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This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports and uses the system dynamics model to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, aiming to promote the development of foreign trade of film copyright and innovation and development of the film industry so as to improve the overall social benefits of the film industry and provide policy enlightenment for enhancing the import power of foreign core enterprises to introduce domestic film copyrights.

In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports is constructed, the evolution process of cooperation strategy is derived, the impact of innovation income coefficient, mixed incentive policy and single incentive policy on the evolution results is analyzed, and the system dynamic model is used to simulate to find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.

The results show that export-oriented core firms are more sensitive to mixed incentives, while import-oriented core firms respond more quickly to single incentives. The large innovation income coefficient has a negative impact on the willingness of import-oriented core enterprises to cooperate. The study proposes measures to increase the willingness of core companies to participate.

Due to the fact that numerical simulation is based on simulation, there may be a certain gap between it and the actual situation. Therefore, it is necessary to further use actual data to conduct empirical analysis on the theoretical model.

This article mainly focuses on analyzing the impact of strategy choices and related parameters of various entities on the incentive mechanism and studying the foreign trade cooperation strategies of film copyright export enterprises under policy support from a theoretical model perspective. Furthermore, research has proven that in order to effectively enhance the willingness of foreign import core enterprises to participate in the foreign trade of domestic film copyrights, the government needs to coordinate the use of single incentive policies and mixed incentive policies. This study provides a major contribution for policymaker to develop film copyright import and export trade.

Based on the research conclusions, this paper puts forward management countermeasures to further improve the development of the film copyright import and export trade. The first is to enrich government incentive methods and stimulate the vitality of film copyright and foreign trade market entities. The second is to guide the core enterprises of film copyright export to increase investment in innovation and stimulate the endogenous driving force of industrial development. Finally, lengthen the foreign trade industry chain of film copyright and increase the income of film derivatives.

Firstly, this paper applies the research methods of evolutionary game and system dynamics simulation to the field of foreign trade research on film copyright and expands the research perspectives and methods of the film industry. Secondly, by analyzing the “cost-benefit incentive” relationship of the evolutionary game of government export-oriented core enterprises and importing core enterprises, an evolutionary game model is constructed, the quantitative point of tripartite interest decision-making is solved and the research object of the evolutionary game method is expanded. Finally, the system dynamics model is used to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate an underexplored aspect of outsourcing involving a mixed strategy in which parallel production is continued in-house at the same time as outsourcing occurs.

The study applied a multiple case study approach and drew on qualitative data collected through in-depth interviews with wood product manufacturing companies.

The paper posits that there should be a variety of mixed strategies between the two governance forms of “make” or “buy.” In order to address how companies should consider the extent to which they outsource, the analysis was structured around two ends of a continuum: in-house dominance or outsourcing dominance. With an in-house-dominant strategy, outsourcing complements an organization's own production to optimize capacity utilization and outsource less cost-efficient production, or is used as a tool to learn how to outsource. With an outsourcing-dominant strategy, in-house production helps maintain complementary competencies and avoids lock-in risk.

This paper takes initial steps toward an exploration of different mixed strategies. Additional research is required to understand the costs of different mixed strategies compared with insourcing and outsourcing, and to study parallel production from a supplier viewpoint.

This paper suggests that managers should think twice before rushing to a “me too” outsourcing strategy in which in-house capacities are completely closed. It is important to take a dynamic view of outsourcing that maintains a mixed strategy as an option, particularly in situations that involve an underdeveloped supplier market and/or as a way to develop resources over the long term.

The concept of combining both “make” and “buy” is not new. However, little if any research has focussed explicitly on exploring the variety of different types of mixed strategies that exist on the continuum between insourcing and outsourcing.

Crime games cannot be simply read with mixed strategies. These strategies are inconclusive of how the players act rationally. This is undeniably true for the crime of tax evasion, where dishonest taxpayers are rational agents, motivated by the comparison of payoffs, when considering the risk of non-compliance. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate that in the presence of a small “private disturbance” of the players’ payoff, the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies provides us with the necessary information on equilibria in pure strategies that will be played.

In tax-evasion games, an equilibrium must necessarily be interpreted in pure strategies, and the only way to do this is to insert some private information into the game and reinterpret it in a Bayesian scheme. We show that taxpayers’ private,subjective considerations on the effective implementation of the penalty and the revenue agency’s private information on the cost of monitoring and conviction can lead to Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies. The present paper takes issue with this Bayesian equilibrium and the implications for comparative-statics results.

In this context, tougher sentencing deters crime, although, as the Italian experience teaches, the necessary condition required is the certainty of punishment and the ability of the government to enforce it. The equilibrium strategies with incomplete information reveal whether it is convenient for the two agents to maintain their “private disturbance” as private information or, on the contrary, it is convenient to expect it to be “common knowledge.”

A distinct set of studies has adopted a game theoretic approach and shows that the standard economic approach to crime deterrence inspired by Gary Beker’s seminal paper might be flawed. See, among others, Saha and Poole (2000), Tsebelis (1989) and Andreozzi (2010). This paper shows that a greater severity of the penalty and a higher certainty of punishment (a lower possibility of appealing against sanctions and no discounts on due penalties) necessarily lead to a unique Bayesian equilibrium without evasion.

This paper attempts to analyze the relationship between the complementarity degrees of imperfect complementary products and sales strategies and give appropriate sales strategies for a two-stage supply chain.

With respect to two-stage supply chain consisting of two manufacturers who produce imperfect complementary products and one retailer who sells the products, aiming at bundling sales strategy, the authors define complementarity elasticity of products and use it to measure the degree of complementary between two products. Based on Stackelberg game and cooperation, the authors analyze the relationship between the complementarity degrees of imperfect complementary products and appropriate sales strategies.

As the impact of complementarity degree on sales strategy decision-making is better, the authors can pinpoint out which sales decision-making is optimal and which bundling sales strategy is the best for a two-stage supply chain. Considering that the degree of complementarity has a significant impact on the product sales strategy, the authors can point out which sales decision-making is optimal, that is, which bundled sales strategy is the optimal in the secondary supply chain of selling complementary products.

An innovative bundling can expand the sales of existing products and new products. It helps a retailer transcend and defeat competitors by reducing marketing expenses while increasing profits. Proper use of bundling can improve consumers utility and create an overall positive effect for both the enterprises and consumer.

The research can help some retailers to make many appropriate bundling sales strategies.

This chapter focuses on the empirical research on the resource-based view of the firm (RBV), and its main purpose is to analyse the use of mixed methods in this perspective. The recent advance of the RBV has posed new challenges, and the issue need not be quantitative versus qualitative methods, but rather how to combine the strengths of each in a mixed methods approach. This study carries out a literature review about the use of mixed methods in the RBV and provides an examination of opportunities and challenges associated with the application of mixed methods in order to improve RBV research. Moreover, the chapter seeks to introduce mixed methods research in order to familiarize to strategic management and the RBV scholars about this type of research and its terminology, procedures, designs and purposes.

The purpose of this paper is to set the scene for this special issue by synthesising the vast array of literature to examine what constitutes mixed methods research, and the associated strengths and risks attributed to this approach.

This paper takes the form of a literature review. The authors draw on extensive methods research from a diverse range of social science disciplines to identify and explore key definitions, opportunities and risks in mixed methods studies. They review a number of accounting studies that adopt mixed methods research approaches. This allows the authors to analyse variance in how mixed methods research is conceptualised across these studies and evaluate the perceived strengths and limitations of specific mixed methods design choices.

The authors identify a range of opportunities and challenges in the conduct of mixed methods research and illustrate these by reference to both published studies and the other contributions to this special issue.

With the exception of Modell's work, there is sparse discussion of the application and potential of mixed methods research in the extant accounting literature.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate and identify the price sensitivity of consumers of three- and five-star hotels and to determine the impact of bundling strategies on consumers’ price sensitivity.

To calculate price sensitivity, authors apply the van Westendorp’s price sensitivity meter (PSM). To understand the impact of bundling strategies, univariate and bivariate techniques are applied.

PSM results reveal the optimal prices and the range of acceptable prices for three- and five-star hotel. The bundling strategy results reveal that five-star customers are less sensitive to mixed-leader bundling. Regarding mixed-joint bundling, managers could improve sales through bundling strategies if they selected an attractive service (e.g. restaurants).

Findings assist hotel managers to understand the different price sensitivities, according to the hotel typology. Managers can manage prices without the risk of losing market share or revenue. The results help managers in deciding which bundling strategies they can create, as well as the services to be included to achieve highest profitability.

No research to date to the best of the authors’ knowledge has attempted to understand and compare the role of bundling strategies in three- and five-stars hotels. Moreover, no research has attempted to measure and compare customers’ price sensitivity of three- and five-stars hotels.

The twenty-first century is noted globally as the urban century because more than half of the world's population lives in cities. This population is projected to increase to 70% by 2050. South Africa is no exception to this phenomenal increase in urban population. More than 60% of South African population lives in urban areas, and this figure is projected to increase to 71.3% and 80% by 2030 and 2050, respectively. Access to human settlement by this teaming population remains a challenge. The problem of access to human settlement is compounded by historical apartheid's spatial geography characterized by racial segregation, fragmentation of urban space and separate development. During the apartheid period, settlement patterns were designed and planned in accordance with racial differentiation. This resulted in fragmented, segregated and dysfunctional residential settlements pattern that forced many people to travel long distances between place of work and home. Since 1994, the various housing policies, programmes and legislations have not been able to find solution to the spatial challenges that South Africa faces. The objective of this book is to investigate and unravel mixed-income housing development planning strategy and how this housing typology with a new framework can bring about spatial integration, inclusive cities, improved access to services and the promotion of social cohesion and economic inclusion. This book utilized the case study research design and employed the Delphi method for the investigation. The findings reveal that proper coordination across all sectors of government and good working relationship between the private and public sectors will increase the sustainability of mixed-income housing development. This study also supports existing theory that mixed-income housing might not be able to bring about the overall social integration, and solve all housing problems but has the unique tendency and potential in the South African case to address spatial imbalances by increasing the affordability of low-cost housing. This book concludes that there is need for both inter-sectoral and intergovernmental collaboration as well as proper coordination/adequate urban planning policies to address the increasing human settlement challenges in South Africa and for effective implementation of mixed-income housing development.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a practical method to be used in team decision making when allocating resources.

The paper proposes the following hypothesis: the selected team consensus strategy from among all available strategies must have minimum sum of squares of monetary regrets. A general algebraic representation of the above hypothesis is developed.

This hypothesis can be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium involving mixed strategies when the entire problem is viewed in game theoretic framework. The paper provides an explanation in quantitative terms of the reasoning process pursued by five business college department chairs faced with three strategies, in an actual consensus decision making to illustrate the above hypothesis. By making observations of the behavior of decision makers in the selection of a budget allocation formula, the paper shows that the hypothesis holds true for the specific reasoning process pursued by the chairs in arriving at the consensus solution. However, the chairs' consensus solution is found to be a local solution vis‐à‐vis the global optimal solution found by solving the game theoretic model.

The authors plan to conduct further empirical testing of the hypothesis using allocation strategies found in diverse decision‐making environments involving diverse decision makers such as business executives, government officers, education administrators, and others.

If this hypothesis can be validated to be true, decision makers should propose for consideration only those rational strategies that have minimal or low variance in monetary regrets since these are the strategies that would most likely be selected in team decision making.

Team decision making involving resource allocation abounds in all organizations, at all levels and in diverse applications. The practical procedure proposed in this paper, based on analytical foundation of game theory, provides decision makers a viable tool for allocating resources that results in consensus of all rational parties involved.