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The paper outlines and examines a social‐institutional conception of income inequality or economic distribution. The fundamental proposition of this conception is that income inequality/distribution is far from being the outcome of the operation of strictly market laws or economic forces but rather one of institutional arrangements or social structures. Of the latter particularly important have shown to be the institutional structure of the economy, particularly labour markets, as well as the degree of democracy of political systems. The results suggest transcending single‐factor economic explanations and predictions of income inequality, as implied in the Kuznets curve and its ramifications, in favour of an alternative multilevel sociological approach.

In this chapter we present an indicative exemplar of continuity between economics and sociology. This exemplar involves Adam Smith and Max Weber, two major protagonists in the establishment and development of economics and sociology. The point of departure is that Weber's work implies substantial continuities or serendipitous points of overlap with Smith's. The major continuity lies in Weber's elaboration and specification of Smith's political economy into social economics. This is epitomized by Weber's extension of Smith's implicit ‘economic sociology’ or ‘sociological economics’ dealing with the social setting of the economy into an explicit social economics, as an analysis of the ‘sociological categories of economic action’. There is some gap in exploring this continuity in the present literature on the history of economic thought and methodology, and this chapter contributes toward spanning this gap.

This article’s indented contribution is to provide novel theoretical insights and empirical observations on “who gets what” in the way of incomes, including wages. The article challenges the conventional wisdom about stratification, especially power and status, as an outcome or function of economic distribution. It posits that income distribution is conditional on pre‐existing social stratification expressed in antecedent differences in class, power, status and related factors.

To reexamine the Weber Thesis pertaining to the relationship between ascetic Protestantism – especially Calvinism – and modern capitalism, as between an economic “spirit” and an economic “structure,” in which the first is assumed to be the explanatory factor and the second the dependent variable.

The chapter provides an attempt to combine theoretical-empirical and comparative-historical approaches to integrate theory with evidence supplied by societal comparisons and historically specific cases.

The chapter identifies the general sociological core of the Weber Thesis as a classic endeavor in economic sociology (and thus substantive sociological theory) and separates it from its particular historical dimension in the form of an empirical generalization from history. I argue that such a distinction helps to better understand the puzzling double “fate” of the Weber Thesis in social science, its status of a model in economic sociology and substantive sociological theory, on the one hand, and its frequent rejection in history and historical economics, on the other. The sociological core of the Thesis, postulating that religion, ideology, and culture generally deeply impact economy, has proved to be more valid, enduring, and even paradigmatic, as in economic sociology, than its historical component establishing a special causal linkage between Calvinism and other types of ascetic Protestantism and the “spirit” and “structure” of modern capitalism in Western society at a specific point in history.

In addition to the two cases deviating from the Weber Thesis considered here, it is necessary to investigate and identify the validity of the Thesis with regard to concrete historical and empirical instances.

The chapter provides the first effort to systematically analyze and distinguish between the sociological core and the historical components of the Weber Thesis as distinct yet intertwined components.

The rediscovery and analytical reconstitution are present tendencies in much of social science, especially economics and sociology. The emergence and expansion of the so‐called new institutional economics exemplify these tendencies as do attempts at revival and rehabilitation of the old institutional economics. Analogous tendencies have been manifested in sociology by the further development of economic sociology, especially by various reformulations of its classical premise of institutional structuration and embeddedness of economic behavior. Nevertheless, much of mainstream economics tends to neglect or play down certain salient divergences between the latter's neoclassical or orthodox institutionalism, and heterodox or critical institutionalism advanced by the old institutional economics as well as by economic sociology. Identifies and elaborates such divergences between these seemingly homologous varieties of institutionalism. Since institutionalist varieties and tendencies in both economics and sociology are considered, represents a contribution to an interdisciplinary treatment of social institutions, a treatment originally proposed by the old institutional economics of Veblen et al., the German historical school as well as by Weberian‐Durkheimian classical economic sociology.

The paper argues in favor of reestablishing sociological or social economics as a legitimate discipline of economic science. Conspires toward undertaking analyses of the social co‐determination of economic behaviors, variables and systems. Suggests the need for incorporation of sociological/social economics in the existing semi‐official (JEL) taxonomy of economic fields and subjects. The argument for sociological economics can be made on two grounds: ontological or empirical‐historical and epistemological or theoretical‐methodological ones. The article bases the argument for sociological economics on the former, i.e., the empirical‐historical social co‐determination of the economy. The relations of sociological economics to sociology of economics are specified and the implications of sociological/social economics for modern economic science are also discussed.

The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the impact of conservatism on political liberty and liberal democracy in contemporary society. It applies Weber's description of capitalism as the “most fateful” social force in modern society to analyzing conservatism in relation to political liberty and liberal democracy. The paper posits and finds that conservatism primarily (with secondary variations) negatively impacts political liberty and so modern liberal democracy. Alternatively, it argues and shows that conservatism almost invariably generates political repression and elimination or subversion of liberal democracy and society. It concludes that conservatism, especially in America, becomes from the “most fateful” to the “most fatal” social force on the account of its adverse impact on political liberty and democracy.

The paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of conservatism and its essentially destructive effects on political liberties and liberal democracy in contemporary society.

The paper finds that conservatism, especially in America, becomes from the “most fateful” to the “most fatal” social force on the account of its adverse impact on political liberty and democracy.

The paper posits and finds that conservatism primarily (with secondary variations) negatively impacts political liberty and so modern liberal democracy. Alternatively, it argues and shows that conservatism almost invariably generates political repression and elimination or subversion of liberal democracy and society.

The paper considers whether and how Calvinism as a specific type of religion, ideology, and social system impacts political democracy in modern society. In contrast to the previous sociological and related literature assuming only a positive or negative linear effect, the paper proposes that Calvinism exerts mixed positive-negative and non-linear effects on democracy. The purpose of this paper is to aim at making a contribution to the sociological theory and research on Calvinism and democracy and modern society in general.

A combination of comparative and historical sociological methodology.

The main proposition and finding is that whether Calvinism is likely to have a positive or negative impact on democracy is the function of its specific position within social structure and its concrete phase of development. Thus, different positions of Calvinism in social structure are linked to its differential consequences in aggregate for democracy, and various stages of its development to time-variable non-linear effects in sequence.

This is a relatively novel finding innovating and expanding on the literature's assumption that Calvinism has a structurally uniform, either positive or negative, and linear, time-constant effect on democracy.