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This chapter aims the research whether the application of European Directive, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), had any significant effects on the European Capital Markets and the progress of the European Integration. This new regulation specifies the tasks and responsibilities of the supervisory authorities of the Member State of origin and the host Member State, in order to enhance the certainty of effectiveness of cross-border transactions supervision and to reduce the risk of imposing unnecessary legal reforms from the host Member State on investment firms which perform cross-border transactions. It has been concluded, among others, that the aligning of the national regulatory approaches to a common European regulatory system is quite necessary. It is finally concluded that MiFID will contribute to reduce problems at country level as the previous experience of the Investment Services Directive, where the European investments and economies of Member States were based mainly on the level of ‘country’ and not of the ‘sector’. An effective capital entrepreneurship market is a strategically important element in the development of new and innovative businesses, encouraging entrepreneurship, increasing the productivity and maintaining high economic growth rates in Europe. Currently, European venture capital market is much less effective than that of the US market, for example. Therefore, in this area, should be specified the priorities that will lead to new initiatives.

Product intervention power is introduced under the markets in financial instruments regulation (MiFIR) and packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) Regulation for all EU Member States and gives National Competent Authorities (NCAs), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and European Banking Authority (EBA) powers to monitor financial products (and services) under their supervision and to “temporarily” prohibit or restrict the marketing, distribution, or sale of certain financial instruments, or to intervene in relation to certain financial activities or practice. This extends the supervisory measures defined in MiFID II to any PRIIPs (including insurance-based investment products “IBI products”) that would not otherwise fall under the scope of MiFID II. Product intervention power is given to the NCAs, and in order to use power, it requires to take the specifics of the individual case into account and a series of conditions, criteria, and factors to fulfill. Moreover, ESMA and the EBA have a type of control function and ability to override national regulators on product. The aim of product intervention powers is to ensure strengthening of investor protection, but given the potential significant impact of this power, calls into question of possibility to delay innovation and slow down product developments on the capital market.

This paper provided an overview of supervisory measures on product intervention, that is, scope of the product intervention power, criteria, factors, and risks which have to be taken into consideration when using this regulator’s tool.

In the context of increasing private provision of social security and welfare, alongside what is argued to be the ‘financialisation’ of daily lives, individuals in many countries face an array of potentially difficult financial choices and decisions. Limitations in levels of knowledge and expertise may lead them to consider seeking financial advice. Yet, in the wake of the great financial crisis, trust in the financial services industry is low.

At the same time, in a number of countries the financial advice sector is facing its own challenges. These include regulatory issues concerning the definition, suitability and delivery of advice; the affordability of advice; and the challenges and opportunities facing the advice sector as a result of the increasing use of technology in the financial services sector.

This chapter examines the implications of these developments for the regulation and governance of financial advice in the context of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II. In particular, it considers the example of the UK and issues this raises for the implementation of recent European regulatory reforms.

The area of law where the principle of transparency is applicable is expanding fast. Also many financial markets have recently become subject to new regulations requiring transparency, such as EU directives MIFID II or Solvency II. Here, what is expanding is not just the applicability of the principle as such, but also the scope of issues which are affected by transparency, that is, remuneration or conflict of interests. In the light of these regulations, it may seem that transparency has simply become a sole legislative measure assuring values such as consumer protection, market stability or – most of all – high-quality governance. Indeed, transparency is thought to contribute to the quality of governance in several different ways, although its implementation must meet certain standards if it is to produce the desired results, especially when it comes to financial institutions. Financial institutions are commonly required to be particularly transparent due to the fact they often act as public trust entities. As the activity of financial institutions is of such importance, the issue of transparency efficiency is worth discussing. Although it is said that the emergence of the principle of transparency in the EU law is a fairly new phenomenon, the existence of transparency obligation is not. Therefore, some doubts may arise as to the question whether the principle of transparency actually adds much to existing rules and principles. In this chapter the author explored and discussed how mandatory transparency affects financial institutions’ activity, and whether it performs its function efficiently.

In this article, we make the point that managerial domination as described by pragmatic sociology is an appropriate notion to make sense of complex forms of domination in contemporary organizations. Based on Lemieux’s work on ‘grammars’, we complement approaches of complex domination put forward by pragmatic sociologists such as Boltanski and Thévenot. We illustrate these ideas by means of an ethnographic study of the financial intermediation industry. Our analysis sketches out an alternative conceptualization of power in such environments, and by so doing, helps us delineate the features that characterize complex financial domination. We conclude by arguing that this type of domination is the result of specific contradictions inherent to the grammars of financial intermediation.

This chapter examines the roles and challenges for the Irish economy in the aftermath of the collapse of the Celtic Tiger and the onset of the 2008 economic crisis. Specifically, it does review the role that Government, the Central Bank of Ireland, and the Financial Regulator had before, during and after the collapse of both the Irish banking system and property market. This chapter explains the drivers behind the growth of the Celtic Tiger and the sources of leverage that amplified the severity of the subsequent collapse. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the changes that have since been made and provides a review of the lessons that can be obtained from the collapse.

The results presented in this chapter are based on analysis of secondary sources and a literature review to determine conceptual and theoretical frameworks for identifying the specific issues that the Irish economy endured since the 2008 economic crisis and the red flags and signals that were either missed or ignored.

Combined with the subprime collapse of 2007 and the international sovereign debt crisis evident since 2008, Ireland and the actions of its regulators and policy makers undoubtedly generated not only a catalyst to financial ruin, but also an incubator to aid its severity. The precise drivers that created the Celtic Tiger remained unchanged and played a significant role in the subsequent collapse. Banks were leveraged towards the Irish property market and the role of leverage in financial markets created mispricing, to which the basic principles of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) failed. This miscalculation of risk was severe and destructive for the real economy. The reward for this error was a place in history as an ‘I’ in the derogatory term ‘PIIGS’.

This chapter could be used as teaching material for undergraduate and masters programmes in economics and finance. It provides a response to further understand the behaviour of the Irish economy during the development of the Celtic Tiger and the subsequent financial collapse that enveloped the Irish state.

This chapter discusses the role of leverage throughout a financial system and the necessity for financial monitors to promote an environment of sustainability and financial endurance; that which can survive an international financial crisis event.

The 2008 financial crisis emerged in the United States. However, the crisis spread across other countries very rapidly. The European Union countries were also affected by the crisis. The uncertainties and the decreases in balance sheet assets observed in European countries complicated the discharge of debts of countries, which have more fragile structures, and turned the financial crisis into a debt crisis in the year 2010. The European debt crisis caused a significant pressure on the Eurozone, put the financial sector under stress, and expanded the gaps in capital budgets. In order to restructure after the crisis and to eliminate the effects of the crisis, many measures were taken, and various mechanisms were developed. As a result of the measures are taken and the policies implemented, recovery was seen in financial and economic indicators as of the year 2012, but the COVID-19 pandemic emerging in the year 2019 brought a new shock wave. As a result, it became necessary to review the economic and financial measures taken before, to add new ones to the current mechanisms, and determine and monitor the vulnerability of the system. For this purpose, in January 2021, European Commission declared that a new strategy was set. In the present study, the measures taken and the mechanisms developed after the 2008 crisis were summarized and the advancements in financial and economic variables were examined by making use of the statistical data. Moreover, also information about the new strategy set after the year 2021 was provided. It is projected that, in the long run, the consistent and uniform implementation of measures taken and ensuring the efficient functioning of mechanisms developed would strengthen the economic and financial structures of European economies, support the integration, and increase the competitive power.