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The purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of UK investment firms’ implementation of the requirements in Commission Delegated Regulation 2017/589 (more commonly known as “Regulatory Technical Standard 6” or “RTS 6”) that govern the conduct of algorithmic trading activities.

A qualitative examination of 19 semi-structured interviews with practitioners working for, or with, UK investment firms engaged in algorithmic trading activities.

The paper finds that practitioners generally have a good understanding of the requirements in RTS 6. Some lack knowledge of algorithms, coding and algorithmic strategies but have used best efforts to implement RTS 6. However, regulatory fatigue, complacency, cost pressures, governance in international groups, overreliance on external knowledge and generous risk parameter calibration threaten to undermine these efforts.

The study’s findings are limited to the participants’ insights. Some areas of the RTS 6 regime attracted little comment from participants.

The paper proposes the introduction of mandatory algorithmic trading qualification requirements for key staff; the lessening of the requirements in RTS 6 for automated executors; and the introduction of a recognised software vendor regime to reduce duplication and improve coordination between market participants that deploy algorithmic trading systems.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, the study represents the first qualitative examination of firms’ implementation of the algorithmic trading regime in the second Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2014/65/EU.

The EU prudential regime for investment firms comprising the Directive (EU) 2019/2034 (IFD) and Regulation (EU) 2019/2033 (IFR) introduces a fit-for-purpose capital framework for investment firms. The capital impact on the practice of investment management can be material depending on firms’ specific business models and risk profiles, which may require them to take strategic decisions with respect to the services they provide. Despite the importance of this issue for the practice of investment management, there exists no study among the existing studies that focuses on this issue. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature.

This paper reviews the calibration approaches the European Banking Authority (EBA) has used by exploring the deficiencies of the regime with respect to the calibration of categorization thresholds and coefficients that are used by the EBA to calculate regulatory capital requirements.

This paper sets out that the choice of the relevant percentile for setting the firm categorization thresholds was not based on any theoretical rule. It also discusses that the calibration of the K-factors was subjective and lacked consistency. In addition, it criticizes the sample that the EBA used for business model coverage on the grounds that it was unbalanced, resulting in certain K-factors driving the overall capital impact.

Further research is needed on the calibration of thresholds as this will remain a crucial factor for the effectiveness of the new regime. In particular, a more data-driven and transparent approach would be necessary to ensure the accuracy and consistency of the thresholds.

This paper leads to the policy implication that, despite its merits that overweigh its shortcomings, potential market competition and financial stability issues that may stem from inconsistencies and a general lack of objectivity in certain aspects of the regime should not be underestimated by the EU policy makers.

The present paper contributes to the existing knowledge primarily by reviewing the EBA’s calibration approaches with respect to the K-factor coefficients and firm categorization thresholds, concluding that lack of objectivity and precision in the relevant methodologies could distort capital allocation decisions in the practice of investment management.

Motivated by significant global developments affecting the sell-side industry, in particular a shift toward passive investments and growing regulation, this study examines whether financial analyst coverage declined over the past decade and if any loss of analyst coverage is associated with a change in forecast accuracy.

After investigating, and confirming, a general decline in analyst following, the authors calculate the loss of analyst coverage relative to the firm-specific maximum between 2009 and 2013. In multivariate analyses, the authors then examine whether this loss of coverage differs across geographic region, firm size and capital market development, and whether it is associated with consensus analyst accuracy.

Results indicate that between 2011 and 2021, firm-specific analyst coverage globally declined 17.8%, while the decline in the EU was an even greater, 28.5%. Within the EU, results are most pronounced for small-cap firms. As a consequence of the loss of coverage, the authors observe a global decline in forecast accuracy, with EU small-cap firms and firms domiciled in EU non-developed capital markets faring the worst.

This study is the first to document a concerning global decline in analyst coverage over the past decade. The study results provide broad-based empirical support for anecdotal reports that smaller firms in the EU and those in EU non-developed capital markets bear the brunt of consequences stemming from changes in the sell-side analyst industry.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of two regulatory initiatives in developing awareness of conduct risk associated with algorithmic and direct-electronic access (DEA) trading at broker-dealers: the UK Financial Conduct Authority’s algorithmic trading compliance in the wholesale markets and Commission Delegated Regulation 2017/589 (CDR 589) to the second Markets in Financial Instruments Directive.

A qualitative examination of 15 semi-structured interviews with representatives of London Metal Exchange member firms, their clients and regulators.

This paper finds that the key conduct related messages in algorithmic trading compliance in the wholesale markets may not yet be fully embedded at broker–dealers. This is because of a perceived simplicity of the algorithms deployed by broker dealers or, alternatively, a lack of reflection on their impact. Conversely, a concern exists that clients’ deployment of algorithms on DEA channels provided by broker–dealers increase conduct risk. However, the threat of harm posed by clients is not envisaged in current definitions of conduct risk. Accordingly, CDR 2017/589 does not currently require firms to evaluate clients’ awareness of it.

This study’s findings are limited to the insights provided by 15 participants.

This paper contributes to existing research by deepening understanding of conduct risk arising from algorithmic trading and DEA. To account for the potential harm arising from clients’ activities, this paper proposes a revision to Miles’s definition of conduct risk. This is complemented by a proposed amendment to CDR 2017/589 to require evaluation of clients’ understanding of conduct risk.

This study aims to examine the deterrent effect of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) introduced in the European Union in 2003. The purpose is to evaluate whether the Directive has resulted in significant changes in pre-bid stock price run-ups observed in mergers and acquisitions within the Portuguese, Spanish and Greek stock markets.

The study analyzes a sample of 199 mergers and acquisitions in the aforementioned stock markets. The magnitude of pre-bid stock price run-ups is investigated as an indicator of illegal insider trading. The effects of the MAD, toehold positions of bidders and industry similarity between firms involved in the deals are assessed using statistical analysis.

The study’s findings indicate that the MAD has been ineffective in deterring investors from trading on non-public information. Pre-announcement price run-ups remain significant, suggesting ongoing illegal insider trading practices. Additionally, the research reveals that pre-bid stock price run-ups tend to be lower when bidders have established a larger toehold position in the target and when the firms involved in the deal belong to the same industry.

This study contributes to the existing literature by providing empirical evidence on the ineffectiveness of the MAD in deterring illegal insider trading. The findings highlight the limitations of increasing penalties without an effective monitoring system in place. Furthermore, the study identifies additional factors, such as toehold positions and industry similarity, that influence the magnitude of pre-announcement price run-ups in mergers and acquisitions.

The purpose of this paper is to bridge the gap between the existing theoretical and empirical studies by examining the asymmetric return–volume relationship. Indeed, the authors aim to shed light on the return–volume linkages for French-listed small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) compared to blue chips across different market regimes.

This study includes both large capitalizations included in the CAC 40 index and listed SMEs included in the Euronext Growth All Share index. The Markov-switching (MS) approach is applied to understand the asymmetric relationship between trading volume and stock returns. The study investigates also the causal impact between stock returns and trading volume using regime-dependent Granger causality tests.

Asymmetric contemporaneous and lagged relationships between stock returns and trading volume are found for both large capitalizations and listed SMEs. However, the causality investigation reveals some differences between large capitalizations and SMEs. Indeed, causal relationships depend on market conditions and the size of the market.

This paper explains the asymmetric return–volume relationship for both large capitalizations and listed SMEs by incorporating several psychological biases, such as the disposition effect, investor overconfidence and self-attribution bias. Future research needs to deepen the analysis especially for SMEs as most of the literature focuses on large capitalizations.

This empirical study has fundamental implications for portfolio management. The findings provide a deeper understanding of how trading activity impact current returns and vice versa. The authors’ results constitute an important input to build and control trading strategies.

This paper fills the literature gap on the asymmetric return–volume relationship across different regimes. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the present study is the first empirical attempt to test the asymmetric return–volume relationship for listed SMEs by using an accurate MS framework.

The purpose of this paper is to scrutinise the effectiveness of four derivative exchanges’ enforcement efforts since 2007. These exchanges include the Commodity Exchange Inc. and ICE Futures US from the United States and ICE Futures Europe and the London Metal Exchange from the UK.

The paper examines 799 enforcement notices published by four exchanges through a behavioural science lens: HUMANS conceived by Hunt (2023) in Humanizing Rules: Bringing Behavioural Science to Ethics and Compliance.

The paper finds the effectiveness of the exchanges’ enforcement efforts to be a mixed picture as financial markets transition from the digital to artificial intelligence era. Humans remain a key cog in the wheel of market participants’ trading operations, albeit their roles have changed. Despite this, some elements of exchanges’ enforcement regimes have not kept pace with the move from floor to remote trading. However, in other respects, their efforts are or should be, effective, at least in behavioural terms.

The paper’s findings are arguably limited to exchanges based in Anglophone jurisdictions. The information published by the exchanges is variable, making “like-for-like” comparisons difficult in some areas.

The paper makes several recommendations that, if adopted, could help exchanges to increase the potency of their enforcement programmes.

A key aim of the paper is to shift the lens through which the debate concerning the efficacy of exchange-level oversight is conducted. Hitherto, a legal lens has been used, whereas this paper uses a behavioural lens.

This paper aims to conceptualize and empirically illustrate the challenges that financial market regulation presents to politicians and the organization tasked with specifying regulations and supervising their implementation in the interest of users and consumers of financial instruments. It analyses the problem from the viewpoint of the governor's dilemma and the control/competence conflict, the linked problem of the rent-seeking of agents/intermediators and consumers of financial instruments. Political accountability problems are enhanced by the materiality of the technologies used, i.e. algo trading.

The paper theoretically conceptualizes and empirically illustrates the argument.

The paper finds that regulators of digitalized financial markets are faced with considerable problems and depend on private agents when regulating financial transactions. However, the new technological instruments also offer new possibilities for securing compliance.

Further research should focus more in-depth on the cooperation between public and private actors in the specification and implementation of regulatory details. It should further investigate the conditions which allow regulators to use RegTech in the surveillance of financial firms.

Since financial market transactions are opaque for most users, the creation of more transparency is crucial to hold regulators accountable in their activity of surveillance of financial firms. New algorithm-based technologies may lend important support in doing so.

By linking the different analytical perspectives, i.e. the governor's dilemma vis-à-vis the intermediator or agent and the possible rent-seeking of intermediators, under the condition of a highly developed technology of financial transactions as well as the market structure, the paper offers new insights into the limits as well as new opportunities of regulating financial markets allowing for political accountability of regulators and financial firms.

This paper aims to measure the trade price impact of a recent regulatory disclosure intervention in municipal securities secondary markets, which required broker-dealers to disclose securities trading information on a near-real-time and continuing basis.

The author analyzes trade price outcomes in the preintervention and postintervention regimes using a suite of time series estimations that give heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Prais–Winsten and Cochrain–Orcutt), accommodate higher-order lag structure in the error term (autoregressive integrated moving average) and account for volatility clustering in the time series (generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity).

Results show that regulatory disclosure intervention significantly improved trade price efficiency in municipal securities secondary markets as daily trade price differential and volatility both declined market-wide after the disclosure intervention.

The sample consists of trades in State of California general obligation bonds; therefore, empirical findings may not be generalizable to other states, local governments and different types of bonds.

The findings highlight voluntary information disclosure as a practical and effective mechanism in disclosure regulation of municipal securities secondary markets.

Only a small body of work exists that examines information disclosure regulation in municipal securities secondary markets; therefore, this paper expands knowledge on the topic and should provide renewed impetus for regulatory efforts aimed at improving the efficiency of municipal capital markets.

Drawing insights from institutional theory, this paper aims to examine whether and to what extent banks have reconfigured their management control systems (MCSs) in response to growing institutional pressures towards sustainability, understood as environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues.

The authors conducted an exploratory study at the three largest Italian banking groups to shed light on changes made in MCSs to account for ESG issues. The analysis is based on 12 semi-structured interviews with managers from the sustainability and controls areas, as well as from other relevant operational areas particularly concerned with the integration process of ESG issues. Additionally, secondary data sources were used. The Malmi and Brown (2008) MCS framework, consisting of a package of five types of formal and informal control mechanisms, was used to structure and analyse the empirical data.

The examined banks widely implemented numerous changes to their MCSs as a response to the heightened sustainability pressures from regulatory bodies and stakeholders. In particular, with the exception of action planning, the results show an extensive integration of ESG issues into the five control mechanisms of Malmi and Brown’s framework, namely, long-term planning, cybernetic, reward/compensation, administrative and cultural controls.

By identifying the approaches banks followed in reconfiguring traditional MCSs, this research sheds light on how adequate MCSs can promote banks’ “sustainable behaviours”. The results can, thus, contribute to defining best practices on how MCSs can be redesigned to support the integration of ESG issues into the banks’ way of doing business.

Overall, the findings support the theoretical assertion that institutional pressures influence the design of banks’ MCSs, and that both formal and informal controls are necessary to ensure a real engagement towards sustainability. More specifically, this study reveals that MCSs, by encompassing both formal and informal controls, are central to enabling banks to appropriately understand, plan and control the transition towards business models fully oriented to the integration of ESG issues. Thereby, this allows banks to effectively respond to the increased stakeholder demands around ESG concerns.