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The purpose of this study is to develop penalty measures against concessionaires’ defaults as a mechanism for protecting the interests of parties (public and private) in public–private partnership (PPP) contracts for enhancing project delivery.

The research methodology is a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach. This study commenced with an in-depth literature review, which provided the basis for identification of penalty measures in construction contract management. The qualitative assessment was based on semi-structured face-to-face interviews, which were aimed at identifying the underlying pattern of the penalty measures, and the quantitative assessment was based on a structured questionnaire. In both cases, respondents were stakeholders’ organizations that had been involved in PPP contracts in the southwestern region of Nigeria. These include industrial practitioners from government-based organizations (ministries, agencies, corporations/parastatals, etc.), private developers/concessionaires, law firms, banks, etc. The sample size was selected using a respondent-driven sampling approach, as the comprehensive lists of the participants in PPP contracts are not readily available in the Nigerian construction industry. Responses from the interview were analysed using interpretative phenomenal analysis via ATLAS.ti7. The quantitative data were analysed using percentile for flexibility between “most” and “more” preferred mechanisms.

This study developed mechanisms that defined the rights of the public party to redress underperformance of PPP contracts consequent to the defaults of the private party. “Step-in-right” and “termination of the contracts” were preferred against specific cases of “delayed execution”, “abandonment of the project”, “bankruptcy of the concessionaire” and “non-compliance with design and specifications”. With respect to “shortfall in performance against established dates”, the results converged on “monetary fine” and diverged on “step-in-right” and “termination of the contracts”.

The study contributes to literature on mechanisms for enforcing PPP project performance. Besides, defining rights and obligations of the parties in specific events of underperformance of the concessionaires in PPP contracts is a significant step towards the development of standard conditions of contract for managing PPP projects in which the model is being newly adopted.

Project management studies on PPP were extended by defining the liabilities that are consequent to the defaults of the private party and the mechanisms for their enforcement.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

The purpose of this paper is to assess if federal judges have sentenced criminal corporations to fines that are consistent with the seriousness of the offense and the blameworthiness of the organization, which would be in line with the directives from the US Sentencing Guidelines. This paper will also use the focal concerns framework to measure organizational blameworthiness.

This paper uses secondary data from federal sentencing documents, collected by the US Sentencing Commission, for cases that were adjudicated between October 1, 2010 and September 30, 2017.

Results showed that the focal concerns framework can be used to define potential constructs for blameworthiness and that an organization’s culpability score was a significant predictor in whether the company received a higher fine.

The data are unable to examine two of the three measures of focal concerns. Cross-sectional data limits the ability to draw conclusions regarding cause and effect between blameworthiness and monetary fines.

Results imply that judges are sentencing corporations that have higher culpability scores to more severe fines, in accordance with both the federal Sentencing Guidelines and focal concerns framework.

This study is one of the first to apply the focal concerns framework, usually used to examine the sentencing of individuals, to the sentencing of corporations. It is also one of the first to attempt to empirically define blameworthiness.

This paper surveys published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 1,040 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary finding is that the median long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 25.0%:18.8% for domestic cartels and 31.0% for international cartels. Cartel overcharges are positively skewed, pushing the mean overcharge for all successful cartels to 43.4%. Convicted cartels are on average as equally effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels, but bid-rigging conduct does display somewhat lower mark-ups than price-fixing cartels. These findings suggest that optimal deterrence requires that monetary penalties ought to be increased.

The purpose of this paper is to propose and test a framework to foster safe work behaviour among workers on construction sites.

The proposed framework identifies two main reasons for unsafe behaviours: “don't know how”, and “don't care”. Technical and safety training is proposed to overcome the former problem, while for the latter it is proposed that organisations systematically apply operant conditioning techniques to promote safety, using organisational behaviour modification. A postal survey of contractors in Singapore was conducted to test the framework. The four tools of operant conditioning theory (positive reinforcements, negative reinforcements, extinction, and punishments) were evaluated.

Close and strict supervision, sending workers for safety and health training, and imposing fines are found to be most effective methods. Positive reinforcements (both monetary and non‐monetary) have also been found to be effective, while extinction did not receive much support. Other methods that may foster safe work behaviours are also discussed.

Safety on site could be enhanced via training and application of operant conditioning theory.

Availability of accurate and reliable information in financial markets helps investors make well-informed decisions on capital allocations which is beneficial for long-term economic growth. In this regards, the role of auditing firms that inspect the financial statements of the publicly traded companies in sound operation of financial markets has been increasing. The Capital Market Board of Turkey (CMBT) has the task and responsibility of investigating fraudulent information disseminated by the firms whose stocks are traded in Borsa Istanbul. The investigations can lead to monetary penalties if fraud is proven and the results are published by CMBT in its weekly bulletin. The present study aims to examine the effect of announcements of financial irregularities of companies in CMBT Bulletin on the performance of the relevant company stock in the short term.

This study uses abnormal return, cumulative abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal return as metrics and parametric, as well as non-parametric tests to ascertain whether the announcements of financial irregularities in company operations have any statistically significant effect on the return of its stock.

The results indicate that publication of the financial penalty news by CMBT in its bulletin has almost no statistically significant influence on the performance of the relevant companies’ stock in Borsa Istanbul. The findings indicate that either the investors in this particular markets do not consider such news relevant to long-term success of the firm or the announcement does not provide any new information and penalties have been priced into the stock before the announcement in the bulletin.

In literature there is no more research about the effect of the announcements of administrative monetary penalties and crime complaints on the stock returns.

The purpose of this paper is to review the criminal enforcement of insider dealing cases in People's Republic of China's (PRC) securities market and to provide feasible suggestions for improvement for a more coherent and streamlined insider dealing regulatory framework in the PRC during the enforcement of China's new Securities Law (SL 2020) in March 2020.

Through analysing the previous literature on public interest theories and economic theories of regulation, this paper examines the necessity to regulate insider dealing in China with criminal law to ensure fairness and avoid monopolies in its securities market. The paper reviews the criminalising of severe insider dealing cases in China from the Nanking National Government in the 1920s to the inception of the securities market of the PRC in the 1990s to the present day. The investigation, prosecution, enforcement and trial of criminal offences of insider dealing in China are thoroughly examined.

The paper finds a tendency for over reliance on the investigation and the administrative judgement of the China Securities Regulatory Commission in criminal investigation, prosecution and trial in the PRC.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is one of the first papers to critically and thoroughly analyse the criminal enforcement of insider dealing in China following the recent enforcement of China’s new Securities Law in March 2020.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the macroeconomic determinants of fine-wine prices and estimate their impacts.

The author models the Liv-ex fine-wine price indices with the macroeconomic variables of emerging and developed markets on a monthly basis from 1996 to 2015.

The demand from emerging markets plays a key role in fine-wine pricing and, more precisely, in the price fluctuation of prestige Bordeaux wines. Furthermore, the continuous weakening of the US dollar in real terms favors an increase in fine-wine prices. Since 2011, the slowdown in economic growth in emerging markets, followed by the depreciation of national currencies, has negatively affected the luxury wine market. Along with the process of financialization in the fine-wine market, prices have become more volatile. Factors such as money supply, real interest rates and the growth of investment funds have started to show their influence on fine-wine pricing.

Complementary to the hedonic price modeling, this research can provide an analysis to wine-price modeling and forecasting within the macroeconomic approach.