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The economic and financial crisis, especially the sovereign debt crisis, discovered many deficiencies and weaknesses in the banking sector in the European Union (EU). The need for special surveillance and supervision of cross-border banking cooperation and termination of the toxic link between sovereign debt and banking sector have accelerated the process of forming and establishing a Banking Union (BU). An integrated financial framework has been established in which the European Central Bank (ECB) through the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has a key role and the responsibility for the overall supervision of the banking sector of the euro zone. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and schemes of the Single Deposit Guarantee Mechanism (SDGM) are under the national supervisory authorities while the European Banking Authority (EBA) is responsible for developing the Single Rules. From the new architecture is expected the preservation of the single market and a common currency, breaking “toxic connections” between sovereign debt and banks, mitigation and removal of financial instability and economic growth. The research shows that the BU together with the ECB in a certain sense, also contributes to the normalization of credit and financial conditions in the single mark. Estimates through SSM, conducted by the ECB and the EBA, during, 2014 and 2015 on 107 banks in 21 countries indicate progress toward solvency and resilience of the banking system of the euro area. Despite some initial success the entire project BU seems to have missed on opportunities, resulted in late reactions, and was too complex to be feasible. The political will of national governments to give up sovereignty over its banking sector and transfer competencies to the supranational institutions is a key factor in the success or failure of a BU. It seems so but past experience indicates that there is no political willingness to solve problems. Mainly most of the government avoids cleaning a hidden “skeleton in closets” due to lack of means for recapitalization while some are trying for loans from the ECB to help their banks. The ECB plays a key oversight role at the EU level and has too much power, which can cause risks caused by conflicting goals. The ECB is losing the role of the final refuge of liquidity, which is the main disadvantage of a BU. The SSM is susceptible to criticism due to difficulty in operation because of slow incorporation of European legislation into national law. Slow implementation carries risks of fragmentation of the market, regardless of the responsibility of the ECB. The financial capacity of the temporary agreement with the SRM is insufficient in solving the crisis of more banks while procedural application is complex and time-consuming. Planned backstop with a centralized resource is a resolution that is insufficient for solving the failure of big systemic banks, which are too big to bail. The heterogeneity of the existing Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) and the banking systems of the member states of the euro zone caused controversy in terms of setting of common insurance schemes. The procedures for the recovery and resolution of critical banks are problematic.

Purpose: This chapter focuses on the enterprise’s ethics and social responsibility, which are interdependently resulting in an enterprise’s credibility and better performance. The authors provide a comprehensive tool that can help enterprises and humankind to find a better way toward new economic and social conditions, thus society’s transformation, beginning with the enterprise-level innovation of decisions that originate from the (key) stakeholders’ personal level innovation of decisions. The purpose is to show a possible path toward requisitely holistic enterprises’ governance, management and practice.

Method: The authors use a qualitative methodological approach, based on three relations (the law of requisite holism, the law of hierarchy of succession and interdependence, and the law of entropy) and three elements (10 guidelines defining the subjective starting points and objectives, and 10 guidelines on assuring the agreed policy to survive in latter steps of working process) of Dialectical systems theory. This chapter methodologically also follows the ethics of interdependence. Based on the research, the authors propose to use the supplemented credibility strategy as a possible methodological way of introducing enterprise ethics into practice.

Findings: The authors introduce a supplemented model of the strategy of an enterprise’s credibility. The authors propose using this new model to develop an enterprise’s social responsibility and ethics in a broader sense. The authors focus is on financial institutions’ governance and credibility. The main finding of this chapter is that strong regulation of the financial sector contributes positively to all four dimensions in the strategy of an enterprise’s credibility – if it is requisitely holistic rather than one-sided and short-term.

Originality and Significance of Findings: The strategy of an enterprise’s credibility could be used as a practical implementation tool for (key) stakeholders. They can use the strategy of an enterprise’s credibility to innovate its behavior toward appropriate holistic behavior and sustainable development stimulating. This new tool can lead enterprises toward (more) social responsibility, enterprise ethics and credibility. In applying this theory to financial institutions, the authors find that such financial regulation (and supervision) significantly strengthens multiple dimensions of enterprise credibility. In this regard, the authors find it favorable and encourage such regulation in all enterprises engaged in financial services, including non-bank institutions. Besides, to add to more comprehensive social benefits, the authors find it favorable to encourage similar development in other economic sectors, not the opposite, deregulation.

This chapter discusses the regulatory challenges faced by financial institutions in emerging countries and it presents their specific features compared to financial institutions in developed countries. It offers a practical way of implementing regulatory changes while accounting for emerging countries’ specific features. Using a principle-based approach, this chapter builds on the recent regulatory developments in both developed and developing market economies. It relates these developments to industry best practices as well as the current state of the art in risk management and corporate governance. The findings show how the regulation of financial institutions in emerging countries differs from that in developed countries. Different approaches to mitigate the divergences and fill the gaps are discussed. Both regulators and financial institutions in emerging countries will find this chapter offers a practical point of view based on field and industry experience on how to interpret and apply regulations and adopt best practices in risk management in a way that accounts for emerging countries’ specific features.