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This paper investigates state auditors’ decisions regarding the isolation or projection of sample misstatements to underlying sample populations. Seventy-eight state auditors completed four treatment cases that incorporate the complete 2×2 manipulation of intentional/unintentional and systematic/non-systematic misstatements in different case scenarios, enabling a test of the independent variables both across and within case scenarios.

The results indicate that both across and within case scenarios, auditors tend to project systematic misstatements more often than they project non-systematic misstatements. However, the auditors’ isolation/projection decisions are generally not influenced by whether the sample misstatements are intentional or unintentional.

We examine the relationship between tax-related accounting misstatements and changes in the uncertain tax benefits accrual account in the year of the disclosure of a misstatement. We find that the disclosure of a tax-related misstatement is associated with an increase in unrecognized tax benefits during that year. We show that the increase in unrecognized tax benefits in the year of disclosure is from uncertain tax positions taken in prior periods. Overall, this finding is consistent with increase in financial reporting conservatism upon disclosure of tax-related accounting misstatement.

Part IV provides readers with the extant requirements for the application of materiality to recognition, measurement, presentation, and disclosure in the financial statements. This part also includes a detailed critical review of the recent Practice Statement on materiality, the FASB’s proposed ASU on the notes and the amendments to the Conceptual Framework proposed by the IASB and the FASB.

The part expands to issues that are typical of Management Commentary, including the SEC guidance on materiality in Management Discussion and Analysis.

It informs about the complexities and subtle differences between financial statements and bookkeeping and the different standards of reasonableness versus materiality.

A section moves from materiality to material misstatements and covers the application of materiality in auditing.

Another section goes in depth on internal control over financial reporting, showing the linkages between materiality and risk appetite and risk tolerance and the related application guidance.

Part V analyzes the details of how to assess materiality. It first tackles qualitative versus quantitative criteria and the role of professional judgment. It then analyzes the selection of quantitative threshold, to expand to the choice of benchmarks. It contrasts the whole financial statements with subaggregates, line items, and components.

Specific sections contrast IASB, FASB, SEC, and other guidance on materiality applied to comparative information, interim reporting, and segment reporting.

The section on estimates mingles complex guidance coming from accounting, auditing, and internal control over financial reporting to explain how the management can improve its assessment of materiality concerning estimates.

After explaining the techniques to move from individual to cumulative misstatements, the part tackles verification ex post, and finally summarizes the intricacies of whether immaterial misstatements are permissible and their consequences.

Auditors should realize misstatements and communicate to managers for adjustments. Managers usually modify the misstatements, but they have motivations, like earnings management, for not altering the misstatements. The auditor expects to identify the misstatements’ earnings management, inform the managers and reduce earnings management by proposing adjustments. This study aims to determine whether identified and adjusted misstatements cause a decline in earnings management. Is the increase in the materiality of identified and adjusted misstatements associated with a reduction in earnings management?

The identified and adjusted misstatements are obtained from the difference between nonaudited financial statements and audited ones. Earnings management is computed using the adjusted Jones model, and the quantitative materiality threshold has also been calculated based on the Iranian auditors’ guidelines. These variables and other required information were gathered for 159 listed firms on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2014–2019 and examined by the regression models.

The results show a negative relationship between identified and modified misstatements of total assets and earnings management and a positive and significant relationship between identified and adjusted misstatements of total liabilities and earnings management. However, the positive relationship between identified and adjusted misstatements of net income with earnings management is not significant. Besides, the relationship between the materiality difference and an absolute value of identified and adjusted misstatements (materiality minus the absolute value of misstatements) of total assets and earnings management is positive and significant, but the negative association between materiality difference and the absolute value of identified and adjusted misstatements of total assets and earnings management is not significant. The relationship between materiality difference and the absolute value of identified and adjusted net income and earnings management misstatements is negative and significant. These results indicate that the more material the identified and adjusted misstatements, the less earnings management.

The difference between nonaudited and audited financial statements represents identified and adjusted misstatements (audit adjustments). The client probably made some adjustments, but separating these adjustments from the auditor’s identified items was impossible with the available data.

The results show that significant audit adjustments decline earnings management. Paying more attention to a high-quality audit performed by the audit firms, auditors, managers and users and, consequently, discovering misstatements and adjusting or reporting them would decline the earnings management’s unfavorable impacts.

The unfavorable consequences of earnings management can cause the inappropriate transfer of wealth in the capital market and some investors’ loss to others’ benefit. These consequences can cause a loss of trust and leave unfavorable psychological effects on the capital market and society. Identifying and adjusting significant misstatements can lead to the decline of such impacts.

The previous studies assessed the relationship between identified and adjusted misstatements (audit adjustments) and earnings quality or earnings management. However, this study focuses on audit adjustments’ materiality to assess the impact of significant adjustments on earnings management.

This study examines the effects of key audit matter (KAM) disclosures in auditors' reports on auditor liability in cases of fraud and error misstatements using evaluators with audit experience.

The experiment is conducted using 174 professional auditors as participants.

The participating auditors assess higher auditor liability when misstatements are related to errors rather than when they are related to fraud. In addition, the results also demonstrate that KAM disclosures reduce auditor liability only in cases of fraud and not in cases of errors. Together, the results support the view that KAM reduces the negative affective reactions of evaluators, which in turn, reduce the assessed auditor liability.

This study did not analyze the setting in which auditors who act as peer evaluators had an opportunity to discuss the case among their peers, which may have affected their judgments.

The results of KAM disclosures on auditor liability in cases of error and fraud misstatements inform auditors that, different from the auditors' concern that disclosing KAM may increase auditors' legal risk, it tends to decrease or at least have no impact on the liability judgment.

This study contributes to the accounting literature by adding findings on another aspect of KAM in different audit settings, particularly, in the Thai legal environment with different types of undetected misstatements. The current conflicting results on how KAM disclosures affect auditor liability warrant further investigation of this issue in other audit contexts in different countries.

From the sociolinguistic perspective, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether the honorific and actual-name appellations that Chinese auditors use to address clients in audit reports connote differential financial misstatement risk. Specifically, the authors hypothesize that auditors’ use of honorifics signals their inferior social status relative to their clients, thereby leading to compromised auditor independence, lower audit quality, and higher financial misstatement risk.

The authors use a sample of manually coded appellation data from audit reports of Chinese public firms between 2003 and 2012 to conduct the research.

The authors find significantly greater financial misstatements, both in terms of likelihoods and magnitudes, for companies addressed by honorifics than for those addressed by actual names. Moreover, compared to auditors’ consistent honorific usage, discretionary honorific usage has a stronger positive association with misstatements. The authors further show that the positive association between honorific usage and client misstatement risk weakens when the audit firm is a Top 10 accounting firms in China, is an industry specialist, is formed as a partnership, or resides in a more concentrated audit market.

This study contributes to the sociolinguistics literature in accounting and provides evidence supporting the reform proposed by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board to enhance the usefulness of audit reporting.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of qualitative materiality factors on auditors’ assessment of materiality and the determination of the type of the auditors’ reports. This paper also analyzes whether differences in personal characteristics of auditors can influence their use of qualitative materiality factors in assessing material misstatements.

A questionnaire and experimental case studies were undertaken to determine whether differences in personal characteristics of auditors can influence their degree of reliance on qualitative factors in assessing the materiality of detected misstatements. Descriptive and statistical tests were used to analyze the data collected.

The results of this paper show that qualitative materiality factors strongly influence the auditor’s materiality judgments. However, no significant differences were found regarding the effects of auditors’ personal characteristics on the degree to which they rely on the qualitative factors in their materiality judgments. Also, in certain situations, auditors considered factors other than the income for assessing certain misstatements as material and consequently modified their audit reports.

This paper examines the influence of qualitative factors on auditors’ materiality judgments and develops a list of qualitative factors to be considered by auditors when assessing materiality. It also concludes that the nature of misstatement is the least important qualitative factor considered by auditors when assessing materiality of detected misstatements and that the existence of more explicit or standardized qualitative materiality guidelines would lead to a more uniform judgment among auditors.

This study aims to examine the mediating effects of corporate governance mechanisms like the board of directors on the association between disruptive technology adoption by audit clients and the risk of material misstatements, including inherent risk and control risk. In particular, the authors study the mediating effects of board characteristics such as board size, independence and gender diversity.

Based on a sample of 100 audit clients listed on the FTSE 100 from 2015 to 2021, this study uses structural equation modelling to test the research objectives.

The findings indicate a significant and negative association between disruptive technology adoption by audit clients and inherent risk. However, there is no significant evidence observed for control risk. The utilisation of disruptive technology by the audit client has a significant impact on the board characteristics, resulting in an increase in board size, greater independence and gender diversity. The authors also find strong evidence that board independence mediates the association between disruptive technology usage and both inherent risk and control risk. In addition, board size and gender exhibit distinct and differential mediating effects on the association and across the two types of risks.

The study reveals that the significant role of using disruptive technology by audit clients in reducing the risk of material misstatements is closely associated with the board of directors, which makes audit clients place greater emphasis on the construction of effective corporate governance.

This study offers essential primary evidence that can assist policymakers and standard setters in formulating guidance and recommendations for board size, independence and gender quotas, ensuring the enhancement of effective governance and supporting the future of audit within the next generation of digital services.

With respect to relevant stakeholders, it is imperative for audit clients to recognise that corporate governance represents a fundamental means of addressing the ramifications of applying disruptive technology, particularly as they pertain to inherent and control risks within the audit client.

This study contributes to the existing literature by investigating the joint impact of corporate governance and the utilisation of disruptive technology by audit clients on inherent risk and control risk, which has not been investigated by previous research.

This exercise provides comprehensive coverage of audit materiality, assessing inherent risk, and allocating tolerable misstatement appropriate for an undergraduate auditing course. The Delphi method could be an appropriate tool in any accounting setting where the learning goals involve judgment, consensus, or learning through group interaction.

This chapter describes a classroom exercise that required students to establish planning materiality, assess inherent risk associated with balance sheet accounts, and allocate tolerable misstatement using a modified application of the Delphi method. Additionally, the exercise calls attention to group processing skills and the role played by professional judgment in planning an audit. We assigned students to five-person audit teams and through a series of Delphi rounds asked them to establish planning materiality and assess the inherent risk associated with each balance sheet account for a fictitious company. Students prepared a matrix, both individually and as a team, that compared each statement account to every other account to determine which account in each pairing they viewed as having higher inherent risk. As a final step, they allocated tolerable misstatement mathematically for each account based on pairing results.

The result was a consensus of opinion and an early attempt at forming professional judgment. The students’ responses to a debriefing questionnaire and the results of a pre-/post-test suggest that the learning objectives of the exercise were met.

The specific learning objectives of the exercise were to help students understand the concepts of tolerable misstatement and planning materiality, the elements of inherent risk, the Delphi method for reaching group consensus, the need to work as a team, and the importance professional judgment plays in the audit process. The result was a consensus of opinion and an early attempt at forming professional judgment. The students’ responses to a debriefing questionnaire and the results of a pre-/post-test suggest that the learning objectives of the exercise were met.