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This study problematizes the prevailing normative and managerial-dominated view of self-initiated employee ambassadorship on social media from a power perspective. The aim is to provide a more nuanced and critical understanding of the negative aspects of this phenomenon.

The empirical material encompasses qualitative interviews with employees from 14 organizations and Foucault’s concept of disciplinary discursive power to analyze which and how discourses exert power over employee communication on social media and what role visibility plays in it.

This study indicates that employee ambassadors’ social media communication is governed by two discourses that create complex tensions, where ambassadors constantly must negotiate between self-branding requirements and an authenticity paradox. These tensions intensify through visibility on social media, where employees strategize and situationally silence their communication through self-monitoring and self-surveillance practices. Conclusively, the findings also outline the need for further critical research to offer a deeper understanding of power relations that influence the communication practices of organizational members.

The paper contributes to a more nuanced understanding of self-initiated employee ambassadorship on social media and highlights disciplinary power relations that go beyond organizational borders.

The findings underscore that organizations need to address the critical aspects of self-initiated employee ambassadorship and act as facilitators to support employees in their navigation process.

This paper contributes a new critical power perspective on employee ambassadorship on social media.

Signals, e.g. information released by firms about new products attract the attention and scrutiny of customers, competitors and other stakeholders. In product management, an important area of research focuses on the economic value of such signals. However, extant studies consider valuation effects of product signals independently, and largely ignore how the value of a product signal at launch depends upon prior preannouncements. This study aims to investigate how the dependence of new product development (NPD) signals on past preannouncements affects firms’ security prices.

The study develops a conceptual model that draws upon information asymmetry theories, i.e. signaling and agency theory to hypothesize the effect of firms’ product introduction announcements on security prices given two antecedent preannouncement types (costless and costly signals). Hypotheses are tested by conducting an event study analysis on a sample of 149 matched observations (product introduction announcement preceded by a certain type of preannouncement).

Empirical results confirm the hypothesis that positive valuation effects are observed during product launch that is preceded by initial costless product signaling. In contrast, for ex ante costly product signaling, launch events are not diagnostic enough to affect value. Since organizations’ NPD communications can revise investors’ prior beliefs, they need to be understood in more detail and managed strategically.

Valuation metrics can be noisy with a potential to influence information events. In addition, product introduction signals may be deployed more frequently in certain fast-paced industries, e.g. hi-tech.

Managers can incorporate signal dependence in product communications. For example, in costless ex ante product signaling situations, initial economic loss may be recovered through launch announcements. Furthermore, when costly signals have been used earlier, firms may economize on promotion costs during launch.

Past research has focused on assessing the economic value of new product signals independently, i.e. as discrete events. Absent is an examination of valuation effects due to the dependence of launch signals on prior preannouncements. This paper addresses the dependence gap, and empirical results show that even if firms do not deploy product signals ex ante, value can be created through ex post launch announcements.