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The authors explore the impact of an emerging technology, blockchain technology, on diverse governance mechanisms and sustainable supply chain practices and how its relationships with the linkage of these elements.

The methodology incorporates a literature review and a qualitative empirical analysis of the Electronic Product Environmental Assessment Tool (EPEAT) standards. Expert opinions from various firms and organizations within the electronics sector are assessed. Through a thematic analysis, the relationships are identified and examined.

Data immutability, transparency and traceability capabilities of blockchain technology enhance the relationship between environmental standards and ecological supply chain sustainability practices. Although immature, the blockchain can influence the governance of supply chain sustainability practices. Immaturity of technology, lack of expertise, sharing information and trust have delayed adoption.

There is limited empirical evidence regarding blockchain's impact on governance mechanisms, specifically hybrid public-private mechanisms and sustainable supply chain practices. The study further evaluates how particular blockchain features may exert varying influences on these aspects and different sustainable supply chain traits. As an exploratory study, it proposes new areas for further research, including how blockchain's traceability function can improve sustainability standard adoption. Additionally, there is a call for integrating blockchain with technologies like IoT and sensors which may influence supply chain governance mechanisms, standards and sustainability practices.

This paper aims to assess the effects of external governance mechanisms on the performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Togo.

Using annual time series data from a sample of 30 MFIs during the period 2011–2015, the authors apply panel data econometrics in their estimations.

The results indicate that the notation by a rating agency positively and significantly affects the financial return of MFIs. The quality and the regularity of the audits negatively and significantly influence the financial performance (measured by return on assets and operating self-sufficiency) but favorably and significantly influence social performance (increased number of active borrowers (NAB) and reduced size of loans). Furthermore, supervision increases the amount of individual loans but decreases the NAB, which means deterioration in social performance. Overall, this paper shows that external governance mechanisms significantly affect the performance of Togolese MFIs, but with varying effects depending on the mechanism considered.

The sample size of 30 MFIs is small, and the geographic coverage of the study is restricted to MFIs operating in the city of Lomé, Togo. The authors did not have access to the information regarding the portfolio at risk at 30 days, even though it is a measure of financial performance. Likewise, we did not have access to the appendices to the financial statements for the calculation of prudential ratios. This method, which consists of asking the institutions using a questionnaire if they comply with prudential standards, may be biased because this study cannot verify the authenticity of the responses given that the standards are quantitative.

The study findings advocate that improving the financial and social performance of MFIs requires improving the quality of external governance mechanisms. MFIs should then pay close attention to well-functioning external governance mechanisms.

As MFIs are key social actors in a society, all mechanisms that contribute to their efficiency benefit society.

This study contributes to the corporate governance literature by showing that external governance mechanisms influence performance. These external mechanisms are complementary disciplinary measures to internal governance mechanisms and other tools.

This paper aims to analyze the influence of governance mechanisms in the generation of relational rents for supplier in short food supply chains (SFSCs).

This study used data from a survey of 181 organic producers in SFSCs, using partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) with the aid of the SmartPLS® 3 software for the analysis.

The results show the relationship between formal and informal governance mechanisms and relational rents. The predominance of informal mechanisms enabled a higher explanatory power than that provided by formal governance mechanisms. Further, the authors found that the complementary use of governance mechanisms has a stronger impact on generating relational rents. However, contextual factors such as relationship time, power asymmetry and uncertainty in demand have not shown any influence on governance mechanisms for generating relational rents.

The result sheds new light on the relevance of governance mechanisms to foster relational rents to suppliers in SFSCs. It also shows that contextual factors that affect relationships in traditional supply chains do not play a relevant role in SFSCs due to their specific characteristics.

Contemporary supply chain relationships inherently rely on delegation of work between organizations and, thus, are subject to agency problems for which a wide range of governance mechanisms exist. This review of agency theory (AT), across four distinct fields, explains the connection between governance mechanisms and supply chain relationship types.

The study uses a systematic literature review (SLR) of articles using AT in a supply chain context from the operations and supply chain management, general management, marketing, and economics fields.

The authors categorize the governance mechanisms identified to create a typology of agency relationships in supply chains.

The developed typology provides parsimonious theory on different forms of supply chain agency relationships and takes a step towards a “supply chain-oriented agency theory” explaining and predicting relationship types and governance in supply chains. Furthermore, a future research agenda calls for more accurate measuring of agency costs, to examine residual gains alongside residual losses, to take a dual-sided perspective of agency relations and to adopt AT to examine more complex supply networks.

The review provides a menu of governance mechanisms and describes situations under which these mechanisms could be deployed to guide managers when developing their supply chain relationships.

The first review to combine and elaborate views from four major disciplines using AT as a lens to supply chain relationships. Expanding the traditional set of governance mechanisms provides academics and practitioners with a bigger “menu” of options to consider.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse how the use of governance mechanisms in buyer-supplier relationships in the supply chain (SC) are related to the maturity of relationships and the generation of relational rents.

Several studies have analysed interorganisational governance in SCs. However, to the best of the knowledge, no study has focussed on the use of different types of governance mechanisms through maturity stages in buyer-supplier relationships and as a consequence, its relational rents. The aim of this paper is to analyse how the use of governance mechanisms in buyer-supplier relationships in the SC are related to the maturity of relationships and the generation of relational rents. To achieve this goal, this paper carried out multiple case studies.

The results show that changes in the use of formal and informal governance mechanisms contribute to the generation of relational rents and relationship continuity. This paper identified that a reduction in power asymmetry by the buyer may allow for the greater use of informal governance mechanisms and greater relational rents. Moreover, the paper highlights that a relationship might advance or regress throughout the maturity stages, according to the commitment of the buyer to maintain the relationship with the supplier.

The study has the limitation of having chosen polar case studies in the organic sector in Brazil to illustrate the theoretical discussion and propose a model to be tested via further research. This study considered institutional factors in the analysis that might not affect dyadic relationships in other sectors and countries.

As a managerial contribution, the results indicate that when the buyer uses both kinds of mechanisms complementarily and encourages the utilisation of informal mechanisms, relationships become more resilient to adverse events.

The study also contributes towards valuing the role of organic farmers and encourages the government and business community to reflect on the challenges and opportunities in the sector.

Based on four propositions created by evaluating both the empirical data and previous literature, this paper proposes a buyer-supplier relationship maturity model rather than an overall SC maturity model. This paper also elaborated on the arguments of Dyer et al. (2018), proposing a causal explanation of how a relationship might advance or regress throughout the maturity stages, according to the commitment of the buyer to maintain the relationship with the supplier using governance mechanisms. This change in maturity stages, in turn, affects relational rents for the dyad.

Blockchain is a technical solution integrating multiple technologies, with the potential to overcome the drawbacks of organizational governance. Given the emergence and prevalence of blockchain, its importance for organizational governance has progressively increased. Therefore, this study aims to analyze how blockchain restructure organizational governance.

This study presents a structured systematic literature review of blockchain-enabled applications across diverse organizational governance models and several case studies to illustrate them. Based on the above analysis, governance mechanisms, transaction upgrading and challenges are proposed.

Based on the literature review and typical applications, the authors summarize the advances in the research on the theoretical and practical applications of blockchain in organizational governance. We also identify the influence mechanisms of organizational governance and investigate transaction upgrading based on blockchain. Finally, the authors discuss three types of challenges (i.e. administrative, technical and environmental) to the relationship between blockchain and organizational governance. Along with the development of blockchain applications, the impact of blockchain on organizational governance has progressed in both theory and practice. Therefore, these findings will have significant implications for both academics and practitioners.

This paper makes three key theoretical contributions: we review the literature on the impact of blockchain on organizational governance and present typical cases to illustrate it; propose four governance mechanisms for the application of blockchain in organizational governance; and propose an innovating-and-matching-oriented model of transaction upgrading based on blockchain.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the variation in the relationship between governance mechanisms and the effect of the relationship on contract performance, especially in controlling partner opportunism.

This study conducts a comparative case analysis of contract governance of “National Health Insurance Program” in India. The data are collected using field research through in-depth interviews and direct observation across three states in India.

The authors find that the governance mechanisms continue to complement and substitute, both in a dynamic manner, but until aligned with the nature of transaction, they are ineffective to mitigate opportunism, a critical dimension of contract performance. Inappropriate governance mechanisms inflate the gaps in incomplete contracts, resulting in partner opportunism.

The study draws findings from healthcare context and service-based contracting; therefore, the applicability of this study may vary in other contexts.

The paper highlights the need for building flexibility in the governance structure while designing contracts. Further, managers need to combine both governance mechanisms dynamically to align with the nature of the transaction to control partner opportunism.

The authors contribute to the existing debate on the conundrum of the relationship between governance mechanisms and provide a new explanation. The authors propose that it is not the specific governance mechanisms but the alignment of the governance mix with the nature of the transaction that determines the contract performance, especially control of partner opportunism.

Project governance has been linked to project success because top management support is necessary for projects to succeed. However, top managers are time poor and it is not clear which project governance mechanisms are effective for project success. The purpose of this paper is to address this issue and identify project governance mechanisms that correlate with success.

This is a quantitative study. A theoretical model of project governance was developed and tested with secondary industry data gathered from 51 global organisations and 66,817 responses.

The results found five project governance mechanisms (Vision, Change, Sponsor, KPI and Monitor) significantly correlate with project success and are effective at different stages in the project lifecycle.

Earlier research has found a relationship between project governance and project success but it has not been specific enough to guide top managers in practice. This is the first research to take this next step and identify project governance mechanisms that correlate with project success. One finding of this research that has particular value is the identification of when in the project lifecycle a particular governance mechanism is most effective.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the effect of country and corporate governance mechanisms on zero leverage is heterogeneous across market- and bank-based financial systems.

Using logit regression methods and a sample of listed firms from 14 Western European countries for the 2002–2016 period, this study examines the propensity of firms having zero leverage in different financial systems.

Country governance mechanisms have a heterogeneous effect on zero leverage, with higher quality mechanisms increasing zero-leverage propensity in bank-based countries and decreasing it in market-based countries. Board dimension and independency have no impact on zero leverage. A higher ownership concentration decreases the propensity for zero-leverage policies in bank-based countries.

This study’s findings show the importance of considering both country- and firm-level governance mechanisms when studying the zero-leverage phenomenon and that the effect of those mechanisms vary across financial and legal systems.

For managers, this study suggests that stronger national governance makes difficult (favours) zero-leverage policies in market (bank)-based countries. In bank-based countries, it also suggests that the presence of shareholders that own a large stake makes the adoption of zero-leverage policies difficult. This last implication is also important for small shareholders by suggesting that investing in firms with a concentrated ownership reduces the risk that zero-leverage policies are adopted by entrenched reasons.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to consider simultaneously the effects of both country- and firm-level governance mechanisms on zero leverage and to allow such effects to vary across financial systems.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the relationship between knowledge transfer characteristics in alliance and alliance governance mechanisms, the influence of alliance governance mechanisms on knowledge transfer consequences and investigate the role of environmental uncertainty in knowledge transfer of alliance.

Survey data were collected mainly in high-tech industries of China, the firms in which often establish alliance for the purpose of learning and knowledge transfer often takes place in that alliance. Finally, 293 usable samples were included in subsequent analysis. Multiple regression analysis was used to examine the hypotheses.

The extent of relational (/formal) governance mechanism used in alliance has a stronger positive relationship with the extent of tacit (/explicit) knowledge transfer in alliance than with the extent of explicit (/tacit) knowledge transfer in alliance between them; environmental uncertainty impairs relational governance mechanisms and enhances formal governance mechanisms used in alliance; both relational and formal governance mechanisms could facilitate knowledge transfer in alliance; environmental uncertainty hinders knowledge transfer and negatively moderates the relationship between alliance governance mechanisms and knowledge transfer.

This paper finds the relationship between knowledge transfer in alliance and alliance governance mechanisms, and the role of environmental uncertainty, providing managers with direct implications about how to manage alliance with different knowledge transfer characteristics for the purpose of facilitating knowledge transfer in alliance; provides managers more details about the dark side of the environmental uncertainty in knowledge transfer, also reminds public policy-makers paying enough attention for the improvement of institutional environment to deal with uncertainty.