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This study aims to explore the relationship between the degree of state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) mixed reform and the environmental response of enterprises, against the background of actively promoting the reform of mixed ownership in China.

The study is conducted on a sample of A-share listed manufacturing companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen of China, investigated for the period 2015 to 2020. The baseline regression results are robust to a series of robustness and endogeneity tests. To deal with the issue of endogeneity, the technique of instrumental variable method has been applied.

The study confirms the U-shaped effect of the depth and restriction of mixed ownership on SOEs’ environmentally responsive behaviour in the manufacturing industry, especially for lower environmental regulation and higher level of risk-taking firms. The findings indicate that the government, shareholders and other stakeholders of enterprises should not simply consider that the mixed reform is directly promoting or reducing the environmental response behaviour of enterprises.

SOEs should improve their shareholding structures to undermine performance enhancement at the expense of the environment and increase environmentally beneficial behaviours. Regulators and governments should improve the institutional mechanism of environmental regulation and make efforts to promote corporate awareness of the environment.

Although the adoption and implementation of environmentally friendly policies are costly, improved environmental response and other social responsibilities are helpful to corporate long-term growth and reputation and obtain more capital market attention. Therefore, firms would benefit from improving their environmental response to protect nature, as well as to enjoy the economic and social benefits of a better environmental response.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is a lack of studies focussing on the environmental behaviour of SOEs of mixed reform. As the mixed reform in China has come to a climax phase in recent several years, SOEs of mixed reform is an ideal environment for research. The study focusses on manufacturing firms as these firms are more susceptible to contribute to environmental pollution, exploitation of natural resources and labour concerns.

The purpose of this paper is to explore financial quality problems, based on the dynamics of the ownership structure, in the privatization process to clarify the internal relation among the ownership’s attribution of the commercial mixed ownership company, the company’s performance and its financial relationships. This paper also examines the mixed ownership enterprise’s potential problems during the development process.

Adopting the single case study method, the authors selected the mixed ownership public company Hubei Sanxia New Building Materials Co., Ltd. (stock code: 600293) to explore, from a privatization perspective, the impact of mixed ownership on financial quality.

The study found that Sanxia experienced tight cash flow and heavy debt burdens due to the privatization and that its controlling shareholders used non-operating income to support Sanxia, thus characterizing the dual role of “the grabbing hand” and “the helping hand.” Sanxia’s privatization process highlighted the volatility of performance, the exception of monetary funds and the existence of accounting fraud rather than the prosperous development of the capital combination.

These findings provided case support that privatization negatively affects the financial quality of the company. Previous studies have indicated that there should be greater focus more on the issue that state-owned shares rebound during the process of privatization and that, with respect to commercial mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, such reform must avoid the passive transfer of corporate control, ensure the fairness of the related transactions, prevent the loss of state-owned assets and preclude the controlling shareholders from seizing interests of listed companies.

This study examines the impact of China’s mixed-ownership reform on the innovation of non-state-owned acquirers, with a particular focus on the impact on firms with high financing constraints, low-quality accounting information or less tangible assets.

We use a proprietary dataset of firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges to investigate the impact of mixed ownership reform on non-state-owned enterprise (non-SOE) innovation. We employ regression analysis to examine the association between mixed ownership reform and firm innovation.

The study finds that non-state-owned firms can improve innovation by acquiring equity in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the reform. Eased financing constraints, lowered financing costs, better access to tax incentives or government subsidies, lowered agency costs, better accounting information quality and more credit loans are underlying the impact. Additionally, cross-ownership connections amongst non-SOE executives and government intervention strengthen the impact, whilst regional marketisation weakens it.

This study adds to the literature on the association between mixed ownership reform and firm innovation by focussing on the conditions under which this impact is stronger. It also sheds light on the policy implications for SOE reforms in emerging economies.

This research examines the effects of firm ownership and size on innovation capability using data from the World Bank China Enterprise Survey (WBCES), which provides directly measurable innovation-related variables. Key consideration is given to the role and innovation capability of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) compared with domestic and foreign private enterprises in the Chinese economy.

In its quest for technological self-reliance and a new developmental path, China is focusing on its enterprise innovation capability.

The findings suggest that SOEs and domestic private enterprises are similar in terms of innovation participation but differ in terms of innovation diversification, which implies ownership-specific innovative advantages. In general, the authors find that SOEs are more innovative with respect to processes innovation but less so with respect to product, management and promotion innovations. Foreign-owned enterprises are superior in all types of innovation except product innovation.

The authors also find that size is an important determinant of innovation capability, with the effect varying depending on location and industry. Moreover, the joint effect of firm ownership and size on innovation declines with increasing size. These findings provide new insights into the evaluation of China's major policies.

This research examines the effects of ownership and size on enterprise innovation capability, using the WBCES (2013) data, which include direct measurable innovation related variables.

In the context of China’s efforts to build world-class enterprises through mixed-ownership reform, this study aims to build an agency theory framework to analyze the differential relation between ownership structure and firm performance in majority versus minority state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It also evaluates the differential influence that political connectedness has on firm performance in the two types of SOEs.

Using a panel data set of Chinese state-controlled mixed-ownership enterprises covering the period 2010–2019, this paper uses ordinary least squares, random-effects, fixed-effects and three stage least squares regression analysis to study the differential impact of ownership structure and political connectedness on firm performance in majority versus minority SOEs.

In minority SOEs, firm performance is positively related to the ownership share of the largest private shareholder and state ownership positively moderates this relation. Furthermore, minority SOEs with a politically connected chairman perform worse than those with a politically connected chairman. In majority SOEs, there is no relation between the ownership share of the largest private shareholder and firm performance. In addition, majority SOEs with a politically connected chairman perform similar to those without a politically connected chairman.

The theoretical framework demonstrates that agency problems are substantially different in minority versus majority SOEs and that this influences how changes in ownership structure and in the type of chairman that is assigned affect firm performance. The empirical analysis confirms these predictions.

Since the core issue of Chinese economics is to elucidate the logical relationship between socialism and the market economy, it necessitates a robust foundation for microeconomic analysis to uncover the behavioral patterns and characteristics of microeconomic agents in a socialist market economy and identify the conditions and methods for the functioning of market mechanisms.

The core issue of microeconomics with Chinese characteristics is to identify the economic logic of how market mechanisms play a decisive role in resource allocation under the basic socialist economic system based on China's reform.

The core issue in building the foundation of microeconomic analysis of Chinese economics is addressing the compatibility issue between SOEs and a market economy.

In the author’s view, this can be achieved under the logic of classified reform so as to build the microeconomic foundation for the effective functioning of a socialist market economy.

Against the background of actively promoting the reform of mixed ownership in China, this study regards government ownership in private sector enterprises (PSEs) as an important political connection mechanism and examines private holding listed companies in high-polluting industries that sold China A-shares from 2012 to 2019.

Using regression models such as Tobit and negative binomial estimation, the research empirically examines the impact of government ownership in PSEs on the corporate fulfillment of their environmental responsibilities.

Government ownership can effectively promote PSEs to fulfill their environmental responsibilities. Government ownership, as a corporate-level political connection mechanism, enables the government to provide firms with more environmental protection subsidies and environmental tax incentives, encouraging firms to fulfill their environmental responsibilities. When considering the policy risks faced by PSEs, government ownership effectively reduces the impact of policy uncertainty on firms’ fulfillment of environmental responsibilities. Additionally, verifying the economic development level of the city in which the firm is located makes the positive impact of government ownership on fulfillment of environmental responsibilities of PSEs in regions with lower economic development levels more significant.

Unlike existing studies that generally use the personal political identity of entrepreneurs to measure the political connections of PSEs, this study regards government ownership in PSEs as an important political connection mechanism. It provides a useful reference for China to formulate environmental protection policies for PSEs.

The primary objective of introducing nonstate ownership into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is to enhance corporate performance. This study explores how nonstate ownership affects corporate performance, emphasizing agency costs as the primary mechanism.

Using data from 2010 to 2019 for listed SOEs, the authors measure nonstate ownership based on shareholding ratios, control rights and shareholding–control matching. The authors also use fixed-effects and mediation-effects models, with agency costs as the primary mechanism.

Increased nonstate shareholding ratios, stronger control rights and improved shareholding–control matching promote SOE performance. Nonstate shareholding ratios boost performance through resource effects, while control rights and shareholding–control matching promote performance by mitigating agency costs. A heterogeneity analysis indicates stronger effects in local SOEs and highly marketized regions. Moreover, control rights and shareholding–control matching reinforce the positive impact of shareholding ratios on performance.

The mixed-ownership reform of Chinese SOEs aims to optimize shareholding and control structures between state and nonstate shareholders. Therefore, research on the impact of nonstate shareholding ratios, control rights and shareholding–control matching on corporate performance is highly pertinent. However, existing studies have focused on the effects of single factors on performance, without exploration of the economic implications of shareholding–control matching. This study not only prioritizes the optimization of shareholding and control structures but also underscores the importance of granting nonstate shareholders control rights proportionate to their shareholding, providing critical evidence of the value of improving SOEs' ownership structure.

This study aims to disclose how the nature of corporate ownership, stock efficiency and wage level affect the optimal proportion of employee stock.

This paper studies three duopoly markets: two private enterprises, two state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and a private enterprise and an SOE. The competitions between the two parties are taken as a two-stage dynamic sequential game and studied through back-induction.

The results reveal that the enterprise ownership has a directly bearing on the optimal proportion of employee stock and determines whether to implement the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) and the specific level of the plan. The optimal proportion of employee stock is positively correlated with its contribution to enterprise efficiency. There are many influencing factors on the effect of wage level on the optimal proportion of employee stock, namely, the ownership nature of ESOP implementer and efficiency difference of different nature stocks.

The results of this study provide policy recommendations for companies preparing to implement ESOP.

The research findings provide policy implications for enterprises to prepare a suitable ESOP and the reform of national equities, especially the mixed-ownership reform in China.