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The purpose of the paper is to clarify the relationship between stakeholder interests and the ownership of a company, and to specify the distinctions between three types of maximization: shareholder‐, stakeholder‐owner‐ and total stakeholder maximization.

This conceptual paper first analyzes how company‐related rents are connected to different stakeholder groups. These rents are defined as the monetary and non‐monetary returns from stakeholder involvement in a company, in excess of what stakeholders could achieve from their best alternatives. The paper distinguishes between general stakeholder benefits and the additional owner benefits a stakeholder secures by having controlling ownership. The stakeholder having the highest net benefits (benefits minus costs), and thus paying the highest price for ownership, will be the controlling owner. The controlling stakeholder‐owners' benefits are those which are maximized by the company. This leads to the second part of the paper, which analyzes different types of maximization.

The general type of maximization that companies pursue is stakeholder‐owner maximization. Maximization of shareholder value is a special case of stakeholder‐owner maximization. Only under quite restrictive assumptions is shareholder maximization larger or equal to stakeholder‐owner maximization. Total stakeholder maximization is calculated on the sum of the returns to all stakeholders including shareholders. Because of problems of measurement and practical application, total stakeholder maximization is difficult or impossible to achieve. Firms generally approximate to total stakeholder maximization by implementing stakeholder‐owner maximization under constraints defined by other stakeholder interests. With stronger regulation, pressure from different stakeholder groups, and more emphasis on corporate social responsibility, the decision area where the company can simultaneously maximize stakeholder‐owners' returns and stakeholder interests will be increased.

This paper breaks new ground by linking controlling ownership and stakeholder interests/rents. This is used to give precise definitions on three types of maximization: shareholder‐, stakeholder‐owner, and total stakeholder maximization.

In the past two decades, corporate casino gambling has expanded from being legal in only two U.S. states (Nevada and New Jersey) in the late 1980s to 12 states in 2007. As a result, the annual gambling revenue realized by the casino industry has grown from $9 billion in 1991 to more than $34 billion in 2007. The growth of gambling revenue as a source of additional state tax revenue, however, has not been matched by a corresponding increase of academic research on casino gambling. The research addresses the question of whether states are maximizing collected corporate casino tax revenue and finds that states fall into one of four clusters: undertaxing; overtaxing; undertaxing but close to the revenuemaximization tax level; and overtaxing but close to the revenue-maximization tax level.

This paper examines the limitations on monetary profit maximization assumption in Quaker businesses, historically one of England's most successful set of business people. This view challenges the central theoretical assumptions of management and strategic entrepreneurship by demonstrating the influence of religious institutional logic over the profit maximization drive in business.

Using a historical analysis of Quaker religious institutional logic, the authors demonstrate how Quakers’ religious logic of simplicity in lifestyle and equality of all people led, in turn, to actions by Quaker businesses that limited the monetary profit maximizing for their businesses. Such actions are consistent with the Quakers’ belief that linked their business activities to their religious beliefs.

The present analysis shows that English Quakers had specific beliefs, enforced by the group’s willingness to expel members that limited monetary profit maximization among Quaker businesses. Thus, the authors challenge the typical assumptions of business scholars by demonstrating that business entities can succeed economically even when they do not embrace profit maximization as their core element. This paradoxical finding has the potential to significantly expand management and strategic entrepreneurship theory.

The authors discuss how religious logic can replace profit maximization as a foundation for business. This insight enriches not only the understanding of business but also of religious institutional logic. Finally, the authors address the call for greater use of historical analysis in the management literature.

The study develops a mathematical model of the firm to derive theoretical foundations for the balanced scorecard concept (BSC). The model is based on several parts which are integrated into a company model. This model includes the demand function, the production function and the objective function of the firm which are depicted by traditional microeconomic concepts. Demand is presented as a function of price and customer relationship management (CRM) costs. Production is assumed to depend on labor, capital, and development and learning (D&L) costs. Simple dynamics is included both in the demand and production function. The strategy of the firm is depicted by the objective function based on profit and net sales. The output variables of the model are classified as the four perspectives of BSC. The effects of the objectives (strategies) on the importance (shadow prices) of the constraints are analysed. It is shown that a change in the objectives may alter the order of their importance. Thus, a change in the strategy should be accompanied with a change in the focus of BSC. Furthermore, non‐financial and financial performance ratios may change in opposite directions, when the strategy is shifted towards revenue maximization. Thus, inconsistencies with the interpretation of cause and effects may emerge, when the strategy is shifted. Numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the results.

This paper aims to extend previously reported research on the Sisyphus Effect in consumers’ decision making to consumers classified as either maximizers or satisficers. The purpose of this study was to examine whether the Sisyphus Effect influences consumer behavior related to purchasing brand-extension products and explore factors that influence the Sisyphus Effect in brand extension.

A survey was administered to participants in three studies. A convenience sample consisting of 875 participants was asked to complete the questionnaires. The authors assessed whether the participants were maximizers or satisficers. In addition, the participants were given information on brand-extension products that differed in the level of involvement and price and were asked whether they would purchase them.

Using regression analysis, the authors found that consumers’ willingness to purchase extended products became weaker as maximization tendencies became stronger. In addition, purchase involvement was confirmed as a situational factor that can increase maximization tendencies even in individuals who do not maximize as a default strategy. Finally, for low-involvement extended products, the authors found that product price played a moderating role in the negatively correlated relationship between maximization tendency and willingness to purchase a product.

This study suggests avenues to increase the effectiveness of a brand-extension strategy and illustrates some tactics that are not likely to be successful.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between corporate governance structures and stakeholder and shareholder value maximization perspectives in 267 African banks from 2006 to 2011.

The authors used the Prais–Winsten ordinary least squares and random effect regression models to explore this relationship to ensure consistency and efficiency in results. The data for this study were collected from Bankscope.

The results of this study show that corporate governance structures such as CEO duality, nonexecutive members and extreme large board size lead to a reduction in both shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. However, audit independence and board size also promote both shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. Although gender diversity promotes profit maximization, it was not significant in any of the models estimated. The results further suggest that the same corporate governance structures promote and detract shareholder and stakeholder value maximization in Africa although the effect of corporate governance structures was weightier on shareholder value maximization confirming the agency theory.

From these findings, bank management must pursue the institution of good corporate governance structures and avoid weak corporate governance structures to promote shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. Also equity holders may have to pay particular attention to corporate governance structures because they benefit the most from the institution of good corporate governance structures.

This study explores and compares how corporate governance structures promote shareholder and stakeholder value maximization separately in African banks. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first of such studies.

The purpose of this paper addresses the issue of inconsistent findings regarding the impact of consumers' need for touch (NFT) on webrooming behavior. It investigates the moderator of maximization by drawing on maximizing mindset theory.

Three studies were carried out to test the hypothesized relationships. The first study investigated the impact of autotelic NFT on webrooming intention. The second study examined the impact of instrumental NFT on webrooming intention. The third study tested all hypotheses by the structural equation modeling approach.

The results confirm moderation by consumers' maximizing mindset. The moderated mediation analyses show that the interaction effect of autotelic NFT and maximization influences webrooming intention indirectly via anticipated sensory pleasure. Likewise, the interaction effect of instrumental NFT and maximization influences webrooming intention indirectly via product fit uncertainty.

The study draws on maximizing mindset theory to show that consumers' autotelic NFT and instrumental NFT drive their webrooming intentions depending on the activation of their maximizing mindset. The nonsignificant relationship between autotelic NFT and webrooming intention in the context of satisficers explains the conflicting findings reported in the literature. Consumers' affective and cognitive responses were also studied to uncover the underlying mechanisms of their webrooming intention. This research contributes to the literature by enhancing the understanding of webrooming behavior.

Revealed preference axioms provide a simple way of testing data from consumers or firms for consistency with optimizing behavior. The resulting non-parametric tests are very attractive, since they do not require any ad hoc functional form assumptions. A weakness of such tests, however, is that they are non-stochastic. In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of two non-parametric approaches that can be used to derive statistical tests for utility maximization, which account for random measurement errors in the observed data. These same approaches can also be used to derive tests for separability of the utility function.

Baumol’s impact on the development of managerial theories of the firm is investigated here through the material found in Galbraith’s archives. In 1957, Galbraith published a paper claiming that the impact of macroeconomic policies varies with market structures (competitive versus oligopolistic). That publication prompted Baumol (1958b) to send Galbraith a manuscript dealing extensively with a crucial question of managerial theories of the firm, namely, the trade-off between sales and profits. I argue that Baumol’s critiques and Galbraith’s answers largely explain the way Baumol (1958a, 1959) framed his alternative model of the behavior of corporations. He reasoned in terms of maximization of sales with a profit constraint as their main objective. In return, Business Behavior, Value and Growth fostered the development of Marris’ (1964) and Galbraith’s (1967) theories of the corporation. While Tullock (1978) provides a narrative in which the sales maximization hypothesis has two main branches – Baumol for the one and Galbraith–Marris for the other – the paper demonstrates that these branches are intimately connected.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple microeconomic model of the firm to give theoretical foundations for the balanced scorecard concept (BSC).

The model consists of demand, production, and objective functions integrated into a resource allocation model. Costs, sales volume, and sales revenue grow at constant rates. Strategy is depicted by a weighted objective function of profit and net sales. Output variables are classified according to the four perspectives of BSC.

The effects of the parameters, especially growth and strategy, on the importance of the perspectives and on performance measures, are shown.

Many results are based on assumptions of a constant growth; and of constant demand and production functions. Empirical research is welcome to give evidence on demand and production elasticities, the shifts of strategy, their effects on performance measurement; and tension between profit and revenue maximization.

BSC should be elastic to respond to shifts of strategy towards revenue maximization. When a shift is happened, the focus in BSC should be transferred towards customer relationship management and development and learning; and the time‐series of performance measures should be interpreted cautiously. Even for a constant strategy, the time‐series of non‐financial and financial measures may give a contradicting signal.

This research paper introduces a new growth model of the firm useful in the theoretical analysis of BSC. It can be applied to assess the importance of the four perspectives of BSC, trade‐offs between them, and relationships between non‐financial and financial measures.