This research paper aims to explore blended learning implementation in universities that are on a low budget, essentially determining the more important steps to invest…
This research paper aims to explore blended learning implementation in universities that are on a low budget, essentially determining the more important steps to invest during the initial stage of implementation and investing in costly IT infrastructure or training faculty for student-centred learning and relevant pedagogies.
A survey of 254 students at the University of Jordan (UJ) has been administered. Student satisfaction with blended learning is related to the two main variables of IT infrastructure and teacher training for blended learning strategies.
The results indicate that faculty training has a significantly higher impact on predictability of satisfaction than IT infrastructure. Therefore, low-budget institutions should focus first on helping instructors shift to student-centred styles of pedagogies before making large investments in IT infrastructure.
Because of the fact that the chosen setting did not completely lack IT infrastructure, the results may need to be retested with at least two individual institutions, one where advanced IT infrastructure is available and one where it is completely lacking. More can also be done to vary the limited location of the study.
This paper suggests that making costly investments into technology is not a necessary first step during the initial stages of blended learning adoption in developing countries.
This paper addresses the need for more research on blended learning adoption in developing countries with scarce finances and lack of resources sufficient to achieve faculty training and IT infrastructure improvement together. Several universities make costly investments only to lack sufficient blended learning pedagogies which often results in failed blended learning implementation.
Inconsistencies and contradictions in the US government's story of hijackers and their masterminds are examined to account for what happened on 9-11. A little-known initial FBI list of 19, scrutinized for four names not on its final list, calls into question the FBI naming process. We discovered 11 of the FBI-named finalists could not have been on those planes, with 10 still alive and another's identity improvised by a double. The Dulles videotape, essentially the government's case that hijackers boarded the 9-11 flights, is found to have serious problems including authentication, as does the so-called bin Laden “confession” video.
Were “hijackers” known to be in the US before intelligence alleges it knew? Evidence is examined which shows that they were closely monitored by agencies which denied this knowledge; in particular, an undercover FBI agent lived with them the prior year.
Noting government refusal to disclose evidence called for by investigators, we find some pieces altered or fabricated and others confiscated or destroyed. Other revelations point to hijackers with national security overrides, protection in their alternate roles as drug traffickers, and deep political connections with government elites. We investigate patterns, reminiscent of historical intelligence involvement, revealing the presence of a covert intelligence operation disguised as an outside enemy attack.
Al-Qaeda is conventionally portrayed as a monolithic, hierarchical organization whose activities – coordinated by the network's leader Osama bin Laden – are the source of…
Al-Qaeda is conventionally portrayed as a monolithic, hierarchical organization whose activities – coordinated by the network's leader Osama bin Laden – are the source of international terrorism today. Al-Qaeda is considered a radical tendency within the broader Islamist Salafi movement, legitimizing its terrorist operations as a global Islamist jihad against Western civilization. Al-Qaeda's terrorist activity today is considered, “blowback” from long finished CIA and western covert operations in Afghanistan.
The conventional wisdom is demonstrably false. After the Cold War, Western connections with al-Qaeda proliferated around the world, challenging mainstream conceptions of al-Qaeda's identity. Western covert operations and military – intelligence connections in strategic regions show that “al-Qaeda” is a network whose raison d’etre and modus operandi are inextricably embedded in a disturbing conglomerate of international Western diplomatic, financial, military and intelligence policies today. US, British, and Western power routinely manipulates al-Qaeda through a complex network of state-regional and human nodes. Such manipulation extended directly to the 9-11 hijackers, and thus to the events of 9-11 itself.11This paper advances an original argument based partially on research in Ahmed (2005), supplemented here with significant new data and analysis. Also see Ahmed (2002).