Search results1 – 3 of 3
This chapter measures financial integration in 10 industries over 4 different periods. We use two robust measures of integration: (i) the Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009)’s…
This chapter measures financial integration in 10 industries over 4 different periods. We use two robust measures of integration: (i) the Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009)’s multi-factor R-square and (ii) the Volosovych (2011)’s integration index. Both measures, based on PCA, indicate that the difference between the level of integration over the period 2009–2012 (“Post-Lehman” era) and the level of integration over the period 1994–1998 (“Post-Liberalizations” era) is relatively high. In addition, the level of financial integration across international equity markets decreased during the late 1990s. This suggests that de jure integration does not necessarily improve de facto integration. Overall, our findings give rise to a “diversification benefits-insurance benefits trade-off.”
– The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of the 2007-2009 uncertainty shocks on policymakers’ behavior.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of the 2007-2009 uncertainty shocks on policymakers’ behavior.
Uncertainty shocks in the US credit, financial and production markets are represented by extraordinary events. As in Bloom (2009), these events are associated with significant economic and political shocks (e.g. Lehman Brothers’ collapse). Credit markets uncertainty shocks, which played a crucial role in the aftermath of the house prices collapse in the USA, are first analyzed in a bivariate VAR context, and then, embodied in a simple theoretical framework.
The empirical evidence suggests that the US credit, financial and production markets have been affected by a relative large number of uncertainty shocks (i.e. rare events). In a Brainard’s (1967) uncertainty scenario, it is shown that a bizarre money-liquidity relationship exacerbates the “policymakers’ cautiousness-aggressiveness trade-off.” In addition, the model suggests that a “double” dose of policy, in presence of a global credit crunch, might be useless.
This paper improves the existing literature in two main directions. First, it provides novel empirical evidence on the unusual dynamics of the US credit market and its effects on the real economic activity during the crisis. Second, in a very simple theoretical framework accounting for parameter uncertainty, it addresses whether a bizarre money-credit relationship affects policymakers’ behavior (i.e. cautiousness vs aggressiveness).