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This article considers what has happened in the 20 years since REIO was founded. The article argues that in sub-Saharan Africa many of those self-same issues currently continue to plague Africans, and that these issues urgently need to be addressed if we are going to improve morality in Africa. In exploring these issues, we considered the circumstances which the Victorian novelist, Anthony Trollope (1815–1882), experienced when he lived in Ireland during the Irish famine. Our article argues as to the very similar circumstances which led to the Irish famine and, currently, lead to the recurrent famines in sub-Saharan Africa. Trollope explored both the causes and the ramifications of the Irish famine in his novel Castle Richmond. According to Trollope, many of the effects of the Irish famine could have been averted if those in the community able to help had had the necessary moral willpower to do so. Trollope was an extremely keen fox-hunter and argued as to the communal benefits of fox-hunting. The article also considers a current devotee of fox-hunting, the Oxford philosopher Roger Scruton, and we explore Scruton’s arguments as to the benefits of local communities. We argue that Scruton’s conservative arguments have much in common with that of the renowned communitarian, Michael Sandel. And that if their arguments were seriously considered much of what the Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo fears for her fellow sub-Saharan Africans might be avoided.

During recent years, financial economists have made a significant contribution to the rapid development of a vibrant and growing literature on organization structure and corporate governance. In reviewing the development of this literature, it becomes easy to see how the seminal contributions of Ronald Coase (awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991) have become the cornerstone of a new institutional economics. In particular, researchers following in Coase’s footsteps have clarified the conditions under which voluntary contracts between private agents can resolve a wide variety of so-called “agency problems.” More than just representing an important discovery of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy, Coase’s work has become an important foundation for the theory of contracts and for the whole field of “organization economics.”