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This paper examines the impact of founder ownership concentration (FOC) on risk disclosures. It further investigates the moderating role of risk governance in the association between FOC and risk disclosures.

We use data from the top 200 Indian listed firms as our sample and rely on ordinary least squares (OLS) for our results. In addition, we use the propensity score matching, Heckman selection model and instrumental variable estimates for robustness checks.

We find that FOC decreases the risk disclosures. However, the effectiveness of risk management committee composition (risk governance) mitigates the negative influence of FOC on risk disclosures.

The paper is built on the agency theory. Based on the agency theory, the ownership concentration has two implications: first, it reduces the conflicts between managers and shareholders. Here, the managers act in favour of shareholders and therefore, brings more risk disclosers. Second, it invites conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. The study is, therefore, interesting to see the cost and benefits of FOC on risk disclosures.

The study has practical implications for the regulatory bodies to encourage risk disclosures and benefit the outsiders of the firm. It also has implications for the companies to see the benefits of risk management committee as improved risk governance.

It contributes to the literature of risk disclosures and risk governance in emerging economies. It is the first study to investigate the role of risk governance in mitigating the adverse effects of founder’s ownership on risk disclosures in developing economies. It also contributes to the theory of agency cost and information asymmetry.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the moderating effect of the board of directors on the strategic decisions made by family firms, and to understand the board attributes that can alleviate the aversion of family-owned firms toward mergers and acquisitions (M&A).

The study uses a sample of several firms listed in India from 2006 to 2019 with 19,813 firm-year observations. The empirical tests have been performed using logistic and negative binomial regressions. The study also tests for endogeneity with the help of Heckman (1979) two-step treatment effects model.

The study shows that board characteristics like smaller board-size, presence of outside directors, lower intensity of board activity, presence of busier board members and separation of board chair and CEO positions alleviate the inhibition of family firms toward M&A.

The findings imply that investors and policymakers can encourage family firms to have smaller boards, more independent directors, passive boards and CEO nonduality to reduce their aversion toward risky activities. Family-owned firms could consider a board comprising members with multiple directorships who can bring wider knowledge and expertise which can reduce the perceived threat to socioemotional wealth (SEW) and alleviate their aversion toward M&A.

Ownership concentration in family firms posits a unique challenge in terms of their aversion toward M&A. This study is one of the few that highlight the relevance of the monitoring and advisory role of the board in alleviating this aversion in an emerging market like India.