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To assess the efficiency of the anti‐money laundering regulation by using an incentive‐based approach.

It is designed a mechanism in which competent authority is the principal and the financial institutions are the agents.

The analysis shows that despite the efforts of the authorities to combat money laundering the efficiency of an incentive‐based approach has been damaged by the existence of hidden information related to the ability or willingness of banks to cope with money‐laundering prevention.

The contract approach adopted to assess the efficiency of the regulation may highlight the efficiency properties of international schemes of combat against money laundering. But, it is subject to limitations related to the hidden information.

This is a theoretical result that points out to the necessity of creating financial intelligence units in order to concentrated the efforts of collecting information about the willingness or ability of banks to cope with money laundering prevention.

The paper presents an attempt to apply an incentive theoretic approach to evaluate the efficiency of a scheme of combating money laundering. Besides, it reveals the fragile connections in the framework to combat money laundering.

Recent research shows that because of money-laundering risks, there has been an increase in the off-boarding of certain types of corporate clients in the financial sector. This phenomenon known as “de-risking” has been argued to have a negative impact on society, because it increases the possible risk of money laundering. The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the de-risking strategy of financial institutions results in an expansion of the regulatory framework concerning anti-money laundering focusing on off-boarding of clients and, if so, is there a way to avoid further regulation by changing present behavior.

This paper applies functional methods to law and economics to achieve higher efficiency in combating money laundering.

In this paper, it is found that the continuing of de-risking by financial institutions because of the avoidance strategy of money-laundering risks will inevitably result in further regulatory demands regarding the off-boarding process of clients. The legal basis for the introduction of further regulatory intervention is that some of the de-risking constitutes a direct contradiction to the aim of the present regulatory framework, making the behavior non-compliant to the regulation.

There has been very little research concerning de-risking related to money laundering. The present research has focused on the effect on society and not the relationship between the financial institutions and the regulator. This paper raises an important and present problem, as the behavior of the financial institutions constitute a response from the regulator that is contradicting the thoughts behind the behavior of the financial institutions. It is found that the paper is highly relevant if an expansion of regulation is to be hindered.

The objective of this paper is to illustrate the link between the effectiveness of the anti‐money laundering regulations and the characteristics of the compliance costs involved for banks. The work is set out as follows. The next section describes the economic framework, which starts with the assumption that intermediaries have an advantage in terms of information and then demonstrates, by means of a principal‐agent model, how this advantage can produce collective gains in the war against money laundering only if the regulations take the problem of compliance costs into due consideration.

The aim of this paper is to estimate the costs of implementing the anti‐money laundering regulations in Sweden.

The banks are the central institutions in this respect and the paper shows that the costs of the banks in Sweden amount to 400 million SEK yearly. The paper is based upon interviews with a sample of banks and bank statistics.

There are big deficiencies in the Swedish legal regulations. For example, banks have no right to freeze the money in suspicious transactions. There are also deficiencies in the legal regulation systems that make it possible for unserious companies to transfer money on behalf of criminals by using the normal retail banking system. The resources of the supervising authorities are insufficient. The results of the regulations are meagre seen in relation to the costs of the banks for the implementation of the regulations. One argument against this assertion about inefficiency is that the regulations have preventive effects. There is nothing in this project that gives evidence for any noteworthy preventive effects of the regulations upon the original criminality or terrorism. Why should accept a system that costs substantial sums of money and has other negative effects just because it might have some uncertain positive effects? It seems to be a better strategy to develop a system whose effects are measurable.

Very little research about the costs of the anti‐money laundering regulations has been done so far and this paper is entering a new field of research.

The purpose of this study is to provide a timely synthesis of the empirical literature focusing on the economic consequences of money laundering, as this topic has been gaining momentum among policymakers and academic researchers due to its adverse effects.

Empirical studies are collected by consulting accounting and finance journals in diverse digital sources (e.g. Science Direct, Blackwell, Taylor and Francis, Springer, Sage and Emerald). Key words used to identify relevant papers include “money laundering” and “anti-money laundering regulations,” with specific focus on the economic consequences. Our search strategy includes 24 published papers over the period of 2018–2023.

Findings show that most studies represent cross-country investigations; the main topics investigated focus on accounting field (e.g. audit fees, real and accrual earnings management), tax evasion, financial stability, sustainability, economic indicators (inflation, economic growth, foreign direct investment) and financial inclusion; and the economic consequences of money laundering have been also examined within banking industry (e.g. banking profitability, banking stability). Reported findings of reviewed studies suggest that money laundering has diverse adverse impacts at the country level (e.g. increased tax evasion, higher inflation rate, less sustainability and foreign direct investments), at the firm level (e.g. increased audit risk and aggressive real and accrual earnings management) and within banking industry through negative impact of money laundering on bank’s loan portfolio quality, stability and profitability.

With respect to policymakers, strengthening anti-money laundering regulations may play a critical role in reducing money laundering activities. Furthermore, financial institutions should implement specific rules dealing with anti-money regulations to ensure adequate compliance and disclosure. Finally, policymakers should be aware about the importance of digital transformation to combat money laundering activities since it facilitates the detection of financial crimes due to their traceability.

The summary of the empirical literature focusing on the economic consequence of money laundering represents a historical record and an introduction for accounting researchers. It also urges them to further explore the economic implications of anti-money laundering disclosure within banking industry.

The purpose of this paper is to show that an evolutionary approach to combat money laundering can shed new lights on this matter.

An evolutionary game between financial institutions and employees is assumed in which the decisions of the banks and employees to cope against money laundering endogenously is evaluated. The players are allowed to review their strategies in each period of time comparing their payoffs with the average payoff.

The paper shows that the efficiency of anti‐money laundering combat relies on the conjugation of factors such as a proper design of the anti‐money laundering regulation and an endogenous willingness of banks and workers to cope against this war. On one hand, that the number of banks willing to fight money laundering affects the number of employees who also fight against money laundering. On the other hand, the number of banks that decide to cope against money laundering is also affected by number of employees that are prepared or willing to fight it. Of course, these decisions are affected by the design of optimal regulatory system made by the government which may reflect its commitment to combat money laundering.

The efficiency of the anti‐money laundering regulation may be subject to endogenous characteristics of countries that range from the regulatory design to the willingness of banks and employees to cope against money laundering.

This is a theoretical result that shows that an efficient combat to money laundering depends on the joint effort of competent authorities, banks, and employees.

To the best of the author's knowledge, the paper is the first attempt to approach money laundering combat by using an evolutionary game theory approach, which allows it to focus on the endogenous aspect of the anti‐money laundering fight.

The aim of this paper is to outline some key features of China's new rules on anti‐money laundering.

This paper describes the expanded definition of “anti‐money laundering”; the application of the rules to a broader group of financial institutions; the three required anti‐money laundering systems (client identity recognition, retention of client identity documents and trading records, and reporting of large‐sum transactions and suspicious transactions); the expected manner of anti‐money laundering investigations by the People's Bank of China; liabilities for breach; and anti‐money laundering regulations in the insurance and securities sectors.

The paper finds that new anti‐money laundering rules expand the definition of “anti‐money laundering” broaden the scope of institutions to which anti‐money laundering regulations apply, and establish more stringent requirements for the three key internal anti‐money laundering systems that financial institutions and certain non‐financial institutions must have: client identity recognition, retention of client identity documents and trading records, and reporting of large‐sum transactions and suspicious transactions. Compared to the old rules, the new anti‐money laundering rules impose more serious punishment on violations.

The paper provides a detailed and readable reference on the new Chinese anti‐money laundering regulations for those working in the China market and those who wish to compare these Chinese regulations with similar ones in other countries.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the anti‐money laundering legislation and its implementation under Turkish law. The steps taken to combat money laundering in Turkey and the importance of combating money laundering for Turkey are also analyzed in the paper.

In the paper the main features of the Turkish anti‐money laundering laws and regulations of general and specific nature, as well as the authorities and implementations of the Turkish anti‐money laundering authority, namely the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (Mali Suçlar Araştırma Kurulu – MASAK), are analyzed.

Combating money‐laundering has a particular importance for Turkey in the achievement of its goal of becoming a European Union member. Having examined the Turkish anti‐money laundering legislation and its implementation, it can be mentioned that certain major steps have already been taken by Turkey as a candidate for the European Union accession and as a member to several international conventions against money laundering.

In the paper the main features of the Turkish anti‐money laundering laws and regulations of general and specific nature, as well as the authorities and implementations of the Turkish anti‐money laundering authority are analyzed. The paper underlines the importance of combating money laundering for Turkey in order to become a member of the European Union.

To describe and to discuss the implications of the US Department of the Treasury's PATRIOT Act regulations requiring “covered financial institutions” (including broker‐dealers, banks, and mutual funds) to maintain risk‐based procedures to ensure that: correspondent accounts held on behalf of specified non‐US financial institutions; and private banking accounts, are subject to due diligence procedures to ensure that those accounts, and the financial institutions holding those accounts, are not being used for money laundering purposes.

Summarizes and analyzes the adopted rules.

Since the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, regulation relating to anti‐money laundering has been among the highest profile – and highest priority – activity of securities and financial institution regulation. Consequently, anti‐money laundering rules and regulations have become a major aspect of compliance programs at financial institutions such as banks and broker‐dealers. The rules that are the subject of this article are noteworthy in part because they continue the trend of widening the universe of “financial institutions” that are now subject to substantial anti‐money laundering regulation. The rules described in this article add substantially to the complexity of anti‐money laundering regulation at financial institutions for a number of reasons, including: firstly, placing new, broad‐based requirements on financial institutions; secondly, requiring those financial institutions to make judgments regarding both the level of risk posed by certain accounts and the appropriate diligence that may be necessary for each such account; and thirdly, interpretive and implementation challenges.

A summary and analysis of new anti‐money laundering regulation, which comes at a time when US regulators are placing substantial emphasis on anti‐money laundering.

The purpose of this study is to check the effectiveness of anti-money laundering (AML) regulations in Pakistan. The study investigates and analyses some key variables that may be influencing the effectiveness of anti-money regulations in Pakistan. Money laundering is most prevalent in the banking sector, as banks deals with the money’s deposition, withdrawal and transfer, therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-money regulations on subjective judgments. It is an exploratory study in which I have tried to find the relationship and impact of three regulations, which are customer record keeping, employee training and suspicious transaction reporting on money laundering.

A sample of hundred responses has been collected from employees working in different banks located in Rawalpindi and Lahore through questionnaire. Questionnaire has been developed on the basis of different dimensions of the research variables.

It has been found that that there is an impact of employee training on money laundering in banking system. A moderate inverse relationship between employee training and money laundering and anti-money laundering regulation of customer record keeping has weak impact on money laundering in developing countries.

The research is limited to Pakistan only, and to apply the same concept in other countries, researchers need to check the financial institutions of that country as well.

It has been suggested that to stop money laundry, special budget should be allocated for the capacity building of employees through training. Timely guidance and assistance of foreign-trained instructors or experts in combating money laundering should be taken. Implementation of anti-money laundering regulations should be transparent, consistent and timely.