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In class action antitrust litigation, the standards for acceptable economic analysis at class certification have continued to evolve. The most recent event in this evolution is the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1435 (2013). The evolution of pre-Comcast law on this topic is presented, the Comcast decision is thoroughly assessed, as are the standards for developing reliable economic analysis. This article explains how economic evidence of both antitrust liability and damages ought to be developed in light of the teachings of Comcast, and how liability evidence can be used by economists to support a finding of common impact for certification purposes. In addition, the article addresses how statistical techniques such as averaging, price-dispersion analysis, and multiple regressions have and should be employed to establish common proof of damages.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

The purpose of this paper is two fold: educate investors about hedge fund managers' activities prior to the fraud recognition by the authorities and to help investors and other stakeholders in the hedge fund industry identify red flags before fraud is actually committed.

The paper investigates fraud committed by the Bayou Funds, Beacon Hill Asset Management, Lancer Management Group (LMG), Lipper & Company and Maricopa investment fund. The fraud activities took place during 2000 and 2005.

The five cases alone cost the hedge fund investors more than $1.5 billion. Investors may have had a good opportunity for avoiding the irrecoverable costs of the fraud had they carefully vetted the backgrounds of the hedge fund managers and/or continuously monitored the funds activities, especially during turbulent market environments.

This is the first research paper to identify and extensively investigate fraud committed by hedge funds. In spite of the size of the hedge fund industry and relatively substantial level and inevitably recurring fraud, academic journals are to yet address this issue. The paper is of great value to hedge funds and their individual and institutional investors, asset managers, financial advisers and regulators.

The purpose of this paper is to offer case studies of hedge fund fraud, solutions that could mitigate hedge fund fraud risk, and a proposal for the industry to establish a hedge fund information depository (HFID) where participants/stakeholders could provide information on any hedge fund on regular basis.

Four major hedge fund fraud cases, Bayou Funds, Lipper Holdings, Manhattan Investment Fund and Maricopa Investment Corporation are used as examples of the complete absence of independent oversight and the application of HFID.

The paper finds that investors in the four funds lost more than $1.3 billion. In all four fraud cases, independent oversight and compliance function were conspicuously missing. In each fraud case there was at least one serious alert (warning) that took place at least 14 months prior to SEC first filing against the fund.

Some hedge fund industry stakeholders may reluctantly join HFID due to concern over possibly disclosing information deemed crucial for their own competitive advantage.

Had third parties become aware of the alerts, they could have made a different investment or business decision. Most importantly, this depository would allow all hedge fund industry stakeholders (accountants, administrators, auditors, investors, marketers, prime brokers, custodians and regulators) to communicate with one another regularly.

The paper makes two proposals: the founding of a hedge fund information depository; and outsourcing of the compliance function for hedge funds where it is more cost effective.