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The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between the size of the legal penalty for fraud and CEO turnover.

Using a sample of 93 securities lawsuits that were filed in the US between 1997 and 2005, logit regression is used in the analysis of the relation between probability of CEO turnover and size of the litigation monetary penalty and ordinal logit regression is used to examine the relation between timing of CEO turnover and size of the litigation monetary penalty.

A positive association is documented between the size of the monetary penalty and the probability of CEO turnover. A larger monetary penalty is associated with earlier CEO turnover. Equity issue related securities lawsuit is associated with a higher probability of CEO turnover and an earlier CEO turnover.

The results imply that the greater the legal penalty levied on the sued firm, the more likely the CEO is considered as being complicit in the alleged fraud. A limitation of this study is that in constructing the sample, some meritorious lawsuits that may have resulted in legal penalty but were dismissed for procedural reasons were excluded. Further, the CEO turnover data did not provide sufficient information about the reason for the termination of the CEOs.

This is one of the first empirical studies to examine the relation between the legal penalty for fraud and CEO turnover in the period after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. This study adds to the existing literature on the consequences of financial misreporting on managers by documenting an association between the legal penalty for fraud and CEO turnover.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether foreign firms pay disproportionately higher monetary penalties after controlling for factors that affect the sanctioning of the firm.

In this paper, a cross-sectional data analysis has been used to examine the enforcement actions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) against all private and public companies from 1978 to 2019.

The findings indicate that that foreign firms pay disproportionately higher monetary penalties than domestic firms after controlling for factors that affect the sanctioning of firms. On average, foreign firms pay $43.3m more to the US government than US firms pay. This is a considerable difference in monetary penalties and equal to 68.95% of the average monetary penalty.

This paper shows that the US government treats US firms more favorably than foreign firms in monetary sanctions. Because the FCPA is not applied equally, this is contrary to US government guidelines and to the rule of law. The government needs to reconsider the consequences of imposing disproportionately higher penalties on foreign firms. Given the lack of judicial scrutiny of the FCPA settlement amounts against foreign firms, prosecutorial harshness against them can be remedied by amending the FCPA to eliminate the unequal treatment of foreign entities.

The purpose of this study is to develop penalty measures against concessionaires’ defaults as a mechanism for protecting the interests of parties (public and private) in public–private partnership (PPP) contracts for enhancing project delivery.

The research methodology is a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach. This study commenced with an in-depth literature review, which provided the basis for identification of penalty measures in construction contract management. The qualitative assessment was based on semi-structured face-to-face interviews, which were aimed at identifying the underlying pattern of the penalty measures, and the quantitative assessment was based on a structured questionnaire. In both cases, respondents were stakeholders’ organizations that had been involved in PPP contracts in the southwestern region of Nigeria. These include industrial practitioners from government-based organizations (ministries, agencies, corporations/parastatals, etc.), private developers/concessionaires, law firms, banks, etc. The sample size was selected using a respondent-driven sampling approach, as the comprehensive lists of the participants in PPP contracts are not readily available in the Nigerian construction industry. Responses from the interview were analysed using interpretative phenomenal analysis via ATLAS.ti7. The quantitative data were analysed using percentile for flexibility between “most” and “more” preferred mechanisms.

This study developed mechanisms that defined the rights of the public party to redress underperformance of PPP contracts consequent to the defaults of the private party. “Step-in-right” and “termination of the contracts” were preferred against specific cases of “delayed execution”, “abandonment of the project”, “bankruptcy of the concessionaire” and “non-compliance with design and specifications”. With respect to “shortfall in performance against established dates”, the results converged on “monetary fine” and diverged on “step-in-right” and “termination of the contracts”.

The study contributes to literature on mechanisms for enforcing PPP project performance. Besides, defining rights and obligations of the parties in specific events of underperformance of the concessionaires in PPP contracts is a significant step towards the development of standard conditions of contract for managing PPP projects in which the model is being newly adopted.

Project management studies on PPP were extended by defining the liabilities that are consequent to the defaults of the private party and the mechanisms for their enforcement.

The purpose of this study is to examine regulatory sanctions from an emerging economy perspective and analyzing the impact of regulators imposed monetary sanctions on banks’ performance.

The study adopted correlational research design to examine the effect of regulatory penalties on the performance of deposit money banks in Nigeria. This study used panel data from a sample of 15 deposit money banks in Nigeria for the period of 2006-2015. Multiple regression analysis was carried out.

Results showed that penalties imposed by regulators in the Nigerian banking industry have no significant impact on the bottom line of the defaulters. Penalties imposed on foreign exchange and international trade related infraction showed that the cost of penalties is below the benefits enjoyed from such infractions.

The insignificant impact of penalties on performance implies that deposit money banks have considered penalties imposed by regulators as operational expenses and transferred such to customers.

The study differs from other studies that examined regulatory penalties on performance by focusing on financial performance and using data from an emerging economy perceived to have weak regulatory environment.

In a high‐profile case that first drew big media headlines last February, a New York brokerage firm and a ring of eight brokers on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange were charged with perpetrating a scheme in which they made over $11.1m in illegal profits and at the same time covered their tracks with an elaborate fraud.

The purpose of this paper is to assess if federal judges have sentenced criminal corporations to fines that are consistent with the seriousness of the offense and the blameworthiness of the organization, which would be in line with the directives from the US Sentencing Guidelines. This paper will also use the focal concerns framework to measure organizational blameworthiness.

This paper uses secondary data from federal sentencing documents, collected by the US Sentencing Commission, for cases that were adjudicated between October 1, 2010 and September 30, 2017.

Results showed that the focal concerns framework can be used to define potential constructs for blameworthiness and that an organization’s culpability score was a significant predictor in whether the company received a higher fine.

The data are unable to examine two of the three measures of focal concerns. Cross-sectional data limits the ability to draw conclusions regarding cause and effect between blameworthiness and monetary fines.

Results imply that judges are sentencing corporations that have higher culpability scores to more severe fines, in accordance with both the federal Sentencing Guidelines and focal concerns framework.

This study is one of the first to apply the focal concerns framework, usually used to examine the sentencing of individuals, to the sentencing of corporations. It is also one of the first to attempt to empirically define blameworthiness.

The purpose of this paper is to map out the corporate criminality among the 70 top‐ranked corporations in the Swedish business world. It aims to identify properties common for companies that get a decision by a regulatory agency and which kind of properties there are when the regulatory agency goes to a decision.

Data on decisions taken against violation (criminal, civil, or administrative) collected from annual reports (1999‐2008) presented on the internet by eight regulatory agencies in Sweden. The corporations collected by the internet site “largest companies” and the Swedish business magazine Affärsvärlden (World of Business). The analysis of data were worked out by cross tab, designed as analysis of covariation between one independent variable to one dependent variable, or two or more independent variables (were one or more of them were held invariant to each other) to one dependent variable.

Approximately, 60 companies (85.7 per cent) had at least one decision against them during the period 1999‐2008, and 28 companies had more than five decisions (court, administrative law, objection or settlement) against them, which means that 40 per cent of the whole sample performed a carrier criminality. Among the variables, low profitability, interior business, and to some degree, management control tend to covary with some or all kinds of decisions given by the regulatory agencies.

The paper provides the field of white‐collar crime an investigation of corporations as offenders from the Swedish horizon. It provides regulatory agencies with a model of the causality behind the decisions against a corporation.

The Covid-19 pandemic has persisted for almost three years. States have since then enforced laws, policies and measures believed to be the most effective to handle the global pandemic. Along this line, the Indonesian Government opted to implement mandatory vaccination and refusal of which entails monetary penalties. Hence, this study aims to analyze two legal issues that touch upon the realm of International Human Rights Law: first, whether state has the authority to implement the said mandatory vaccine program to those who refuse to be vaccinated, and second, how is the more appropriate legal policy to obligate vaccination but without coercive sanction.

This is a normative legal research that uses a qualitative method with case studies, conceptual, historical and comparative approaches. A descriptive-analytical deduction process was used in analyzing the issue.

The results present, as part of state’s right to regulate, it has the authority to enact mandatory vaccination with monetary penalties to fulfil its obligation to protect public health in times of emergency; this is legal and constitutional but only if it satisfies the requirements under the International Human Rights Law: public health necessity, reasonableness, proportionality and harm avoidance. Alternatively, herd immunity is achievable without deploying unnecessary coercive sanctions, such as improving public channels of communication and information, adopting legal policies that incentivize people’s compliance like exclusion from public services, subsidies revocation, employment restrictions, higher health insurance premiums, etc.

This study analyzes in depth the following issues: of whether the government has the authority to apply mandatory vaccination laws enforced through monetary penalties for those who refused to be vaccinated and how does the government implement the appropriate legal policy to enforce mandatory vaccination without imposing penalties for non-compliance while maintaining a balance between the interests of protecting public health and the human rights of individuals to choose medical treatment for themselves, including whether they are willing to be vaccinated. Hence, the political affairs, economic matters and other non-legal related issues are excluded from this study.

This paper hence offers a suggestive insight for state in formulating a policy relating to the mandatory vaccination program. Although the monetary penalties do not directly violate the rule of law, a more non-coercive approach to the society would be more favorable.

Availability of accurate and reliable information in financial markets helps investors make well-informed decisions on capital allocations which is beneficial for long-term economic growth. In this regards, the role of auditing firms that inspect the financial statements of the publicly traded companies in sound operation of financial markets has been increasing. The Capital Market Board of Turkey (CMBT) has the task and responsibility of investigating fraudulent information disseminated by the firms whose stocks are traded in Borsa Istanbul. The investigations can lead to monetary penalties if fraud is proven and the results are published by CMBT in its weekly bulletin. The present study aims to examine the effect of announcements of financial irregularities of companies in CMBT Bulletin on the performance of the relevant company stock in the short term.

This study uses abnormal return, cumulative abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal return as metrics and parametric, as well as non-parametric tests to ascertain whether the announcements of financial irregularities in company operations have any statistically significant effect on the return of its stock.

The results indicate that publication of the financial penalty news by CMBT in its bulletin has almost no statistically significant influence on the performance of the relevant companies’ stock in Borsa Istanbul. The findings indicate that either the investors in this particular markets do not consider such news relevant to long-term success of the firm or the announcement does not provide any new information and penalties have been priced into the stock before the announcement in the bulletin.

In literature there is no more research about the effect of the announcements of administrative monetary penalties and crime complaints on the stock returns.