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1 – 10 of 23The past few years have seen a swelling of interest in explicitly Christian approaches to business ethics. The time is ripe, it would seem, to map the diversity of approaches…
Abstract
The past few years have seen a swelling of interest in explicitly Christian approaches to business ethics. The time is ripe, it would seem, to map the diversity of approaches within what I term “Christian business ethics.”1 Here I will frame the diversity of approaches as answers to the distinctive kind of question which religiously minded ethicists have brought to the terrain of business. I will not use theological or religious terms or categories, since such language is not likely to be of interest to philosophers and social scientists. Drawing up this map has been rendered easier by the fact that Christian business ethicists themselves have used a language which is readily accessible to listeners outside their traditions.
Entrepreneurs and their ventures are often portrayed as unambiguously positive forces in society. Specifically, high technology and equity-funded startups are heralded for their…
Abstract
Entrepreneurs and their ventures are often portrayed as unambiguously positive forces in society. Specifically, high technology and equity-funded startups are heralded for their innovative products and services that are believed to alter the economic, social, and even political fabric of life in advantageous ways. This paper draws on established theory on the causes of misconduct in and by organizations to elaborate the factors that can give rise to misconduct in entrepreneurial ventures, illustrating our arguments with case material on both widely known and less well-known instances of entrepreneurial misconduct. In venturing into the dark side of entrepreneurship, we hope to contribute to theory on entrepreneurship and organizational misconduct, augment entrepreneurship pedagogy, and offer ideas and examples that can enhance entrepreneurs’ awareness of their susceptibility to wrongdoing.
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Recent spectacular collapses globally have sparked renewed public interest in corporate governance and the pursuit of a new global model. The prevailing dominance of an American…
Abstract
Recent spectacular collapses globally have sparked renewed public interest in corporate governance and the pursuit of a new global model. The prevailing dominance of an American model has overshadowed constructive attempts to derive a model that is more appropriate for ‘non-western’ and developing countries. In this paper, I examine the discourse of corporate governance in China. I argue that rather than being a mere captive of the American model, it could have crafted and developed an alternate and more appropriate model that takes into account the economic and social needs of China instead of a corporate governance model developed for other countries.
Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog and Sunny Li Sun
We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as…
Abstract
Purpose
We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible “stewards” rather than “agents” of the state.
Methodology/approach
We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets.
Findings
Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform.
Research limitations/implications
Economic reform without reforming the human resources policies at the executive level enables the autocratic state to exert political power on corporate decision making, so as to ensure that firms’ business activities fulfill the state’s political objectives.
Practical implications
As a powerful social elite, the state-steward managers in China have the same interests as the state (the government), namely extracting rents that should adhere to the nation (which stands for the society at large or the collective private citizens).
Social implications
As China has been a communist country with a single ruling party for decades, the ideas of socialism still have a strong impact on how companies are run. The legitimacy of the elite’s privileged rights over private sectors is central to our question.
Originality/value
Chinese executive compensation stimulates not only the maximization of shareholder value but also the preservation of the state’s interests.
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Shaw Chen, Bing-Xuan Lin, Yaping Wang and Liansheng Wu
The effectiveness of corporate governance is a major factor in forecasting firm performance. We examine the relationships among cross-listing, corporate governance and firm…
Abstract
The effectiveness of corporate governance is a major factor in forecasting firm performance. We examine the relationships among cross-listing, corporate governance and firm performance for a sample of Chinese cross-listed companies. We show that cross-listed firms display higher overall quality of corporate governance compared to non-cross-listed firms. Consequently better corporate governance results in higher operating performance. Our results support the bonding hypothesis of cross-listing. Furthermore, we also illustrate that the cross-listing status encapsulates the higher quality of corporate governance that leads to higher operating performance. When forecasting performance of cross-listing companies, it is therefore important to recognize the substitute effect between cross-listing and corporate governance.