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With the rise of employer-promulgated mandatory employment arbitration, scholars have become concerned that these policies may reduce the economic viability of lower value…
Abstract
With the rise of employer-promulgated mandatory employment arbitration, scholars have become concerned that these policies may reduce the economic viability of lower value employment claims. Of particular worry are claims made under the Fair Labor Standards Act since the FLSA does not include punitive damages. This study empirically tests the relationship between 368 Fortune 1000 companies’ employment arbitration policies and their wage and hour violations discovered during the Department of Labor inspections. Surprisingly, firms that used arbitration were found to have fewer violations and lower back wages for those violation compared to firms that did not use arbitration. This suggests that viewing arbitration merely as a cost-reduction tool may cast the practice too narrowly and instead it may be part of a larger conflict management system that seeks to address conflict at the earliest possible stage.
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Michael Maffie and Mark D. Gough
This chapter extends the concept of associational power into the context of online platform work. To do so, this chapter centers on platforms' underlying economic model – the…
Abstract
Purpose
This chapter extends the concept of associational power into the context of online platform work. To do so, this chapter centers on platforms' underlying economic model – the multisided market – to better understand how workers may be able to collectively influence their terms and conditions of employment. In illuminating how labor's associational power functions in platform work arrangements, this model helps explain how collective action may function in the “gig economy” and provides a roadmap for future academic inquiry.
Methodology
This chapter develops a model of associational power in the ride-hail industry which can be extended to markets defined by geographically specific platforms, like ride-hail, delivery, domestic work, and home healthcare workers.
Findings
This chapter finds that there is substantial promise for labor unions and other worker associations in the gig economy. Additionally, we find that even well-intended regulations can harm workers' power if the regulators do not grapple with the structure of digital platforms.
Originality/Value
This chapter identifies the foundations of workers' associational power: network effects and multihoming. In contrast to traditional analyses of workers' power, labor's ability to withdraw its effort from a single employer is not the basis of its collective power. Instead, labor's power resides in its ability to withdraw its labor from a competitor and promise its exclusive labor to a single platform. Existing literature has explored the interaction between network effects and market power from the companies' perspective but has yet to extend this analysis to workers' perspective.
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