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The purpose of this paper is to discuss incongruities in the corporate entity over the matter of agency. In lieu of the traditional notion of moral agency theory, the stakeholder model offers congruent grounding to corporate governance. Socially irresponsible or unethical corporate activities are perceived to increase expenses, diminish shareholder value and tarnish business reputations. In contrast, socially responsible corporate practices contribute to positive attitudes to the company and contribute to the creation of competitive advantage.

This paper follows the ongoing evolution of the regulatory changes instituted after the scandalous corporate fiascos of the present century, such as those of Enron and WorldCom in the USA, Polly Peck in the UK, HIH Insurance and One.Tel in Australia, and Siemens in Germany, inter alia. The exposition also touches on the regulatory metamorphosis of corporate governance in its convergence towards “meta-regulation” with corporate social responsibility at the core.

While meta-regulation has so far worked in many countries, caution is expressed over the perils of over-reliance on a meta-regulatory approach. Industries or market sectors should also attempt to operate from the start within the confines of self-regulation and government regulation. Market sectors and industries need to find the framework of regulation that is best suited to their operations.

The paper concludes by discussing the observed challenges and implications of such convergence, as well as future directions for law practitioners, academics and researchers in the realm of corporate conduct.

Debate is growing around the expansion of risk-based regulation. The regulation scholarship provides evidence of regulatory failure of the risk-based approach in different domains, including financial regulation. Therefore, this paper aims to provide cautionary evidence about the risk of regulatory failure of risk-based strategy in the financial regulation while using enterprise risk management (ERM) as a meta-regulatory toolkit.

Based on interview data gathered from 30 risk managers of banks and five regulatory personnel, combined with secondary data, this study mainly explores the challenges for meaningful use of ERM based self-regulation in regulated banks. The evidence helps to assess the risk of regulatory failure of the risk-based regulation while using ERM.

The evidence reflects that regulated banks face diverse challenges arising from both peripheral and internal environments that limit the true internalization of ERM-based self-regulation. Despite this, the regulator uses this self-regulation as a meta-regulatory toolkit under the risk-based regulation to achieve the regulatory aims. However, the lack of true internalization of ERM based self-regulation is likely to raise the risk of regulatory failure of risk-based regulation to achieve the regulatory goals. Risk-based regulation is an evolving strategy in the regulatory regime. Therefore, care should be taken while using ERM as a regulatory toolkit before relying on it substantially.

The paper provides empirical insights about the challenges for effective use of ERM as a meta regulatory toolkit that might be useful practically both to the regulators and regulated firms.

The purpose of this paper is not only seek to trace developments that have contributed to the importance of risk in regulation, but also to justify why risk has become so significant within regulatory and governmental circles.

This task will be facilitated through a consideration of theories associated with risk, and by reference to two forms of risk regulation, namely risk‐based regulation and meta regulation. As well as a consideration of the application of both in jurisdictions such as the UK, the paper adopts a comparative approach through references to the their application in jurisdictions such as Germany, Italy, and the USA, and also through a comparison between meta‐regulatory strategies and risk‐based regulation.

This paper concludes that all regulatory strategies should take into consideration the importance of management responsibilities – both on individual and corporate levels. Meta‐risk regulation has not only assumed such a prominent position in regulation through its application in Basel II, but also is preferred to risk‐based regulation – not only because of the element of ambiguity which risk‐based regulation introduces into its assessment (through a consideration of the external environment of the firm), but also because of its impact of the use of external auditors in regulation and supervision.

The practical implications of a move towards risk‐based regulatory strategies, and meta‐regulatory strategies in particular, is that courts are simply not adequately equipped to deal with the pace with which some financial instruments, such as derivatives, operate.

This paper not only introduces originality through its comparative approach and the choice of jurisdictions involved, but also through the attention it draws to the need for more innovative techniques such as meta regulation. Meta regulation can be considered to be the most evolved and collaborative form of regulation, which is best suited for such an ever‐evolving and changing regulatory environment that currently exists.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the probable structure of bilateral derivatives contracts following international regulatory reforms.

The theoretical context of the paper is private and meta‐regulation, which the author applies to a case study and current industry analysis.

While regulations are still being written, it is likely that elements of oversight for the bilateral derivatives market will involve enforced self‐regulation. When combined with more specific outcome‐oriented regulatory requirements, the industry is well‐suited to this type of coordinated regulatory regime.

In light of the uncertainty of derivatives regulation and the future size of the bilateral, over‐the‐counter (OTC) derivatives market, practitioners should consider a likely broader range of regulation structures.

The paper fills a gap in the literature about non‐traditional governance structures for the derivatives markets following the financial crisis. Rather than considering regulation on a light/heavy axis, the paper examines whether this segment of the market can sustain a process‐oriented regulatory arrangement.

The primary objective of this study is to explore consumers' non-adoption intentions towards meta-commerce (or metaverse retailing). Utilizing the Innovation Resistance Theory (IRT) as the theoretical foundation, this study investigates the impact of diverse barriers on non-adoption intentions within the meta-commerce context.

A total of 356 responses were gathered to test the proposed hypotheses. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) with SmartPLS 4 software was used to examine these hypotheses.

The findings of this study show that perceived cyber risk, perceived regulatory uncertainty, perceived switching cost and perceived technical uncertainty are significantly linked to non-adoption intention towards meta-commerce. Furthermore, the study suggests that the moderating influence of technostress on these connections is more pronounced for consumers with high technostress compared to those with low technostress.

This study makes a significant contribution to the current body of literature by providing valuable insights into the fundamental barriers that consumers encounter when contemplating the adoption of meta-commerce. This contribution is particularly noteworthy as it fills a gap in the existing literature, as no prior study has comprehensively examined the primary obstacles that shape consumer intentions towards meta-commerce adoption. This novel perspective offers scholars, businesses and policymakers a foundation for developing strategies to address these barriers effectively.

In Australia, national harmonisation of occupational health and safety (OHS) regulation was pursued through the development of model Work Health and Safety legislation. The model Work Health and Safety Regulations specify that construction works above a threshold cost of AU$250,000 are deemed to be construction projects requiring the appointment of a principal contractor with duties relating to OHS planning and coordination. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of the monetary threshold as a suitable trigger for specific OHS planning and coordination duties.

Interviews were conducted with 46 Australian construction industry stakeholders, including union representatives, employer groups, construction firm representatives and regulators, as well as four international construction OHS experts, to explore perceptions about the effectiveness of the monetary threshold. Two construction scenarios were also modelled to test for variability in operation of the threshold by geographical location of works and design conditions.

The monetary threshold was perceived to be subject to two forms of capture problem, reflecting inadvertent capture of low risk works or failure to capture high risk works. Organisations were also reported to deliberately split contracts to avoid capture by the threshold. The cost-estimate modelling revealed inequalities and variation in the operation of the monetary threshold by geographic location and design specification.

The analysis suggests that limitations inherent in the use of a monetary threshold to trigger duties relating to OHS planning and coordination in construction works. Opportunities to use more sophisticated risk-based mechanisms are considered.

The study explores a fundamental challenge of risk-based OHS regulation, i.e., how to ensure that workers’ health and safety are adequately protected without creating an unnecessarily high regulatory burden. The research provides evidence that using a monetary value as a proxy measure for OHS risk in construction projects may be problematic.

This introduction unpacks the key question that informs the articles in this special issue. How does a social sphere inform regulation and, more specifically, how can the regulatory capacity of a social sphere be harnessed, as an alternative or significant complementary force to state regulation and reliance on the self-regulatory capacity of markets? This question is salient and topical also in light of the search for new regulatory strategies and perspectives in the aftermath of the 2007 financial and subsequent EU sovereign debt crises, which have led to a major realignment of economy and society in a number of countries.

This introduction argues that economic sociology is a crucial reference point for understanding more about the social practices that constitute business behavior. It enables to explore the scope and significance of often interlinked social and legal norms for regulating various transnational risks that economic activity can give rise to. The introduction therefore locates the quest for understanding more about the regulatory capacity of a social sphere in debates that draw on Karl Polanyi’s analysis of the embedding, disembedding, and re-embedding of economic activity into social norms. The introduction highlights one of the key themes developed in this special issue, the idea of society within economy which questions an assumed conceptual distinction between economy and society.

This introduction concludes by specifying how the accounts of risk regulation developed in this special issue chart a path that is different from recent explorations of the role of a social sphere in regulation, which were conducted under the banner of “the sociological citizen,” “regulatory sociability,” and “collaborative governance.”

Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) is the single regulator of firms in the UK financial services industry. The Act grants extensive powers to the FSA such that it can impose by rules and regulations additional corporate governance requirements on firms in the financial services industry. The legislative and regulatory requirements also extend to individuals under the FSA approved persons' regime. The purpose of the paper is to examine this individualization of corporate governance.

The paper first explores the rise to significance of internal control and risk management in corporate governance and regulation, and links this to Beck's risk society and individualization theses. The extent of the individualization of corporate governance by the approved persons' regime is explored by examining three sources of evidence: the FSA's documents setting out the approved persons' regime; the initial perceptions about the implementation of the approved persons' regime from interviews with high‐level individuals in the financial services industry; and the outcomes of illustrative FSA enforcement actions against individuals.

The findings are that the FSA has developed a comprehensive and formidable apparatus for the individualization of corporate governance in the UK's financial services industry. It is argued that a discourse based on the interpretive evaluations of internal control and risk management may be replacing a discourse based on the quantitative techniques of management accounting, which may be characterised as the demise of the “calculating self” and the rise of the “auditable self”.

The FSA's approved persons' regime could be developed as a model for other areas of the private and public sectors, where for regulatory purposes it may be desirable to identify approved or official roles.

The ability of regulators to “make” corporate governance by rules and regulations is relatively unexplored. Also, the focus of corporate governance is on firms rather than individuals. The paper considers the extension of corporate governance from the firm to the individual that may be achieved by regulation.