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This study examines whether mutual funds buy or sell the stock of merger targets advised by their investment bank affiliates in advance of merger announcements and withdrawals. Existing literature finds mixed evidence on whether financial conglomerates act on conflicts of interest across divisions.

Affiliations between investment banks and mutual funds are identified, and the incidence and characteristics of mergers where funds trade the stock of targets advised by affiliates are examined.

Mutual funds buy or increase holdings of merger targets advised by their investment bank affiliate in advance of merger announcements, capturing highly positive abnormal returns. Mergers with this pre-announcement trading by affiliates are more likely to be completed successfully. Furthermore, mutual funds are more likely to liquidate holdings of a target in advance of a merger withdrawal if the fund is affiliated with the target's investment bank advisor, thus avoiding negative abnormal returns surrounding merger withdrawals. Results are robust after controlling for potential sample selection bias.

These findings contribute to the literature on affiliations between investment banking and mutual fund management, M&A outcomes, and to the discussion of potential conflicts of interest within banks. Also, this study is the first to examine trading activities by mutual funds affiliated with merger investment bank advisors during value-sensitive periods beyond the pre-announcement phase, such as the time period leading up to merger withdrawals.

We investigate institutional investors’ trading behavior of acquiring firm stocks surrounding merger activities for the period 1992–2001. We label investment companies and independent investment advisors as active institutions and banks, nonbank trusts, and insurance companies as passive institutions. We analyze the trading behavior of active and passive institutions surrounding merger announcements and their eventual resolution. Our results indicate that active institutions significantly increase their holdings of acquiring firm stocks for mergers with higher announcement period abnormal return and this increase is more pronounced for stock mergers than cash mergers. Active institutions display preference for stock proposals at the merger announcement on the basis of their prior beliefs and this is explained by the “overreaction phenomenon.” However, they update their beliefs between announcement and final resolution as more information arrives into the market. Finally, active institutions appear to correct their overreaction behavior by displaying their greater preference for cash proposals as compared to stock proposals at the quarter of eventual outcome. The trading behavior of passive institutions suggests that these institutions disregard the market response of merger announcement in trading acquiring firm stocks at the announcement quarter. The passive institutions gradually update their beliefs and utilize the information released at the announcement in rebalancing their portfolios at the final resolution.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the stock price movements for existence of informed trading prior to a merger announcement for the companies listed on the emerging markets of India for the period from 1996 to 2010.

This study applies several event study methodologies and regression analyses to analyze the stock price movement surrounding a merger announcement. The paper divides mergers in two different types: industry merger cases and non-industry merger cases and in two different time periods: recession and boom.

The results show that the information held only by insiders’ works its way into prices. The paper finds strong evidence of insider trading in the case of industry mergers and mergers during recessions.

The results from this study have immediate policy implications for India and other developing markets as the paper provides the type of mergers and time periods when merger announcements are more susceptible to insider trading.

The paper extends the literature on mergers and insider trading by analyzing firms trading on a developing capital market, which, unlike the developed markets, is characterized by inadequate disclosure and a weaker enforcement of securities regulations. The results support this notion and recommend Indian securities market regulators to tighten the lax regulations. In addition, the author document the divergence in price reaction to the merger announcements for different types of mergers: industry mergers and non-industry mergers, as well as for mergers during different market conditions: recession vs booming capital markets.

Research on mergers has made considerable progress over the last 50 years and has produced a vast body of literature, especially in the developed markets of the world. Little is known about the effect of announcements of mergers on shareholder wealth in the Indian context. Also unknown is the apparent influence of the market for corporate control on such wealth effects. The purpose of this paper is to fill gaps in this knowledge.

The study uses a standard event study method and statistically analyses share price and other secondary data.

It was found that the acquired firm shareholders enjoy significant wealth gains of 11.6 per cent in a 21‐day event window period, whereas the acquiring and combined firm shareholders do not do so. Mergers that do not see transfer of corporate control bestow significant wealth gains of 21.1 per cent on announcement on the target firm shareholders, whereas those where such a transfer takes place do not witness such gains.

One of the limitations of the study is the period. This study, a part of research covering a larger gamut of issues, necessitated the restriction of the time to the seven‐year 1996‐2002 timeline. The sample size of 34 usable, finally merged pairs of firms may appear limited, though several studies of this genre have used smaller sample sizes. However, the findings obtained are of value. The study points towards further research using a longer period that might help one to understand longitudinal variations in merger announcement effects on shareholder wealth. It also encourages future studies on several other factors which influence such effects.

The redistribution of shareholder wealth on merger announcement in India seems to be following a pattern similar to that found in many other studies, though the quantum of gains to the target shareholders is larger. Managers may also have to factor‐in the impact of the transfer of corporate control from the acquired to the acquiring firm on their assessment of shareholder wealth effects before announcing mergers.

The paper simultaneously adds to knowledge about wealth effects on merger announcement and the influence of the market for corporate control on this effect, in the Indian context.

We investigate global competitors’ reaction to the Citicorp–Travelers mega merger announcement and find that global competitors, especially banks in Europe and the US, reacted positively to the Citicorp and Travelers’ merger announcement. The uncertainties created by the investigations into the merger proposal had significant impact on the competitors’ stock price. The announcement that the merger had been consummated also elicited a significantly positive reaction from the rivals following the resolution of uncertainties emanating from the regulatory challenges. The positive reaction by competitors suggests that the merger was a wealth-creating event for the large firms in the financial services industry. The expected benefits outweighed any competitive effects resulting from the merger. The competitors’ reaction was, however, not homogenous. Our cross-sectional analysis shows that the abnormal returns earned by the competitors were higher the larger the competitor. In addition, the abnormal returns were greater for the US rivals. That the global competitors reacted positively to the Citicorp–Travelers mega merger announcement is consistent with our assertion that the merger had ramifications that go beyond regulatory concerns in the US.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of regulatory changes by the US Securities and Exchange Commission in 2000 on private information leakage prior to merger announcements.

Using a sample of 5,045 merger announcements between 1990 and 2008, the authors examine differences in information leakage between the pre- and post-regulation period merger announcements for acquirers using regression analysis.

The results suggest that regulatory changes have been effective in preventing private information leakage in merger announcements for large- and medium-sized firms, for high-tech firms, and for stock deals. The authors find that abnormal trading volume due to differences in information quality is reduced post-regulation for stock deals, high-tech firms, large- and medium-sized bidders, indicating less leakage of information after the new regulations. The authors find higher announcement returns post-regulation for the entire sample and for all subsamples except stock deals, small firms, and public targets. Higher announcement returns indicate that merger announcements are a greater surprise to the market due to a reduction in leaked private information after the regulatory changes.

The results have implications on future rule changes, on refinements of insider trading rules, regulation fair disclosure, and regulation M-A. The authors leave for future research why certain types of firms or deals are not impacted by regulatory changes.

Examine the effect of changes in information environment on merger announcements for acquirers because the impact likely has greater significance on acquirers than that on targets. Past studies have examined only targets.

This study seeks to analyze the differences between merger cancellations and three types of takeover failures: failures that are associated with targeted share repurchases (greenmail), failures in which the sole bidder simply withdraws the offer, and failures that are accompanied by a general share repurchase (buyback).

The paper uses event study methods and regression analysis.

The paper observes negative target stock price reactions around all types of takeover failures and merger cancellations. However, the cumulative effect of takeover attempts is positive, suggesting that even unsuccessful tender offers generate permanent gains to target firm shareholders, while the cumulative effect of canceled mergers is negative. Furthermore, the market reaction to greenmail‐induced takeover failure announcements is no worse than that of voluntary withdrawals, suggesting that greenmail may play an efficient role in mitigating the effects of takeover bid withdrawals. Finally, while bidder wealth is destroyed in takeover failures, the effect of merger cancellations on bidders is considerably more devastating.

The paper provides evidence of negative stock price reactions to all forms of merger failure. The paper also shows that the cumulative effect of all types of takeover failures is still positive: suggesting that being put into play is still beneficial overall but that canceled mergers destroy value for both targets and bidders. The paper shows that the market reaction to greenmail‐induced failure announcements is no worse than other forms of failure. Finally, while there is an immediate downturn in target prices around a failure, the negative outcome is more severe for the bidders. Thus, the market sees that there was something useful about the anticipated change in corporate control, which was lost when it failed to be completed.

This paper aims to investigate the consequences of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on information asymmetry in the banking sector. Specifically, the authors look at whether specific firm or deal characteristic influence information asymmetry levels between insiders and investors, as well as the impact of recent regulation such as the Dodd–Frank Act.

The authors decompose the M&A process into three periods (pre-announcement, negotiation and post-completion period) and document changes in the information asymmetry levels between insiders and investors through the M&A process. The authors capture changes in information asymmetry using six different spread-based information asymmetry measures.

The authors find evidence that information asymmetry increases following M&A announcement and decreases following deal completion. These findings are more pronounced for acquisitions involving a private target, all-cash deals and for mergers, as opposed to acquisition of assets. We find that overall, successful mergers improve the quality of the information environment, while failed deals degrade it. Additionally, the enactment of Dodd–Frank reduced the magnitude of the changes in information asymmetry during the M&A process. The results are important to regulators, policy makers and investors.

To authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that looks at the effect of bank M&As on information asymmetry as well as the effect of regulations on information asymmetry.

This study examines acquirers' earnings management in intragroup mergers to investigate whether stock-for-stock mergers between affiliated firms within the same family-controlled business group facilitate the controlling shareholder's rent seeking. Specifically, it investigates the acquiring firm's incentive to inflate premerger-announcement earnings in intragroup mergers given the controlling shareholder's relative equity holdings in the target and acquiring firms. The authors also examine how creditor monitoring affects premerger-announcement earnings in intragroup mergers compared to mergers between independent firms.

Using univariate analysis, panel regression based on accruals and cross-sectional regression based on discretionary accruals, the authors compare earnings management in mergers between affiliated firms with that in mergers between independent firms in the context of Korean business groups. The authors also compare the effects of creditors on earnings management in both cases.

Acquirers' premerger-announcement positive abnormal accruals are less evident in mergers between affiliated firms than in mergers between independent firms. These accruals decrease with high financial leverage only in the latter case, suggesting that creditor monitoring mitigates earnings management only in independent firm mergers.

The authors examine intragroup mergers, unlike previous studies, which focus on unaffiliated firm mergers. They also contribute to the literature on stock-for-stock mergers, showing that lender monitoring can mitigate the acquiring firm's premerger earnings management in unaffiliated firm mergers but not in intragroup mergers. These findings suggest that stock-for-stock mergers between affiliated firms may facilitate the controlling shareholders' rent seeking, which has policy implications for emerging markets with large family-controlled business groups.

Following the cultural distance and the acquisition cultural risk propositions, I study the impact of organizational culture differences among merging companies on their short-term stock performance following merger announcement. I assume that on announcement the market cannot access companies’ organizational culture detailed information, that it focuses on its exposure risk, and that it is inefficient. Using public information available prior to merger announcement, I construct proxies of organizational culture differences among the merging companies and a proxy of a factor mitigating the acquisition cultural risk. Analyzing 6,742 merger announcements released by publicly traded U.S. companies between 1984 and 2005, I show that following merger announcement the market prices a factor mitigating the acquisition cultural risk rather than the magnitude of specific organizational culture differences. Moreover, the market prices stocks of companies involved in high-risk mergers lower than of companies in low-risk mergers. Results are robust to size and period controls.