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This chapter develops a community perspective on entrepreneurialization and demonstrates the epistemic value of community-based analysis. It focuses on the particularities of socio-economic settings that shape the emergence of social enterprises and allows for a consideration of diverse groups of actors beyond entrepreneurs.

The chapter draws from a literature review on UK policies around social enterprise and an ethnographic study of a deprived community in North-West England. It provides an in-depth account of how competition for scarce funds and the new hope around entrepreneurialism are negotiated and translated into action by policy actors in one local community.

The review contextualizes the evolution of social enterprise in the United Kingdom and highlights the need for grounded analysis of the effects of policies. A range of themes emerge from the ethnographic case: a misalignment between social workers’ and beneficiaries’ expectations and interests; a tendency to shift from holistic welfare to narrow, time-limited interventions; the importance of spatiality for issues of deprivation; and imbalances in the flows of money and attention between different communities.

The chapter questions the emphasis placed upon social enterprise as a source of innovation. The suggested focus on community redirects scholarly debate to the most important group of actors: the socially, politically, or economically excluded target groups of social innovations.

This chapter contributes to our understanding of the roles being played by social enterprises in a community and raises questions about their value as a vehicle of policy and of innovation.

Management buyout (MBO) is a specialized form of acquisition with different motives. Sometimes, there are initiatives taken by the senior management to bailout the firm from sickness. The predominant agency theory focuses only on the governance issues in the MBO firms and this theory can be applied to understand how managerial discretion can play vital roles in mitigating value destruction in the post-MBO firm. A CEO-led MBO is presumed to be greed-driven (Bebchuk, L., Cremers, M., & Peyer, U. (2011). The CEO pay slice. Journal of Financial Economics, 102, 199–221.). But a senior management team-led MBO is said to be a socialistic move. By default, MBOs are debt-driven, unless the buying management team is financially affluent, which may be rare, considering the price for the buyout. Private equity (PE) players play a dominant role in providing and or arranging funds in the form of equity and or debt. There is a notion that the PE investors help promote entrepreneurial and modern management practices. The MBO target firm has to ensure returning the entire money back to the sponsors within the shortest possible time out of the operational cash flow. Therefore, various issues like identifying a target firm, sourcing mix of finance, MBO price determination, value creation and value delivery to all stakeholders are all important for understanding the subject. This chapter attempts to construct a robust model for structuring MBO to ensure value fairness to all parties involved in the transaction.

The author develops a bilateral Nash bargaining model under value uncertainty and private/asymmetric information, combining ideas from axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory. The solution to the model leads organically to a two-tier stochastic frontier (2TSF) setup with intra-error dependence. The author presents two different statistical specifications to estimate the model, one that accounts for regressor endogeneity using copulas, the other able to identify separately the bargaining power from the private information effects at the individual level. An empirical application using a matched employer–employee data set (MEEDS) from Zambia and a second using another one from Ghana showcase the applied potential of the approach.