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Review essay on Wade Hands’, Reflection without Rules: Economic Methodology and Contemporary Science Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Wade Hands’ Reflection without Rules is the best book in town for the student who wants to get acquainted with the field of economic methodology. Just like Mark Blaug’s The Methodology of Economics and Bruce Caldwell’s Beyond Positivism during the 1980s and the 1990s, Reflection introduces the reader to the debate in the area, in all its complexity and with many of its details, yet in a clear and logical manner. The book reproduces portions of the author’s earlier articles published since 1985 in different periodicals and books. Hands successfully achieves his goal of building a survey of recent developments in the field of economic methodology in a book that can be praised for its comprehensive outlook; its wide array of subject-matters; successful incursions into the neighboring fields of epistemology, philosophy, rhetoric, sociology of knowledge and others; its clear discussion of relevant topics, following a logical order; and its full coverage of the available literature, with the impressive reference list of more than 1,200 entries.

One of the concepts most commonly evoked in order to characterize and explain the zig-zag trajectory of political dynamics in the Islamic Republic of Iran has been the “middle class.” Yet there is no scholarly consensus on a fundamental approach to identification and measurement of the middle class. Rather, the category of the middle class is both a category of analysis – long debated within social theory – as well as a category of practice – routinely deployed in political behavior and social distinction. In order to better conceptualize and understand the formation and role of Iran's middle classes in the country's sociopolitical dynamics, theories of class formation in the global South should be rearticulated away from a reified notion of the middle class as a transhistorical subject. To do so, this chapter is divided into four sections. First, internal debates over the role of Iran's middle classes in the country's recent political history are assessed and data from the 2016 Iran Social Survey is used to test a long-standing demographic assumption on the class dynamics of electoral behavior. Second, the tradition of theorizing the social power of middle classes is reassessed, drawing on the growing scholarly attention to the heterogenous origins and differentiated internal composition of middle classes across the global South. Third, a typology is proposed of four middle classes across the twentieth century shaped by varying state attempts at “catch-up” development. These types are then applied in a revisionist telling of the making and unmaking of middle classes in postrevolutionary Iran. Finally, implications of this framework beyond Iran are sketched out for global waves of protest in the twenty-first century.

A subprime loan to straw borrower Charlotte Delaney was used to fraudulently strip equity from an elderly African American couple in Chicago. Following this loan from origination to securitization highlights responsibility for the wave of early payment default loans that contributed to the implosion of subprime lending. The Delaney loan, funded by subprime lender Mortgage Investment Lending Associates (MILA), was representative of the stated income, no down payment loans that defaulted in 2006 at the peak of the subprime bubble. MILA was suffering financially from demands to repurchase loans and was insolvent as early as 2004. MILA underwriters approved the Delaney loans despite obvious indications of fraud. Goldman Sachs bought MILA loans for inclusion in a $1.5 billion residential mortgage-backed security. Goldman Sachs warned investors that subprime loans were high risk and promised extensive due diligence. When subpoenaed for evidence of due diligence on MILA, Goldman Sachs provided none. The drive to generate profits through securitization explains why Goldman Sachs did not investigate and did not uncover MILA's inability to repurchase a growing portfolio of early payment default loans. Competition to buy subprime loans for securitization relieved lenders like MILA of pressure to verify that their loans were sustainable and not fraudulent.

This volume includes two major explanations of the meltdown that I critically discuss. The first is a “normal accident theory” arguing that the complexity and coupling of the financial system caused the failure. Although these structural characteristics were evident, I argue that the case does not fit the theory because the cause was not the system, but behavior by key agents who were aware of the great risks they were exposing their firms, clients, and society to. The second interpretation is a neoinstitutional one, emphasizing that ideologies, worldviews, cognitive frames, mimicry, and norms were the source of behaviors that turned out to be disastrous for the elites and others. The implication is that elites were victims, not perpetrators. I argue that while ideologies, etc., can have real effects on the behavior of many firm members and society in general, in this case financial elites, to serve personal ends, crafted the ideologies and changed institutions, fully aware that this could harm their firms, clients, and the public. Complexity and coupling only made deception easier and the consequences more extensive. For anecdotal evidence I examine a decade of deregulation, examples of elected representative, regulatory officials, firms, and the plentiful warnings.

We use normal accident theory to analyze the financial sector, especially that part of the financial sector that processed home mortgages, and the mortgage meltdown. We maintain that the financial sector was highly complex and tightly coupled in the years leading up to the mortgage meltdown. And we argue that the meltdown exhibited characteristics of a system or normal accident; the result of a component failure (unusually high mortgage defaults) that, in the context of unique conditions (which included low interest rates and government policy encouraging home loans to less credit-worthy households), resulted in complex and tightly coupled interactions that financial elites and government officials were ill-equipped to control. We also consider the role that agency and wrongdoing played in the design of the financial system and the unfolding of the mortgage meltdown. We conclude that a fundamental restructuring of the financial system, so as to reduce complexity and coupling, is required to avert future similar financial debacles. But we also conclude that such a restructuring faces significant obstacles, given the interests of powerful actors and the difficulties of labeling those responsible for the meltdown as wrongdoers.

On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and nearly caused a meltdown of the financial system. This article looks at the situation before Lehman went bankrupt and how this event came to trigger a financial panic during the fall of 2008 and early 2009. Two key ideas inform the analysis. The first is that what triggers financial panics are typically hidden losses. The second is that confidence plays a key role in financial panics and that confidence can be conceptualized as a belief that action can be based on proxy signs, rather than on direct information about the situation itself.

This paper examines the role of structured products in the 2008–2009 financial crisis. The growth of asset securitization has allowed loans that used to be funded by traditional intermediaries, including commercial banks, to be funded in securities markets. As credit-related services became unbundled, layers of transactions were added to the financial intermediation process. These layers were added as structured products, e.g., credit default swaps, in the over-the-counter market. This paper looks at the evolution of credit markets and the importance of using off-balance-sheet-based measures as an alternative in assessing the financial sector.