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Journal of Management Development, vol. 18 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0262-1711

Article
Publication date: 24 August 2021

Mehtap Aldogan Eklund

The purpose of this study is to examine whether chief executive officer (CEOs) are paid for the systematic and/or unsystematic risks and whether there is any optimum risk premium…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to examine whether chief executive officer (CEOs) are paid for the systematic and/or unsystematic risks and whether there is any optimum risk premium level in the executive pay.

Design/methodology/approach

Firm and year fixed effect panel data regression was used to estimate the relationship between total CEO compensation and systematic (market) and unsystematic (firm) risks.

Findings

There is no nexus between CEO pay and unsystematic (diversifiable) risk; however, the association between CEO compensation and systematic (undiversifiable) risk is positively significant in line with agency theory. Moreover, it is revealed that this positive relationship has an optimum point (curvilinear).

Research limitations/implications

This paper contributes to the controversial argument in the literature by investigating the situation in the Swiss market. Switzerland is an exemplary country because of its direct democracy (consensus) structure for executive pay. This study is limited by the fact that only total CEO compensation is analyzed.

Practical implications

As a practical implication, it is shown that after the optimal point, the higher compensation does not motivate the CEOs to take higher risks and does not provide the organizations with any additional benefit.

Originality/value

The finding of this study supports agency theory’s risk premium assumption and provides additional evidence to the contradictory results in the literature with a new country setting that has paramount importance in executive compensation phenomena. It is a comparative finding with prior literature also outlines the future research area in the risk and compensation literature.

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Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, vol. 22 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1472-0701

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 1 October 1997

Michael Poole and Glenville Jenkins

Proposes to assess the extent to which line management has responsibility for human resource management (HRM) practices in the enterprise. First, addresses a number of theoretical…

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Abstract

Proposes to assess the extent to which line management has responsibility for human resource management (HRM) practices in the enterprise. First, addresses a number of theoretical positions that include “traditional”, “cyclical” and “secular” approaches and that emphasizing “diversity”. Then deploys survey data based on the responses of more than 900 managers in the Institute of Management and located throughout the UK to assess these approaches. Investigates four main areas: employee involvement, training and development, rewards and work practices. Reveals that with the partial exception of rewards, line management is found to be dominant in most areas. However, this pattern is likely to have been historically the case rather than representing a “new wave” or movement associated with the rise of HRM itself.

Details

Personnel Review, vol. 26 no. 5
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0048-3486

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