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Amidst the turbulent tides of geopolitical uncertainty and pandemic-induced economic disruptions, the information technology industry grapples with alarming attrition and aggravating talent gaps, spurring a surge in demand for specialized digital proficiencies. Leveraging this imperative, firms seek to attract and retain top-tier talent through generous compensation packages. This study introduces a holistic, integrated theoretical framework integrating machine learning models to develop a compensation model, interrogating the multifaceted factors that shape pay determination.

Drawing upon a stratified sample of 2488 observations, this study determines whether compensation can be accurately predicted via constructs derived from the integrated theoretical framework, employing various cutting-edge machine learning models. This study culminates in discovering a random forest model, exhibiting 99.6% accuracy and 0.08° mean absolute error, following a series of comprehensive robustness checks.

The empirical findings of this study have revealed critical determinants of compensation, including but not limited to experience level, educational background, and specialized skill-set. The research also elucidates that gender does not play a role in pay disparity, while company size and type hold no consequential sway over individual compensation determination.

The research underscores the importance of equitable compensation to foster technological innovation and encourage the retention of top talent, emphasizing the significance of human capital. Furthermore, the model presented in this study empowers individuals to negotiate their compensation more effectively and supports enterprises in crafting targeted compensation strategies, thereby facilitating sustainable economic growth and helping to attain various Sustainable Development Goals.

The cardinal contribution of this research lies in the inception of an inclusive theoretical framework that persuasively explicates the intricacies of a machine learning-driven remuneration model, ennobled by the synthesis of diverse management theories to capture the complexity of compensation determination. However, the generalizability of the findings to other sectors is constrained as this study is exclusively limited to the IT sector.

The purpose of this paper is to model the determinants of executive compensation of school district superintendents using structural equation models (SEM). These chief executives have unique characteristics and function in a complex environment, due in part to the political nature of the position. SEM has not been used widely to test archival data using economic theory. The complex environment of superintendent salaries is a test case for the viability of the SEM approach. The success of SEM depends on the development of a strong theoretical base. The theory developed assumes that compensation should be based, in part, on fiscal and academic performance, indicating that accounting-related information including performance measures should be important in this context. In this case, a complex theoretical structure was reduced to a relatively simple model: superintendent salary can be best explained with three direct effects (enrollment, teacher salary, and the local tax percentage) plus indirect effects by including two additional factors (white percentage and percent economically disadvantaged). Performance did not influence salary, suggesting that future superintendent compensation contracts should consider financial- and education-based performance measures.

Multistage amplifiers require a reliable frequency compensation solution to remain stable in a closed-loop configuration. A frequency compensation scheme creates an inner negative feedback loop amongst different amplifying stages and shapes the frequency response such that an unconditionally stable single-pole amplifier results for closed-loop operation. The frequency compensation loop is thus responsible for the placement of the poles and zeros and the final stability of multistage amplifiers. An amplifier incorporating a sophisticated frequency compensation network cannot be, however, analyzed in the presence of a complex ac feedback loop. The purpose of this study is to provide a reliable model for the compensation loop of multistage amplifiers at the higher frequencies.

In this paper, the major part of the amplifier, including a two-port network comprising the compensation network, is characterized using a reliable feedback model.

The model integrates all the frequency-dependent components of the frequency compensation network, and it can evaluate the nondominant real or complex poles of an amplifier.

The reliability of the proposed model is verified through analysis of the frequency response of the amplifiers and by comparing the analytic results with the simulation results in standard CMOS process.

This study examines the relationship between management compensation, earnings and cash flows. The preponderance of prior research reveals a substantial correlation between total earnings and compensation. However, the popular press indicates that many firms have switched to less traditional methods of awarding executive compensation. For example, Chrysler Corporation now bases substantial compensation on quality control in manufacturing while First Chicago bases compensation on the minimizing of loan losses. Because of their relatively high debt levels in the late 1980s, some firms are stressing cash flows in designing compensation plans. For example, the New York Times [2/25/90, p.29 in Section 3] reports that RJR Nabisco Inc. uses cash flows to compute the bonus pool while The Wall Street Journal [4/18/90, p. R26] indicates that board of directors often dump income‐based fixed compensation formulas in favor of performance goals such as cash flows. From a normative viewpoint, Holmstrom's [1979] analysis suggests that a performance evaluation scheme based on multiple signals is superior to one that is based on a single signal, provided the additional signals incorporate new information. Given these anecdotal reports indicating cash‐flow based compensation and the implications of existing theory, we explore the role of cash flows and working capital from operations in addition to total reported earnings in determining managerial compensation.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of private investor's fair preference on the governmental compensation mechanism based on the uncertainty of income for the public-private-partnership (PPP) project.

Based on the governmental dilemma for the compensation of PPP project, a generalized compensation contract is designed by the combination of compensation before the event and compensation after the event. Then the private investor's claimed concession profit is taken as its fair reference point according to the idea of the BO model, and its fair utility function is established by improving the FS model. Thus the master-slave counter measure game is applied to conduct the behavior modeling for the governmental compensation contract design.

By analyzing the model given in this paper, some conclusions are obtained. First, the governmental optimal compensation contract is fair incentive for the private investor. Second, the private fair preference is not intuitively positive or negative related to the social efficiency of compensation. Only under some given conditions, the correlation will show the consistent effect. Third, the private fair behavior’s impact on the efficiency of compensation will become lower and lower as the social cost of compensation reduces. Fourth, the governmental effective compensation scheme should be carried out based on the different comparison scene of the private claimed portfolio profit and the expected revenue for the project.

This study analyzes the effects of private investor's fair preference on the validity of governmental generalized compensation contract of the PPP project for the first time; and the governmental generalized compensation contract designed in this study is a pioneering and exploratory attempt.

The purpose of this paper is to improve the positioning accuracy of 6-Dof serial robot by the way of error compensation and sensitivity analysis.

In this paper, the Denavit–Hartenberg matrix is used to construct the kinematics models of the robot; the effects from individual joint and several joints on the end effector are estimated by simulation. Then, an error model based on joint clearance is proposed so that the positioning accuracy at any position of joints can be predicted for compensation. Through the simulation of the curve path, the validity of the error compensation model is verified. Finally, the experimental results show that the error compensation method can improve the positioning accuracy of a two joint exoskeleton robot by nearly 76.46%.

Through the analysis of joint error sensitivity, it is found that the first three joints, especially joint 2, contribute a lot to the positioning accuracy of the robot, which provides guidance for the accuracy allocation of the robot. In addition, this paper creatively puts forward the error model based on joint clearance, and the error compensation method which decouples the positioning accuracy into joint errors.

It provides a new idea for error modeling and error compensation of 6-Dof serial robot. Combining sensitivity analysis results with error compensation can effectively improve the positioning accuracy of the robot, and provide convenience for welding robot and other robots that need high positioning accuracy.

The purpose of this paper is to establish a rigid–flexible coupling model of wind turbine disc brake to simulate the actual working condition of the wind turbine brake and to study the dynamic characteristics of the compensation mechanism under different friction coefficients and braking force. It provides reference for the structure design and optimization of the compensation mechanism (compensation brake wear) in the wind turbine brake.

Based on multi-body contact dynamics theory, the rigid‒flexible coupling dynamic model of wind turbine brakes with compensation mechanism is established, in which the contact process of the components in the compensation mechanism and the phenomenon of rotation and return are described dynamically, and the rotation angle of the compensation nut and the axial displacement response of the compensation screw are calculated under different parameters.

The analysis results show that the braking reliability of the brake compensation mechanism can be effectively improved by increasing the friction coefficient of threads or increasing the friction of push rod contact surface; increasing the braking force can also improve the reliability of brake compensation mechanism, but when the braking force comes over a critical value, the effect of braking force on the reliability of the brake is very small. The braking test verifies the effectiveness of the simulation results.

Analyzing the influence of compensation mechanism on braking reliability in the braking process is of great practical significance for improving the braking efficiency and process safety of wind turbine brake.

The purpose of this paper is to extend our understanding of CEO compensation by looking into the CEO pay‐setting process. Particularly, a process model is proposed to specify the interaction between situational indicators, process variables, contextual factors and CEO pay.

A modest review the major theories that are driving the field of CEO compensation study reveals several interesting findings. These models or perspectives provide valuable but incomplete understanding of the multifaceted phenomenon. Especially, the realm of CEO pay‐setting process is still unexplored. A process model of CEO compensation is developed to fill in this gap.

CEO compensation is a negotiation between a CEO and a principal. Negotiated CEO pay is better predicted by CEO aspirations and principal reservations, rather than economic indicators. CEO power and the institutional environment have a moderating effect.

The study suggests that a better theory is critically in demand in order to improve effectiveness of corporate governance. This paper underscores that a real challenge for a principal in influencing CEO pay is to anticipate CEO aspirations and to monitor the gaps between CEO aspirations and principal reservations, rather than to control economic indicators. Unfortunately, until now there has been very limited information about principal reservation and CEO aspiration.

This inquiry seeks to make a difference by moving CEO compensation research into a fruitful direction. To our knowledge, this inquiry is the first attempt that provides systematic explanation as to how and why situational indicators do not directly influence the negotiated CEO pay. The newly proposed model is much realistic, much integrative and much dynamic, compared with existing conceptualizations. Eight propositions are presented to guide empirical research as well as future theory development.

The authors analyze the association between the functional background of the compensation committee chair and CEO compensation. The analysis is motivated by the continuing debate about the reasonableness of executive pay patterns and the growing emphasis on the role of compensation committees.

The authors define three expert categories—accounting, finance, and generalist—and collect data on the compensation committee (CC) chairs of the S&P 500 firms from 2008 to 2018. The authors run an ordinary least square model and regress CEO total and cash compensation on the three expert categories.

The authors find that firms in which the CC chair has expertise in accounting, finance, and general business favor performance measures that are more aligned with accounting, finance, and general business, respectively. There is little evidence that CC chairs who are CEOs of other firms endorse more generous pay for the host CEO; the authors find some evidence that CC chairs tenure relative to the host CEO's is negatively associated with the level of the CEO's pay.

This study suggests that firms and regulators should consider the background of the compensation committee chair to understand the variations in top executive.

Companies desiring to link executive compensation to particular areas of strategy must also consider matching the functional background of the compensation committee chair with the target strategy areas. From regulatory standpoint, requiring compensation committees to operate independent of inside directors can reduce attempts by inside directors to skim the process, but a failure to also consider the impact of compensation committees' discretion over the pay-setting process can distort the executives' pay-performance relation.

This is the first study to examine the effects of the functional background of the compensation committee chair on CEO compensation.

We investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and a firm's financial performance in the insurance industry to determine CEO pay policies that are more effective in promoting specific financial corporate goals.

Considering different components of executive pay, we investigate the latter’s relationship with the corporate performance of the insurance industry using the generalized method of moments (GMM) model developed for dynamic panel estimation. Our data encompasses the periods before and after the 2008 financial crisis.

We observe that after the crisis the insurance industry experienced a major change in executives’ compensation packages. While CEOs’ compensation was primarily based on bonuses pre-crisis, the average size of the bonus was reduced to one-third of the level, stock awards and nonequity incentives were doubled and option awards increased almost 70 percent in the post-crisis period. It is also evident that the work experience of CEOs and the firm's financial performance play a significant role in determining CEO compensation. As the CEO becomes more experienced, stock awards and option awards replace cash bonus.

The paper finds supporting evidence for the agency-related problem in the insurance industry and the convergence of interest hypothesis, suggesting that a firm's market valuation rises as its managers own an increasingly large portion of the firm. To align the interest of owners with that of management, managers should be converted into owners via stock ownership. The paper addresses a topical issue regarding pay and performance and the effect of the financial crisis in the insurance industry.