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This study aims to explore the relationship between the degree of state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) mixed reform and the environmental response of enterprises, against the background of actively promoting the reform of mixed ownership in China.

The study is conducted on a sample of A-share listed manufacturing companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen of China, investigated for the period 2015 to 2020. The baseline regression results are robust to a series of robustness and endogeneity tests. To deal with the issue of endogeneity, the technique of instrumental variable method has been applied.

The study confirms the U-shaped effect of the depth and restriction of mixed ownership on SOEs’ environmentally responsive behaviour in the manufacturing industry, especially for lower environmental regulation and higher level of risk-taking firms. The findings indicate that the government, shareholders and other stakeholders of enterprises should not simply consider that the mixed reform is directly promoting or reducing the environmental response behaviour of enterprises.

SOEs should improve their shareholding structures to undermine performance enhancement at the expense of the environment and increase environmentally beneficial behaviours. Regulators and governments should improve the institutional mechanism of environmental regulation and make efforts to promote corporate awareness of the environment.

Although the adoption and implementation of environmentally friendly policies are costly, improved environmental response and other social responsibilities are helpful to corporate long-term growth and reputation and obtain more capital market attention. Therefore, firms would benefit from improving their environmental response to protect nature, as well as to enjoy the economic and social benefits of a better environmental response.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is a lack of studies focussing on the environmental behaviour of SOEs of mixed reform. As the mixed reform in China has come to a climax phase in recent several years, SOEs of mixed reform is an ideal environment for research. The study focusses on manufacturing firms as these firms are more susceptible to contribute to environmental pollution, exploitation of natural resources and labour concerns.

The purpose of this paper is to explore financial quality problems, based on the dynamics of the ownership structure, in the privatization process to clarify the internal relation among the ownership’s attribution of the commercial mixed ownership company, the company’s performance and its financial relationships. This paper also examines the mixed ownership enterprise’s potential problems during the development process.

Adopting the single case study method, the authors selected the mixed ownership public company Hubei Sanxia New Building Materials Co., Ltd. (stock code: 600293) to explore, from a privatization perspective, the impact of mixed ownership on financial quality.

The study found that Sanxia experienced tight cash flow and heavy debt burdens due to the privatization and that its controlling shareholders used non-operating income to support Sanxia, thus characterizing the dual role of “the grabbing hand” and “the helping hand.” Sanxia’s privatization process highlighted the volatility of performance, the exception of monetary funds and the existence of accounting fraud rather than the prosperous development of the capital combination.

These findings provided case support that privatization negatively affects the financial quality of the company. Previous studies have indicated that there should be greater focus more on the issue that state-owned shares rebound during the process of privatization and that, with respect to commercial mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, such reform must avoid the passive transfer of corporate control, ensure the fairness of the related transactions, prevent the loss of state-owned assets and preclude the controlling shareholders from seizing interests of listed companies.

This study examines the impact of China’s mixed-ownership reform on the innovation of non-state-owned acquirers, with a particular focus on the impact on firms with high financing constraints, low-quality accounting information or less tangible assets.

We use a proprietary dataset of firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges to investigate the impact of mixed ownership reform on non-state-owned enterprise (non-SOE) innovation. We employ regression analysis to examine the association between mixed ownership reform and firm innovation.

The study finds that non-state-owned firms can improve innovation by acquiring equity in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the reform. Eased financing constraints, lowered financing costs, better access to tax incentives or government subsidies, lowered agency costs, better accounting information quality and more credit loans are underlying the impact. Additionally, cross-ownership connections amongst non-SOE executives and government intervention strengthen the impact, whilst regional marketisation weakens it.

This study adds to the literature on the association between mixed ownership reform and firm innovation by focussing on the conditions under which this impact is stronger. It also sheds light on the policy implications for SOE reforms in emerging economies.

State ownership has been common especially in industries with restricted competition. In Russia, state-controlled firms represent around 41 percent of the market value of all listed firms (Deloitte, 2015). Yet, there is a significant gap in the literature regarding the effects of various forms of government control in listed firms. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by exploring the impact of the complexity of state ownership and competition on the performance of Russian listed firms.

The sample consists of data for 72 firms (360 firm-years) in the Russian MOEX broad market index during 2011–2015. The complexity of state ownership is captured by studying forms of state control including majority/minority, direct/indirect, federal/regional, mixed structures and golden shares.

The authors find significant differences in performance relating to different forms of state ownership. State control is negatively related to firm valuation and the sales/employees ratio. Performance is weakest when state ownership takes the form minority, regional or direct ownership. State control through golden shares typically outperforms other state-controlled firms. The authors find indications of employment prioritization beyond the economical optimum. In addition, the relation between state ownership and profitability becomes positive in sectors where state firms appear to enjoy lower competition.

While the effects of state ownership have been studied on many markets, there is a lack of studies on the effects of different forms, or the complexity, of state ownership beyond direct and indirect ownership. The authors contribute to the literature on the performance effects of state ownership by studying a multitude of forms of governmental ownership as well as the role of competition in Russia. Especially the profitability of state-controlled firms is significantly affected by industry characteristics. Implications of the results are discussed both from firm and policy maker perspectives.

This study aims to disclose how the nature of corporate ownership, stock efficiency and wage level affect the optimal proportion of employee stock.

This paper studies three duopoly markets: two private enterprises, two state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and a private enterprise and an SOE. The competitions between the two parties are taken as a two-stage dynamic sequential game and studied through back-induction.

The results reveal that the enterprise ownership has a directly bearing on the optimal proportion of employee stock and determines whether to implement the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) and the specific level of the plan. The optimal proportion of employee stock is positively correlated with its contribution to enterprise efficiency. There are many influencing factors on the effect of wage level on the optimal proportion of employee stock, namely, the ownership nature of ESOP implementer and efficiency difference of different nature stocks.

The results of this study provide policy recommendations for companies preparing to implement ESOP.

The research findings provide policy implications for enterprises to prepare a suitable ESOP and the reform of national equities, especially the mixed-ownership reform in China.

This paper aims to review the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China and analyzes the role of the Chinese Government in the progress of the SOE reform. It provides suggestions to better guide the direction of further reforms of the SOEs in China.

This paper reviews the historical path of the SOE reform in China and analyzes the underline policy implication associated with the reform.

The success of the function-oriented SOE reform depends on the transformation of governmental functions. Only with the linkage of governmental functions reform can we change the existing pattern of economic development, build a solid foundation for the socialist market economy and achieve the final triumph.

This paper provides suggestions to better guide the direction of further reforms of the SOEs in China.

The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate how opportunity for control and firm capability interact to moderate the amount of risk that managers associate with various international entry‐mode strategies. A secondary goal is to investigate how managers perceive the need to retain control over three core functional areas (marketing, production, and R&D) when making entry‐mode decisions.

A field experiment design was implemented in a sample of US business owner/executives. Using an online data collection method, the study asked a sample of small‐business owners and managers to assess the amount of risk they associated with three modes of entering the Japanese market: non‐ownership (export), equal partnership (50/50 joint‐venture), and sole‐ownership. They were also asked how much control they needed to retain over R&D, production, and marketing for the venture to be successful.

Ownership‐provided control interacts with capability to influence managerial risk perceptions. Managers in lower‐capability firms see the least risk in the non‐ownership entry mode while those in higher‐capability firms see the least risk in the equal‐partnership entry mode. Managers believe that for a new venture in a foreign market to be successful, control should be retained over the R&D function, regardless of entry mode.

The findings appear to reconcile some of the conflicting predictions of the transaction cost and resource‐based theoretical perspectives, because it appears that international managers consider both control (internationalization theory) and capability (resource‐based theory) when judging the perceived risk of an entry strategy.

For firms that are incapable of managing in an international context, a low‐control no‐ownership entry mode is perceived as the least risky approach; for firms that have some capability for international management, then a partial‐ownership mode such as a 50/50 joint‐venture is perceived as having lower risk than no‐ownership. In non‐ownership and joint‐venture type entry modes, managers are more apt to outsource the marketing function to an agent/partner, but not R&D. In contrast, managers believe that marketing needs to be maintained in‐house when utilizing a sole‐ownership entry mode.

By illustrating the role of perceived risk in foreign‐market entry‐mode decisions and demonstrating how capabilities interact with ownership‐provided control to moderate these perceptions, the paper's findings suggest that managers' risk perceptions may mediate the effects of firm‐specific factors, and thus contributes significantly to both theory and practice.

This paper seeks to examine the impact of ownership structure on firm performance and the default risk of a sample of publicly listed firms.

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on firm performance and the default risk of a sample of 59 publicly listed firms in Jordan from 1989 to 2002.

The main findings were: ownership structure has significant effects on the accounting measure of performance return on assets (ROE); government shares are significantly negatively related to the firm's performance ROE; defaulted firms have a high concentration ownership compared with non‐defaulted firms and also high foreign ownership firms have a low incidence of default; government ownership is significantly negatively related to the firm's probability of default; both mix and concentration ownership structure data can be used to predict the probability of default as the largest five shareholders (C5) and government ownership fraction (FGO) are significantly negatively correlated with the probability of the default. These results further suggest that reducing government ownership can increase a firm's performance but will also cause some firms to go bankrupt, at least in the short term.

This paper provides useful information on the impact of ownership structure on firm performance and the default risk of a sample of publicly‐listed firms.

This chapter aims to answer whether foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) operating within the Chinese context differ from indigenous firms on several essential labor standards indicators: white- and blue-collar salaries, pension insurance, and working hours. In drawing upon neo-institutional and organizational imprinting theories and applying these to the Chinese context, the study addresses competing arguments regarding the expected effects of ownership type on these indicators. We employ seemingly unrelated regressions (SURs) to empirically examine a novel national survey of 1,268 firms in 12 Chinese cities. The regression results show that foreign MNCs do not provide uniquely beneficial labor practice packages to workers when compared with various indigenous firm types, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs), affiliate businesses of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, and domestic private enterprises (DPEs). Specifically, although MNCs provide relatively higher wage rates, they underperform relative to SOEs concerning social insurance. However, DPEs consistently underperform relative to MNCs across most indicators. The mixture of the results contributes important nuances to the application of neo-institutional and organizational imprinting theories to the Chinese context.

As a major theoretical breakthrough of the Marxist political economy based on the practice of China’s reform and opening up, the theory of socialist market economy constitutes an important part of the political economy of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

Its essence is that socialism (as a social system) and market economy (as a resource allocation mechanism) can be organically integrated to exert the advantages of both at the same time and generate new institutional and systematic advantages.

It has condensed many important theoretical viewpoints, involving major theoretical and practical issues, such as the relationship between the government and the market, the basic economic system, the income distribution system, the operation of the market economy and the opening up to the outside world, which have become the basic principles of socialist political economy with Chinese characteristics.

The new practice of comprehensively deepening reform and building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way is bound to provide an impetus to the deepening and systematization of the theory of socialist market economy.