Search results

Presented at the “Disarm! For a Climate of Peace,” meeting held on September 30 – October 3, 2016 in Berlin and organized by the International Peace Bureau.

In the aftermath of the global economic crisis, the pursuit of new perspectives and different growth models is imperative. One of the most significant trends of our time is the rise of Asia in the world economy. After centuries of Western economic dominance, China, India, and the rest of the East, alongside emerging economies more broadly, are beginning to challenge the West for positions of global industry leadership and underlying managerial philosophies and perspectives. In this paper, I review some key philosophical insights from Asia that have underpinned the success of many Asian businesses for generations, hoping that it will encourage more efforts – conceptually, theoretically, and empirically – leading the discourse on fresh new perspectives on business in emerging economies in general, and on Asian management in particular.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the social, economic and demographic determinants of rural households' risk perception of farmer–herder (FH) conflicts in Nigeria. The paper also investigates two aspects of FH conflict risk perception relating to food production and physical insecurity.

A FH conflict risk perception model is constructed and tested using exploratory factor analysis (EFA), ordinary least squares (OLS) and seemingly unrelated regression equation (SURE) models. The study uses cross-sectional data from 401 rural households in Nigeria.

Results show that in addition to economic determinants like farm size, land ownership and crop diversity, socio-demographic variables like age and number of languages spoken are significant predictors of household risk perception of FH conflict. Second, although gender and frequency of FH conflict have no significant effect on the risk perception of FH conflict, there is a significant moderating effect of frequency of FH conflicts on the influence of gender on the risk perception of FH conflict. Third, findings also highlight the important predictors of the risk perception of FH conflicts relating to food production and physical insecurity.

Findings give insight into policies targeted at influencing the risk behaviour of rural households. This is important to aid the development of efficient risk management initiatives.

Donald Trump entered the presidency in 2017 with an electoral mandate to reduce US military involvement around the world and to abandon the trade and investment treaties that empowered global corporations. Yet he mostly continued the foreign policies adopted by previous administrations. In recent decades, those policies have increasingly served particularistic elite interests at the expense of the US ruling class as a whole, and they have also been unsuccessful in stemming the decline of US imperial power. This chapter explores the factors that explain this continuity of policy. In analyzing the reasons for policy stasis, it offers an analytical basis to evaluate what might change under President Biden. It also assesses what strategies might be most effective for those who hope to resist US militarism and to undermine the US capacity to enforce a hegemony based on rapacious capitalism.

Many analyses point to Trump's behavior on the world stage – bullying and racketeering more reminiscent of a mafioso than a statesman – as a personal character flaw. We argue that, while this behavior was shocking in how unvarnished it was, Trump marks the culmination of a decades-long trend that shifted US foreign policy from a regime of “legitimate protection” in the mid-twentieth century to a “protection racket” by the turn of the twenty-first. While the temperaments of successive presidents have mattered, the problems facing the United States and its role in the world are not attributable to personalities but are fundamentally structural, in large part stemming from the contradictions of US attempts to cling to preeminence in the face of a changing global distribution of power. The inability of successive US administrations – Trump and Biden included – to break out of the mindset of US primacy has resulted in a situation of “domination without hegemony” in which the United States plays an increasingly dysfunctional role in the world. This dynamic has plunged the world into a period of systemic chaos analogous to the first half of the twentieth century.

This chapter explores how military landscapes have been conceptualised and understood. The chapter starts by defining what is meant by the terms ‘landscape’ and ‘military’. The chapter then proceeds with an exploration of a range of examples from a variety of disciplinary origins in order to support the argument that military landscapes constitute a diversity of sites and have a ubiquity of occurrence. Such examples include battlefields and other sites of conflict, the interconnections between landscapes and the pursuit of specific campaigns and conflicts, the issue of environmental impacts of military activities and the interpretation of these with reference to the specificity of landscapes, and landscapes of memory and military memorialization. The chapter then goes on to consider how military landscapes can be viewed, raising questions about the visibility and invisibility of such sites. The chapter concludes with some observations about the imperative for sustained scholarly attention to military landscapes, in order to inform debates about militarism as a social force.

Democratic renewal in Sri Lanka as well as a cross the Global South depends on strengthening democratic social movements within varieties of patrimonial capitalism. Patrimonial capitalism, emphasising patron–client relations, coincide with weakening democratic institutional cultures and practices. The dominant corruption/anti-corruption narrative is bracketed with elite class strategies aimed at negotiating a ‘managed corruption’. The realm of representative politics creating consent for patrimonial capitalism is shaped by: ethnic and class relations; the weakening of working-class parties; patriarchal cultures within parties; links with criminal networks; opaque finances and the integration of mainstream media with party patronage.

Democratising the realm of representative politics points towards democratic social movements. The internal dynamics of social movements, their relationships with political parties and collective learning are significant factors that shapes the strategic orientation of social movements. State repression of social movements highlights the need for demilitarisation and the abolition of prisons. The global sense of this local struggle relates to transforming financial markets and platform economies towards notions of financial and digital commons. The integration of different realms of politics, such as representative, movement, life and emancipatory politics, is vital for reinforcing solidarity as the basis for counter-hegemonic struggles.

The goal of this chapter is to reexamine the nature and structure of the military–industrial complex (MIC) through the works of John Kenneth Galbraith. MIC, or military power as he prefers, is a coalition of vested interests within the state and industry that promoted the military power in the name of “national security” for their interests. Galbraith’s theory of giant corporations helps us understand the role of military corporations in the MIC. Moreover, he is a critical scholar in examining this topic because he was a political insider in the Roosevelt, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations and a prominent public intellectual against the Vietnam War. Against this background, this chapter has three parts. After explaining the development of military Keynesianism with respect to the main economic thoughts, it examines the history of the MIC and its impact on economic priorities during and after the Cold War through Galbraith’s works. Finally, this chapter discusses MIC’s relevancy today and evaluates Galbraith’s prophecies.

One of the central themes of education for all (EFA) for the last two decades has been empowerment through access to education. The history of EFA, however, can at best be termed as checkered. EFA has been relatively successful in drawing world attention and improving access to education. However, the question whether world attention and improved access has resulted in empowerment of people in the developing world still remains unanswered.

In this paper we argue that the limited success of EFA can best be examined and analyzed by paying close attention to tension between demands of the global capital and labor market place and nationalist agendas of the developing (post-colonial) state. These tensions affect the EFA agenda in the developing countries in complex ways.

Taking empirical-educational data from Pakistan we demonstrate that demands of the global capital and the labor market had resulted in an increased attention on institutions and programs of study that cater to the needs of the global capital and labor pool. Access to these institutions is limited to certain strata of the society. On the other hand the mass education program in Pakistan is largely defined by the nationalistic agenda of the post-colonial undemocratic state. A net impact of the interplay of these global and national dynamics is that not only the EFA's aim of mass education is hampered but also more importantly education in its present state is not empowering the recipients.