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To show that establishing an anti-corruption agency (ACA), by itself, is not likely to be a successful anti-corruption strategy. Instead, a solid base of social trust, participation, and support is just as essential as creating an ACA with significant powers and resources.

This is a historical review of the origins and development of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) of Hong Kong, and an assessment of its three-pronged approach strategy at both strategic and tactical levels.

An ACA requires broad and deep social support and participation if it is to succeed. That the ICAC remains nearly unique in developing such a base of support provides important lessons for those countries with ineffective ACAs.

A reassessment of the ICAC after a half-century shows that the Hong Kong case, despite its familiarity, has much to teach us if we understand it in its broadest implications.

Denmark’s apparent success at controlling corruption is likely both real and more complex than it may appear. This chapter reviews a series of hypotheses about the extent and sources of corruption control in Denmark, emphasizing both domestic and international factors. Some possible vulnerabilities are discussed, including whether Greenland – which is usually excluded from Danish governance ratings – might introduce corruption via its mining industries, and whether the growing wind-power industry (in some senses, another extractive enterprise) might also encourage corruption. A simple data analysis, using the Gothenburg University Quality of Government Impartiality Index, suggests that small social scale, a homogeneous population, competitive politics, and extensive international connectedness might well help check Danish corruption, but relationships among the variables are complex and marked by considerable simultaneity. Denmark illustrates two subtleties often overlooked: the importance of “soft controls” – social values, a working consensus, an emphasis on fairness, and common goals – for corruption control, and the question of whether advanced market societies really control corruption or merely reduce incentives to engage in it, as a result of business-friendly policies and institutions. A final issue involves dependent variables: better indirect measures of corruption might well be obtained by gathering and benchmarking indicators of government performance.

This study aims to investigate if the level of economic freedom matters for how corruption affects per capita income in US states.

Using a new (and novel) index of corruption, which is based on Associated Press news wires, the author estimates the long-run cointegrating relationship between corruption, economic freedom and per capita income with fully modified ordinary least squares (FMOLS) following Pedroni (2000).

The author finds that there is a threshold level of economic freedom that determines if corruption reduces the per capita income in a state. According to the FMOLS estimations, the negative effects of corruption on income decrease as economic freedom increases, and they eventually disappear.

This is the first study investigating the intricate relationship between corruption, economic freedom and economic performance using data from US states. The study uses a news-based measure of corruption constructed by Dincer and Johnston (2017), which has several advantages over the convictions-based measure used in previous studies analyzing the relationship between corruption and growth using US data. The study takes into account the integration and cointegration properties of the data and estimates the relationship among the cointegrated variables using FMOLS following Pedroni (2000).

In its most basic usage, “corruption” means a change from functional or good to dysfunctional or bad. This definition is far too broad to be of use to scholars or policymakers, who need a more precise, shared definition so that they can communicate meaningfully with one another. Scholars and policymakers have developed scores of definitions, which this chapter briefly explains. Within this galaxy of definitions, scholars and policymakers have tended to favor one definition, which this chapter calls the “general definition.” The general definition describes organizational corruption as: the abuse or misuse of power or trust for self-interested purposes rather than the purposes for which power or trust was given. This chapter discusses and illustrates the general definition. The chapter concludes by pointing out that the general definition is only one definition. In many places, the public is deeply concerned with phenomena such as undue influence, which should also be taken into consideration as a form of corruption even though it falls outside of the general definition.

Chapters 2–6 have dealt in turn with how Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Singapore have been effective in curbing corruption, as manifested in their rankings and scores on the five international indicators of the perceived extent of corruption. In contrast, Chapter 7 focuses on India’s ineffective anti-corruption measures and identifies the lessons which India can learn from their success in fighting corruption. The aim of this concluding chapter is twofold: to describe and compare the different paths taken by these six countries in their battle against corruption; and to identify the lessons which other countries can learn from their experiences in combating corruption. However, as the policy contexts of these six countries differ significantly, it is necessary to begin by providing an analysis of their contextual constraints before proceeding to compare their anti-corruption strategies and identifying the relevant lessons for other countries.

The paper seeks to provide a conceptual model of the account management process that isolates the social connections of more versus less effective account managers.

The sales performance research tradition is reviewed and a social network perspective is offered to explore the web of internal working relationships that account managers activate to acquire customer and competitor information and create solutions for customers.

Available evidence suggests that network size, network range, and network diversity are among the relational properties that may influence account manager performance. By building a strong network of relationships both within the firm as well as within the customer organization, high‐performing account managers, compared with their peers, are better able to diagnose customer requirements, mobilize internal experts, and choreograph the activities that are required to out‐maneuver rivals and create the desired customer solution.

The information‐acquisition practices of high‐performing account managers provide a template for improving customer relationship management (CRM) systems and processes.

The paper demonstrates the value of a social network perspective in advancing knowledge of account manager performance.

The purpose of this commentary is to discuss environmental uncertainty and to illustrate the value of scenario planning for small to medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) operating in a volatile environment.

The literature regarding strategy formulation, environmental uncertainty and scenario planning is reviewed and considered in the context of managerial decision making.

Given the way managers learn to “know” what is happening in their business environment, scenario planning can be adapted for use by SME owner/managers.

Although scenario planning was developed for use by large companies, this paper illustrates that it can be used by smaller firms.

The purpose of the paper is to examine features and impact of recent reforms introduced by the Philippines government to deal with the longstanding shortcomings in its procurement system.

The research for the paper is based on reports by international organizations, official documents of the Philippines government, surveys by international and domestic organizations, interviews with relevant officials and media reports.

The findings show that the reforms have focused on fostering competition, increasing transparency, standardizing procedures, enhancing end‐product quality and contractor reliability, ensuring proper planning and budgeting, combatting corruption, and strengthening accountability. These reforms were intended to create a procurement system more in line with international best practices. However the paper shows that the impact has been less than promised. This is due to limitations of certain provisions of the reforms and weaknesses in both implementation and in the accountability of the procuring entities. A key factor in undermining the reforms is widespread corruption, which continues to affect many aspects of the procurement system. The article identifies two important and related reasons for such failings: elite capture of the government and bureaucracy by a powerful network of business leaders from well‐established landed families, who have close links with the political establishment; and second, a long‐established culture of informal influence in the Philippine state bureaucracy (what may be termed the informal bureaucracy), which has been used to maximum effect by the elite network of business leaders. As a result, this network has been able to influence the reforms to serve its own interests and ensure its continued dominance of the procurement market.

The value of the paper is to show how administrative reforms, no matter how well formulated they are, may be readily undermined in the process of implementation by elite groups able to influence government bureaucracy through an informal culture.