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The purpose of this paper is to analyse supply chain network management (SCNM) in the context of emergency preparedness management (EPM). The results of this study revealed that civil-military relations are essential for EPM to function as a coordinated approach to safety and security, and are necessary to respond effectively to complex emergencies and mitigating threats to developed countries. Civil-military relations are still a concern in the context of communication, the exercise of authority, and the coordination of emergency supplies (ES) to emergency operations.

This qualitative study is based on field observations, with attention focused on the EPM of Sweden, Finland, and Poland. The analysis of a broader SCNM through EPM was supported by semi-structured interviews among civil-military actors in Sweden, information collected from informal conversations known as “hanging out”, and secondary materials. Empirically, the analysis included a variety of civil-military relationships and identified implications for management, policy, and planning that are applicable to developed countries.

The management of civil-military relations is a meaningful resource when used as an overall approach for safety and security. The integration of civil-military relations in EPM in the planning of ES is a long-standing and complex matter. The management of Swedish civil-military relations in EPM is recognising that implications for management are imbedded in continuous policy changes in, for example, the Swedish policy history. Civil-military relational complications that arise in the field of operations are impossible to anticipate during emergency planning, as those complications are grounded in policy changes.

Escalating threats to developed countries are highlighted. The study underlines the primary measures used in studying military involvement in EPM. An understanding of SCNM as a choice for management can be obtained in future research that focuses on a broader role of the military in EPM. Sweden has emphasised a clearer role for the military by reactivating total defence planning and by evolving common practices and processes with civil actors in civil defence. Meanwhile, Poland and Finland are increasing their focus on supporting the management of civil-military policies on safety and security regarding communication, authority, and developing coordination. Consistent with findings from previous reports on SCNM, civil-military relations are essential for EPM. This study confirmed the importance of civil-military coordination, the management and practice of authority, and shared forms of communication.

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the long-term trend of professionalization of the military and the civil–military relations of modern Korea. It reviews the patriarchal relation between the king and the military officer in ancient Korea and how the patron–client relations of a parochial society have continued between the political ruler and the military of modern Korea. The history of modern Korea is examined according to the level of development and the nature of civil–military relations. The Korean military has gradually changed from a parochial army to a professional one, and the civil–military relations of modern Korea have been normalized.

The United States of America is on the verge of a possible revolution in civil-military relations in an era marked by increased defensive alertness stemming from the attacks of 11 September 2001. As we anticipate the normalization of terror as a way of life, we are witnessing a paradigmatic shift from the use of violence towards some political end to the use of violence as an end in itself (Jenkins, 2001). 1 It is tempting to frame our analysis in terms of the broader notion of asymmetric warfare, since the arguments we make in this paper may be applied to a wide range of settings, including those in which vastly unequal forces are pitted against one another and one side may make use of irregular fighters employing unconventional tactics. However, this would serve only to shift the emphasis away from our central argument. Terrorism may be a form of asymmetric warfare, but what distinguishes it is the fact that it intentionally targets civilians, and that among civilians, it is indiscriminate in the devastation it wreaks. Terrorism is important because of the way in which it socializes danger, breaking down the barriers between combatant and noncombatant and subjecting all to the worst of harrowing and potentially lethal attacks. It is this socialization of danger produced by terrorism, in turn, that is critical in assessing whether and how civilian and military authorities elect to treat its use against their own societies not as a crime, but as an act of war. Bioterrorism in turn, as we argue below, has unique attributes that distinguish it from other forms of terrorism.1 And where, for most nations, homeland defense is the primary mission of the armed forces, the United States had to establish a new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security due to the primarily expeditionary nature of American armed forces for the past half-century. The military has been a unique institution in modern societies. It has acted as the agent for the state’s possession of a monopoly on the means of large-scale organized violence and war-making. The establishment of a second executive agency responsible for homeland security makes the equation more complex. As a result, ever greater attention must be given to the balance of civil-military relations in American society.

In 1969, Warren Nutter left the University of Virginia Department of Economics to serve as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Nixon administration. During his time in the Defense Department, Nutter was deeply involved in laying the groundwork for a military coup against the democratically elected president of Chile, Salvador Allende. Although Nutter left the Pentagon several months before the successful 1973 coup, his role in Chile was far more direct than the better-known cases of Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, James Buchanan, and Arnold Harberger. This chapter describes Nutter’s role in Chile policymaking in the Nixon administration. It shows how Nutter’s criticisms of Henry Kissinger are grounded in his economics, and compares and contrasts Nutter with other economists who have been connected to Pinochet’s dictatorship.

This chapter focuses on the development of concordance theory with respect to India's civil–military relations and Pakistan's early yet significant state of discordance, which led to subsequent domestic military interventions. On a regional level, discordance is far more prevalent, and India operates in a South Asian environment where domestic military interventions are not uncommon – Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka being clear examples.

Moreover, the influence of China in the region cannot be overlooked, since India's defense policy is often a reaction to the role of China and the presence of conventional and nuclear forces. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular, threatens a delicate balance in a highly volatile region where China exerts enormous influence on neighboring states including Pakistan. An argument can be made that India's domestic concordance between the military, the political elites, and the citizenry contributes to the preservation of regional stability, because India has chosen to maintain its regional strength vis-à-vis China and Pakistan, while continuing to search for a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue with allies such as the United States. India's most recent and ongoing nuclear deal with the United States originally struck in 2005 is an example of the delicate synergies taking place to offset potential threats from China, Pakistan, and Iran, while maintaining domestic military and technological strength.

Although India's successful domestic course encourages partnerships among international political and corporate allies, Pakistan's continuous domestic discordance has resulted in recent difficult relations with the United States, India, and Afghanistan. Pakistan's inability to quell al-Quaeda extremism has contributed to a lack of domestic confidence in General Musharraf's political agenda. Musharraf has continued the discordant political and social relationship begun by his predecessor Ayub Khan. As a result of Khan's initial and dramatic alienation of the East Bengali community, Pakistan's military and political elites have never recovered the domestic credibility needed to partner with other political groups and the citizenry – a credibility so vital to domestic concordance and international foreign policy.I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all the lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any.– Mahatma Gandhi

The EU harmonisation has created changes in the military's formal and informal influence in the directions of decreased formal and informal military influence in civilian politics. The EU reforms have created changes in the mindset of the citizens, by creating changes in the security culture of the citizens and in the civil-military related political culture. The desired level of alignment has not been reached. Therefore, the study examines the areas where further alignment is required. Moving from Rebecca L. Schiff's concordance theory, the article examines the relationship between the Turkish military, the civilian politics and the society before and after the EU harmonisation process. It examines the effects of the EU harmonisation process on the changes in the civil-military balance of power, and on the related security culture and political values. The analysis focuses on: (i) increased civilian control and consequent changes in the policy of accountability; (ii) transparency building in the defence sector; (iii) parliamentary oversight; and (iv) the change in the political culture related to the civil-military issues. It also investigates the extent the EU harmonisation has achieved in building democratic civil-military relations in order to align with the EU standards.

After the Korean War, South Korean politics was dominated by national security concerns. Reversing Carl von Clausewitz's well-known dictum, in South Korea, “politics is the continuation of war by other means.” Until the late 1980s, politics in South Korea was far from democratic. South Korea had five direct presidential elections (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007) and six national assembly elections (1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008) after the democratic transition of 1987. In 1992, a civilian candidate, Young Sam Kim, was elected president. Young Sam Kim (1993–1998) prosecuted and punished former generals turned presidents Doo Hwan Chun (1980–1988) and Tae Woo Roh (1988–1993) for corruption, mutiny and treason in 1995. Dae Jung Kim (1998–2003) was elected president in 1997. For the first time in South Korean political history, regime change occurred between a ruling party and an opposition party.

In this chapter, the change and continuity of civil–military relations through the fluctuating dynamics of the democratic transition and consolidation in South Korea is examined. A positive consolidation of democratic reform is one that, while securing indisputable civilian supremacy, grants the military enough institutional autonomy for the efficient pursuit of its mission. Civilian supremacy should be institutionalized not only by preventing military intervention in civilian politics but also by ensuring civilian control over the formation and implementation of national defense policy.

In sum, despite three terms of civilian presidency, civilian supremacy has not yet fully institutionalized. Although significant changes in civil-military relations did occur after the democratic transition, they were not initiated by elected leaders with the intention of establishing a firm institutional footing for civilian supremacy. South Korea's political leaders have not crafted durable regulations and institutions that will sustain civilian control over the military.

More than six decades, Korea is still divided. The most highly militarized zone in the world lies along the demilitarized zone. How to draw the line prudently between seeking national security and promoting democracy shall be the most delicate task facing all the civilian regimes to come in South Korea. That mission will remain challenging not only for civilian politicians but also for military leaders.

Relations between the People's Republic of China and Latin America have gradually expanded from commerce and finance to cover different aspects of security. The purpose of this article is to provide an overview over security cooperation between China and South America. Specifically, it analyses the motivations for security cooperation on both sides and its value added for Sino–South American relations.

The article describes four dimensions of security cooperation between China and South America: functional cooperation, defence diplomacy, long-term cooperation initiatives and arms sales. For each dimension of security cooperation, the main motivations on the two sides are discussed, together with the value added of security cooperation to the “comprehensive and cooperative partnership” China's policy papers on Latin America and the Caribbean have called for.

Security and defence considerations have not caused the development of Sino–South American security cooperation. Instead, it were the rapidly growing economic links from the 2000s on that facilitated China's broader political engagement with South America, including in the field of security. There are a number of important motivations that indicate security cooperation between China and South American states will further expand in the future.

Security cooperation should not only be practiced as an end in itself but also serve tangible outcomes to reduce insecurity.

In the context of Sino–Latin American relations, security cooperation has received relatively little attention beyond a comparatively small group of pundits despite the fact that military diplomacy has become increasingly important in bolstering China's growing international profile. This article makes an original contribution in discussing four dimensions of security cooperation between China and South America.

This study is aimed at assessing the ROC military using the PMMM according to the perceptions of the citizens of Taiwan. The patterns that can be detected in Taiwan’s military show that it paradoxically spans three distinct stages: the modern, late modern, and postmodern. Taiwan’s is a modern military in terms of perceived threat, force structure, major mission definition, and civilian employees. It can be regarded as more of a late-modern model in the dimensions of dominant military professional, public attitude, and women’s role. Lastly, it achieves a postmodern designation as regards the role of spouses, homosexuals, conscientious objection, and media relations. In all, this paints a picture of a fractured military culture: one between two worlds. This should not be surprising: to many in Taiwan, Taiwan itself is a fractured culture, seeking to define its identity, and find its place in the world, and in history. In the dimensions in which Taiwan rates as a modern military, we can see this is driven by external factors. The geopolitical scenario in which the nation finds itself, that is, under threat of invasion by a numerically and technologically superior foe, is very much a pre-Cold War scenario. It exhibits a late-modern model in the dimensions of public attitude and women’s role, and a postmodern model when it comes to the role of spouses, homosexuals, conscientious objection, and media relations – all factors that are related primarily to how the military interacts with the society it protects. Thus, we have a bifurcated profile. The ROC military must, as it does, focus on a modern-era threat perception, just as it must, as it does, focus on a postmodern-era approach to women and homosexuals in the military.

In the 21st century, disputes between military and civilians are to occur in the arena of security or defense policies. The civil–military relations of Korea might be shifted from the political conflicts between political elites and military leaders to the democratic governances of the military sector.

This chapter examines the existence of civil–military gap in the perceptions or attitudes on the security or defense issues. The samples are classified into six subgroups. The military is classified into “commissioned officers (COs) and non-commissioned officers (NCOs)” and “conscripted soldiers,” and the civilians into four subgroups according to sex and age. There is not much acute or urgent, serious civil–military gap in the analysis. Sometimes the perceptional gap rather resides between the male and the female or between the youth and the elder generation than in between the military and the civilian. But there are some differences in perceptions and attitudes between the military and civilians. These are related to the interests of national security affairs, to the military threat from North Korea, and to the confidence in the defense management. Owing to their different life conditions, the perceptional differences between civilians and military are inevitable to some degree. But to develop better civil–military relations and to enhance the consensus in the national security issues in the 21st century, institutionalizing the democratic governance might be necessary. It is recommended to have more discussions between the military and civilians, to share more information about the security issues, to increase transparency in the defense management, and to have more participation of the civilians in the security sector.