted in an independent secure hospital so may not be generalisable to the NHS.

Use of structured tools/guides to monitor patients’ side effects is recommended so that emergent side effects can be readily recognised, tracked and managed and, relapses made less likely through improved compliance and thus patients’ quality of life improved. This is very important for forensic patients since relapses are likely to increase risk to others.

Previous audits have addressed physical health monitoring of patients on antipsychotics but not by asking them about side effects.

This paper aims to examine the monitoring role of institutional investors in corporate decision-making by classifying financial institutions based on geographical proximity and investment horizon from 1980 to 2014.

By using unique data sets on firm and institution location and investor horizon measure (Gaspar et al., 2005), the authors categorize institutional investors into six proximity-horizon classifications. This method captures the heterogeneity of investors. The corporate decisions assessed include firm investment, financing, payout policy, misbehavior, takeover defenses and profitability.

Both geographical proximity and investment horizon are directly related to institutional investors' monitoring cost. As a result, the effectiveness of institutional monitoring may vary based on geographical proximity and investment horizon. This paper collectively examines both dimensions of financial institutions and provides evidence that institutional investors present different preferences for corporate policies. Given stronger information advantage, both local and nonlocal investors that are long-term oriented fulfill better roles in monitoring corporate decisions but from different perspectives.

Different from previous studies that treat institutional investors homogeneously, this paper provides empirical support that investors are indeed different in influencing firm policies.

To the authors’ best knowledge, this is the first study that classifies investors based on two dimensions, geographical proximity and investment horizon, and examines their joint effects on corporate policies. This proximity-horizon classification allows the authors to better disentangle the effects of institutional ownership structure on the monitoring outcomes.

This paper examines the relationship between women on boards and board monitoring tasks depending on group categories identified in the Kanter's theory.

Using a sample of the largest listed companies in Spain, Italy and France during the period 2007–2017, this study tests the effect of women's presence based on the following board categories: (1) skewed boards with a percentage of women that is less than 20%; (2) tilted boards with a percentage of women that ranges from 20% to 33%; (3) tilted boards with a percentage of women that is more than 33%; and (4) balanced boards with an equal or quasi-equal gender distribution. The authors use the case of the gender board quota regulation in different European Union countries.

The results suggest that tilted boards engage in stronger firm monitoring and that the effect of women on board monitoring tasks is positive and statistically significant when the percentage of female directors reaches the threshold of 33%.

The outcomes of this study help policymakers identify the minimum threshold that quota regulations should mandate in order for boards to be effective.

This paper moves forward the ongoing debate about the effect of women on corporate boards, shifting the focus from the ratio or presence of female directors to the size of the group they form within the board. To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to test Kanter's theory by investigating the relationship between women on boards and board monitoring.

Faced with the financing problem of small-medium enterprises (SMEs), China has attempted to establish as many as third party's collateral institutions. The paper aims to study the design of collateral arrangements including collateral fee rates, risk sharing, collateral capital requirements, types of collateral institutions and recollateral institution, etc.

The paper extends the model of Holmstrom and Tirole to develop the analytic framework of the theory of financing collateral. From the perspective of contract design, the paper establishes a moral hazard model focusing on the minimum capital requirement of the borrower under the condition of risk neutral and limited liability, while considering the structure of lender-collateral institution-borrower.

According to the research, only under certain conditions can third party's collateral arrangements tackle the financing problems of SMEs. Diversification, anti-collateral and linked-transactions are three means to improve financing conditions, but the most important way is efficient monitoring by collateral institutions, especially when it has relative advantage over the lender. In order to improve financing conditions of SMEs, China should rely more on efficient monitoring by banks not on excess development of collateral institutions, meanwhile relax rigid collateral supervision policies. Collateral institutions should be industry-specific, association or transaction-related type.

First, from the perspective of contract design, the paper analyzes the comprehensive institutional arrangements of third party's collateral considering mutual relationships of component elements and develops the analytic framework of the theory of third party's collateral, especially points out necessary conditions of its efficient arrangements. Second, the paper studies various efficient financing mechanisms under the institutional arrangements of third party's collateral and focusing on the role of monitoring and monitors, and the paper also has important policy implications, i.e. the paper should develop specific collateral institutions and promote monitoring role of credit institutions.