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This chapter attempts to analyze mainly the interactions between the implementation of inflation targeting (IT) policy and performance in the conduct of economic policies (fiscal and exchange rate) in emerging countries. More precisely, empirical studies conducted in this chapter aim to apprehend the feedback effect of this strategy of monetary policy on the budget deficit and volatility of exchange rate performance. This said, we consider the institutional framework as endogenous to IT and analyze the response of authorities to the adoption of this monetary regime. To do this, the retained methodological path in this chapter is an empirical way, based on the econometrics of panel data. First, our contribution to the existing literature is to evaluate the time-varying treatment effect of IT’s adoption on the budget deficit of emerging inflation targeters, using the propensity score matching approach. Our empirical analysis, conducted on a sample of 34 economies (13 IT and 21 non-IT economies) for the period from 1990 to 2010, show a significant impact of IT on the reduction of budget deficit in emerging countries having adopted this monetary policy framework. Therefore, we can say that the emerging government can benefit ex post and gradually from a decline in their public deficits. Retaining the same econometric approach and sample, we tried secondly to empirically examine whether the adoption of IT in emerging inflation targeters has been effectively translated by an increase in the nominal effective exchange rate volatility compared to non-IT countries. Our results show that this effect is decreasing and that this volatility is becoming less important after the shift to this monetary regime. We might suggest that this indirect and occasional intervention in the foreign exchange market can be made by fear of inflation rather than by fear of floating hence in most emerging countries that have adopted the IT strategy. Finally, we can say that our conclusions corroborate the literature of disciplining effects of IT regime on fiscal policy performance as well as the two controversial effects of IT on the nominal effective exchange rate volatility.

The global financial crisis demonstrated that monetary policy alone cannot ensure both price and financial stability. According to the Tinbergen (1952) rule, there was a gap in the policymakers’ toolkit for safeguarding financial stability, as the number of available policy instruments was insufficient relative to the number of policy objectives. That gap is now being closed through the creation of new macroprudential policy instruments. Both monetary policy and macroprudential policy have the capacity to influence both price and financial stability objectives. This paper develops a framework for determining how best to assign instruments to objectives.

Using a simplified New-Keynesian model, the authors examine two sets of policy trade-offs, the first concerning the relative effectiveness of monetary and macroprudential policy instruments in achieving price and financial stability objectives and the second concerning trade-offs between macroprudential policy instruments themselves.

This model shows that regardless of whether the objective is to enhance financial system resilience or to moderate the financial cycle, macroprudential policies are more effective than monetary policy. Likewise, monetary policy is more effective than macroprudential policy in achieving price stability. According to the Mundell (1962) principle of effective market classification, this implies that macroprudential policy instruments should be paired with financial stability objectives, and monetary policy instruments should be paired with the price stability objective. The authors also find a trade-off between the two sets of macroprudential policy instruments, which indicates that failure to moderate the financial cycle would require greater financial system resilience.

The main contribution of the paper is to establish – with the help of a model framework – the relative effectiveness of monetary and macroprudential policies in achieving price and financial stability objectives. By so doing, it provides a rationale for macroprudential policy and it shows how macroprudential policy can unburden monetary policy in leaning against the wind of financial imbalances.

The conventional and new inflation bias theories present two distinct facets to explain the outcome of excess inflation without output gains by a discretionary central banker. First is the temptation to achieve a higher than potential output, and, second is not to let it falter. The authors explicitly account for these two distinct dimensions in empirical formulations both exogenously and endogenously. Specifically, the purpose of this paper is to investigate what monetary discretion can and cannot do in terms of dual objectives – inflation and growth – across boom and bust cycles, both directly and indirectly.

(i) Segregate the economic activity into boom and bust cycles; (ii) Explicitly account for the two dimensions of conventional and new inflation bias theories; and (iii) model and estimate the direct and indirect effects of monetary discretion across business cycles.

The results indicate considerable asymmetries in the effects of monetary discretion and distribution thereof across objectives and cycles. The direct impact of monetary discretion tends to induce significantly higher inflation in boom and bust cycles, while it exerts a positive but insignificant effect on output. The inflation effects are more pronounced in boom than bust cycles and vice versa are the output effects. The indirect effects on output via inflation are significantly pernicious, which are more pronounced in expansions than recessions.

In a nutshell, instead of benefiting, monetary discretion tends to harm in terms of both the dual policy objectives, which cautions about its well calculated and constrained use only.

This study provides an empirical analysis of the relationship between job design and the labor-market environment in which firms operate. In particular, I focus on one aspect of job design: the extent to which employees have discretion (autonomy) to organize their work. There has been considerable emphasis in the last 20 years on the importance of “high-involvement” work practices, which seek to give employees more decision rights at work. This literature has been concerned with the introduction of work practices such as team work, job rotation, or quality circles, and with the use of performance pay contracts. Within this literature, there are also some studies that focus more particularly on the extent to which employees have job discretion or autonomy. Discretion is an important characteristic of jobs because much of the redesign effort that has been conducted in the last years has aimed at giving employees more power to make decisions at work, and performance gains are largely attributed to these changes.

This paper derives the optimal monetary policy under discretion, taking into account that aggregate spending depends on the long‐term real interest rate rather than on the short‐term rate. It deduces optimal shock‐dependent strategies for the monetary instrument, the nominal interest rate and analyzes the influence of both the degree of persistence of supply and demand shocks and the weight on output stabilization in the objective function of the central bank on the optimal monetary reaction. The higher the degree of persistence of a supply shock, the stronger is the reaction of the interest rate, whereas the opposite holds for a demand shock. The reaction on demand disturbances is independent of weight given to output stabilization by the central bank; in the case of a supply shock the reaction of the interest rate depends on this weight.

John Taylor devised a simple monetary policy rule that links the Federal Reserve's policy interest rate with inflation and output targets. This paper compares actual policy rates with the rates that would have been recommended by the basic Taylor Rule for three long periods in U.S. economic history: 1875–1913 (“Pre Fed”), 1914–1951 (“Early Fed”), and 1952–1998 (“Modern Fed”). In addition, the authors develop a more complex version of the Rule to facilitate a comparison of the way in which each monetary authority would have reacted to the economic challenges presented outside its own time period. The empirical evidence suggests that Modern Fed would have reacted more promptly and appropriately to inflation and output problems outside its time period than either Early Fed or Pre Fed, and that the movement of interest rates in the Pre Fed period came closer to the corrective policies of Modern Fed than did those of Early Fed.

We would like to thank C. Y. Chen, Wenchih Lee, two anonymous referees and the seminar participants at the 2000 FMA annual meeting for their helpful comments and encouragement. All of the remaining errors are our responsibility.