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Board monitoring should affect a firm's access to debt financing because it improves firm performance and the board is ultimately responsible for the firm's debt. In this study, we show empirically that access to debt financing indeed benefits in two ways from board monitoring: directly from the monitoring and indirectly from improvement in performance. The methodological challenge is in separating the two effects from each other and from those of other drivers of debt financing.

The impact of mitigating flood occurrence in the rural and urban areas has become crucial as it has affected government policies for countries that are prone to flood disaster. Efforts and funds have been put up to a higher level of capabilities to ensure that coping and managing flood disaster could be resolved. Several initiatives made in managing flood are: effectively monitoring the potential at-risk inundated area, improving the river water irrigation and drainage and undertaking the environmental pollution. This chapter basically focusses more on the improvement of flood monitoring system device at the potential flood area. The approach of ubiquitous mobile SCADA offers a low-cost, portable, and small in size flood monitoring system device with easily accessible data. An easy web monitoring of environment surrounding anywhere and at any time offers a real-time data updated with a very minimum delay of each and every environment data required. There are several sensors like ultrasonic, sound, temperature and humidity, water drop and vibration sensors are equipped together with one small monitoring system platform. The alert of water level condition is notified through a beeping buzzer and light LED notation of various colors of green, yellow and red, which notify any increase of water exceeded. The platform is powered by a rechargeable battery that allows the platform to be mobile and portable. Hence, flood monitoring system platform promotes a low-cost, easy-to-handle and ubiquitous data updated device for a better monitoring system platform.

An extensive research base supports the positive effects of self-monitoring interventions on a number of student outcomes, both academic and behavioral. While the vast majority of this research base relied on traditional paper-and-pencil forms of self-monitoring, advances in technology have created significant opportunities to develop technology-based self-monitoring (TBSM) systems that may offer a number of benefits in terms of efficiency and data management, storing, and graphing. Technology-based self-management applications have evolved and been studied extensively in health-related fields, but research and development for such applications is only beginning in the field of education. In this chapter we (1) provide a brief overview of the literature on traditional forms of self-monitoring, (2) examine how educators and educational researchers may apply lessons learned about TBSM from the medical field, (3) summarize emerging literature on TBSM for students with or at risk for emotional/behavioral disorders in particular, and (4) offer suggestions for future research and development in TBSM.

This paper responds to recent calls for deeper scrutiny of the institutional contexts of citizen science. In the last few years, at least two dozen civil society organizations in New York and Pennsylvania have begun monitoring the watershed impacts of unconventional natural gas drilling, also known as “fracking.” This study examines the institutional logics that inform these citizen monitoring efforts and probes how relationships with academic science and the regulatory state affect the practices of citizen scientists. We find that the diverse practices of the organizations in the participatory water monitoring field are guided by logics of consciousness-raising, environmental policing, and science. Organizations that initiate monitoring projects typically attempt to combine two or more of these logics as they develop new practices in response to macro-level social and environmental changes. The dominant logic of the field remains unsettled, and many groups appear uncertain about whether and how their practices might have an influence. We conclude that the impacts of macro-level changes, such as the scientization of politics, the rise of neoliberal policy ideas, or even large-scale industrial transformations, are likely to be experienced in field-specific ways.

Several developing economies witnessed a large number of systemic financial and currency crises since the 1980s that resulted in severe economic, social, and political problems. The devastating impact of the 1982 and 1994–1995 Mexican crises, the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, the 1998 Russian crisis, and the ongoing financial crisis of 2008–2009 suggests that maintaining financial sector stability through reduction in vulnerability is highly crucial. The world is now witnessing an unprecedented systemic financial crisis originated from the USA in September 2008 together with a deep worldwide economic recession, particularly in developed countries of Europe and North America. This calls for devising and using on a regular basis an appropriate and effective monitoring and policy formulation system for detecting and addressing vulnerabilities leading to crisis. This chapter proposes a macroprudential/financial soundness monitoring, analysis, and remedial policy formulation system that can be used by most developing countries with or without crisis experience as well as with limited data. It also discusses a process for identifying and compiling a set of leading macroprudential/financial soundness indicators. An empirical illustration using Philippines data is presented. There is an urgent need for increased coordination, collaboration, and partnership among central banks, banking and financial market supervision agencies, and ministries of finance, economic, and planning for proper macroprudential monitoring. A high-level national financial stability committee under the auspices of the head of the state as well as a ‘‘regional financial stability board’’ needs to be established to complement and support the activities of an “international stability board.”

This study examines how firms’ use of competitor-focused accounting information, specifically competitor monitoring information, impacts their pricing, demand, and overall revenue performance. The monitoring activities examined are the scope of monitoring, monitoring above and below one’s own hotel class (i.e., market segment), and the extent of reciprocity of monitoring. Competitor analysis is a central element in strategic management accounting (SMA), yet little empirical research has been done since companies do not disclose competitor monitoring activities. Proving the value of competitive monitoring provides strong support for SMA. Archival, proprietary monitoring information regarding pricing, demand, and revenue were obtained from one of the largest hotel markets in the United States. Using regression, we modeled the relationships between performance measures (pricing, demand, and revenue) and monitoring behaviors, while controlling for quality (hotel characteristics and management skill), competitive intensity, hotel class, geographic location, and ownership type. Our results indicate that two aspects of competitor monitoring impact hotel pricing that, in turn, impacts hotel demand and revenue performance. Specifically, a hotel monitoring more competitors (what we refer to as Scope) achieves higher prices with unchanged demand, resulting in higher revenue performance. Most hotels monitor within their class. However, deviating from one’s class has profound outcomes: looking at lower (higher) quality hotels results in a hotel setting lower (higher) prices, resulting in higher (unchanged) demand and lower (higher) revenue performance. Surprisingly, we did not find support for the reciprocity of monitoring. That is, whether the competitors monitored by a hotel, in turn follow the target, has no impact on hotel revenue performance outcomes. While the SMA literature notes the importance of competitor monitoring, this study fills a gap in an important, under-researched area by documenting the link between competitor monitoring behaviors and organizational revenue performance. This may help promote greater diffusion of SMA practices.

For organizations to be effective, their employees need to rely upon each other even when they do not trust each other. One tool managers can use to promote trust-like behavior is monitoring. In this chapter, we report results from a laboratory study that describes the relationship between monitoring and trust behavior. We randomly and anonymously paired participants (n=210) with the same partner, and had them make 15 rounds of trust game decisions. We find predictable main effects (e.g. frequent monitoring increases trust behavior) as well as interesting strategic behavior. Specifically, we find that anticipated monitoring schemes (i.e. when participants know before they make a decision that they either will or will not be monitored) significantly increase trust behavior in monitored rounds, but decrease trust behavior overall. Participants in our study also reacted to information they learned about their counterpart differently as a function of whether or not monitoring was anticipated. Participants were less trusting when they observed trustworthy behavior in an anticipated monitoring period, than when they observed trustworthy behavior in an unanticipated monitoring period. In many cases, participants in our study systematically anticipated their counterpart's untrustworthy behavior. We discuss implication of these results for models of trust and offer managerial prescriptions.

Efficiency wage theory predicts that firms can induce worker effort by the carrot of high wages and/or the stick of monitoring worker performance. Another option available to firms is to tilt the remuneration package over time such that the lure of high future earnings acts as a deterrent to current shirking. On the assumption that firms strive for the optimal trade-off between these various instruments, we develop a two-period model of efficiency wages in which increased monitoring attenuates the gradient of the wage-tenure profile. Our empirical analysis, using two cross sections of matched employer-employee British data, provides robust support for this prediction.