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This research paper aims to explore blended learning implementation in universities that are on a low budget, essentially determining the more important steps to invest during the initial stage of implementation and investing in costly IT infrastructure or training faculty for student-centred learning and relevant pedagogies.

A survey of 254 students at the University of Jordan (UJ) has been administered. Student satisfaction with blended learning is related to the two main variables of IT infrastructure and teacher training for blended learning strategies.

The results indicate that faculty training has a significantly higher impact on predictability of satisfaction than IT infrastructure. Therefore, low-budget institutions should focus first on helping instructors shift to student-centred styles of pedagogies before making large investments in IT infrastructure.

Because of the fact that the chosen setting did not completely lack IT infrastructure, the results may need to be retested with at least two individual institutions, one where advanced IT infrastructure is available and one where it is completely lacking. More can also be done to vary the limited location of the study.

This paper suggests that making costly investments into technology is not a necessary first step during the initial stages of blended learning adoption in developing countries.

This paper addresses the need for more research on blended learning adoption in developing countries with scarce finances and lack of resources sufficient to achieve faculty training and IT infrastructure improvement together. Several universities make costly investments only to lack sufficient blended learning pedagogies which often results in failed blended learning implementation.

Inconsistencies and contradictions in the US government's story of hijackers and their masterminds are examined to account for what happened on 9-11. A little-known initial FBI list of 19, scrutinized for four names not on its final list, calls into question the FBI naming process. We discovered 11 of the FBI-named finalists could not have been on those planes, with 10 still alive and another's identity improvised by a double. The Dulles videotape, essentially the government's case that hijackers boarded the 9-11 flights, is found to have serious problems including authentication, as does the so-called bin Laden “confession” video.

Were “hijackers” known to be in the US before intelligence alleges it knew? Evidence is examined which shows that they were closely monitored by agencies which denied this knowledge; in particular, an undercover FBI agent lived with them the prior year.

Noting government refusal to disclose evidence called for by investigators, we find some pieces altered or fabricated and others confiscated or destroyed. Other revelations point to hijackers with national security overrides, protection in their alternate roles as drug traffickers, and deep political connections with government elites. We investigate patterns, reminiscent of historical intelligence involvement, revealing the presence of a covert intelligence operation disguised as an outside enemy attack.

Al-Qaeda is conventionally portrayed as a monolithic, hierarchical organization whose activities – coordinated by the network's leader Osama bin Laden – are the source of international terrorism today. Al-Qaeda is considered a radical tendency within the broader Islamist Salafi movement, legitimizing its terrorist operations as a global Islamist jihad against Western civilization. Al-Qaeda's terrorist activity today is considered, “blowback” from long finished CIA and western covert operations in Afghanistan.

The conventional wisdom is demonstrably false. After the Cold War, Western connections with al-Qaeda proliferated around the world, challenging mainstream conceptions of al-Qaeda's identity. Western covert operations and military – intelligence connections in strategic regions show that “al-Qaeda” is a network whose raison d’etre and modus operandi are inextricably embedded in a disturbing conglomerate of international Western diplomatic, financial, military and intelligence policies today. US, British, and Western power routinely manipulates al-Qaeda through a complex network of state-regional and human nodes. Such manipulation extended directly to the 9-11 hijackers, and thus to the events of 9-11 itself.11This paper advances an original argument based partially on research in Ahmed (2005), supplemented here with significant new data and analysis. Also see Ahmed (2002).

The purpose of this paper is to comparatively examine the cost and the overlooked revenue efficiency of Islamic and commercial banks in the aftermath of the crisis, operating in nine MENA-based countries during the 2010-2017 financial period, where the established empirical work is relatively limited. The authors also update the research where they use recent data sets and they provide for a targeted, structured literature review pre- and post-crisis in the Gulf region.

The authors examine cost and revenue efficiency of 25 major Islamic banks (IBs) and 25 major conventional banks (CBs). They conduct tests on the determinants of such variables. In the first stage of the analysis, they measure efficiency by using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) technique. The analysis performs regressions where these also reveal that the bank efficiency index is influenced by various bank type-specific attributes. It also seems that tighter restrictions on bank activities are negatively associated with bank efficiency. Second stage analysis, which accounts for banking environment and bank-level characteristics, confirms these results.

Conventional banks are both more cost and revenue efficient than Islamic banks over the period under examination. The analysis also reveals that the bank efficiency index is influenced by bank-type attributes. Greater presence of fixed capital resources has positive effects on growth in both Islamic and conventional banking. The major constraints impeding Islamic banking growth include labour costs. The authors examine whether and how bank-type orientation affects the cost and revenue efficiency of conventional and Islamic banks. They find that post-crisis Islamic banks underperform their conventional counterparts on both accounts within a mixed banking system.

This study did not include comparative data before the 2008 financial crisis. There is also a great deal of heterogeneity among Islamic banks in the samples that have been examined here and by other researchers and the constructed efficiency scores should be interpreted cautiously as divergent Islamic banks are pooled in the same samples.

This study identified factors that may help bank managers to improve their financial outlook by controlling revenue and cost efficiency profitability. These factors could as well help to understand how some indicators affect both cost and revenue efficiency, particularly in Islamic banking. It also seems that tighter restrictions on Islamic bank activities are negatively associated with bank efficiency. Islamic banks that directly compete with their conventional counterparts in the aftermath of the crisis are less efficient on both the cost and revenue frontiers. They are potentially hindered by the differential regulations of supervising authorities in dual banking systems.

The authors provide recommendations regarding regulatory and other issues that are relevant to Islamic banking and further research is suggested. Findings are relevant to a variety of stakeholders (managers, policymakers and regulators). Islamic banking authorities could re-examine the benefits of partially moving to a more standardized/conventional system of banking by lifting some trading restrictions. In addition, developing and maintaining managerial skills is an indispensable instrument for the long-term endurance of any system. A related aspect is thus an effort to determine the holistic efficiency (including managerial) of Islamic banks as a guide for policymakers to improve managerial performance.

There is relatively limited empirical work that investigates the efficiency between Islamic and conventional banking in the aftermath of the crisis in the Gulf region despite the growing importance of this region on political and economic levels. The authors also examine the revenue efficiency measure often under-researched in the literature and particularly important for comparative studies. Overseas-owned banks have attained much higher infiltration levels in middle-eastern countries over the past decade. It has also been suggested that market penetration differences may also be related to bank efficiency concerns among countries and their financial systems as opposed to types of banks.