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Summarizes what business and management games are, their history, the different types of games that are available and what their uses are. Through interviews and a questionnaire survey the users of games are studied to ascertain who they are, why they use or are involved with games and what they think of them.

As Gonedes and Dopuch point out, there are many alternative approaches to the allocation of financial accounting information which might be viewed as competitors to ASC, FASB and other extant processes. Even if one begins with the ethical premise that “individual preferences are to count” and it is assumed that some sort of regulatory approach is needed, there are still at least three basic types of standards‐setting processes worthy of consideration: (1) “representative or expert body” processes; (2) “voting” processes; and (3) “demand‐based” (i.e. “willingness‐to‐pay”) processes. While the first type relies on the delegation of decision making authority to a body of “representative” or “expert” parties, the latter two types base their respective decisions on ordinal preference and demand information elicited directly from the affected parties themselves.

The purpose of this paper is to verify existence of political connection of firms in India. For this purpose the paper first presents a theoretical model and then tests empirically the movement of stock prices during two state elections in India.

The methodology is theoretical modelling where the paper applies the standard Cournot model of oligopoly. The paper then applies correlation and Wilcoxon Paired Rank Sum test to verify the results of the theoretical model by using data from the Indian stock market during the election results.

The theoretical result states that some firms opt for political connection and some remain independent in an oligopoly. It also shows that political connection affects stock price. The empirical results find out that divergent responses of stock prices to the election results can be linked to politically connection.

The theoretical model is a simple two firm model and not generalized to n number of firms. The empirical test considers only two state elections and applies simple statistical test. The study is restricted to one country only.

The paper has practical implications for stock market. It has implications for corporate governance and for political governance. This is important since political connection of firms has emerged as an important issue in India.

The paper is important as it addresses the issue of political connection of firms, which have ramifications for social equilibrium. In a democratic country like India any nexus between political party and firms may adversely affect not only corporate governance but also political governance.

This paper looks at political connectedness theoretically in a federal structure, an issue not addressed so far in the literature. Second it considers not so discussed topic of market perception of political connection in India. The originality of the paper is that it presents a theory and also verifies the theoretical results with empirical test.

This paper aims to make a submission to the UK's Economic and Social Research Council as part of its international benchmarking review of economics.

The approach takes the form of a discussion of the health of economics in the UK from the perspective of heterodox or pluralist economists who are members of the Association for Heterodox Economics.

Research assessment based on peer review is damaging economics in the UK because, as currently conducted, it does not promote pluralism. This will lead to a monolithic discipline that will reject new and controversial ideas and arguments.

The current research assessment and subject benchmarking approaches must be completely changed so as to promote pluralism.

This is the first document by a heterodox economics association to challenge the research assessment and subject benchmarking conventions in the UK and also in Europe.

This chapter investigates which factors contribute to (small) shareholder attendance using a hand-collected panel data set with information about turnout rates, voting behaviour and ownership structures of companies that are listed in seven Member States. We document how ownership concentration positively affects total shareholder turnout, but has a negative effect on small shareholder turnout. Voting power also affects small shareholder turnout rates; the greater small shareholder voting power, the greater their eagerness to vote. In addition, total and small shareholder turnout is higher the more important the meeting agenda. And, small shareholders tend to free-ride on large institutional shareholders and corporate insiders, but the magnitude of the free-rider effect is larger for the latter category of blockholders. Our results provide some important insights for the debate on shareholder rights and the role of the AGM in corporate governance. The results show that, despite the criticism, the AGM still plays an important role in small shareholder monitoring. Some topics seem to clearly motivate small shareholders to attend, while others are less relevant. Policy makers can stimulate shareholder monitoring by focusing on the factors that are determined in this study, but it is important to consider possible endogeneity issues as well.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between financial decisions and ownership structure by using the control contests on a sample of Italian listed companies.

The analysis adopts a balanced panel data set of 984 firm-year observations for the period of 2002-2013, with estimation using a generalized method of moments.

The results appear to confirm both the hypotheses of the alignment of interests and the entrenchment effect. The entrenchment and alignment effects are not found to be alternatives but rather are found to co-exist. The presence of a coalition of minority shareholders acts as a tool to control agency costs, particularly when the coalition is instrumental in the contestability of corporate control.

These findings suggest that minority shareholders may have a larger impact than previously identified by strategically aligning with other shareholders to form coalitions. This study provides several practical implications. First, dividend payout is not necessarily a good instrument to control and monitor agency costs. This is because the payout can be used to expropriate benefits from the minority shareholders. Second, high ownership concentration does not always reduce agency costs. Third, a non-collusive coalition can be more useful in the monitoring of agency costs than other tools, such as the debt level.

This study shows that there is considerable value to the firm when individual blockholders come together in a contestable environment and become instrumental in making business decisions. The results support the contention that contestability is an excellent deterrent to dampen the expropriation of benefits to minority shareholders. This study also provides evidence that cash holding can be a good substitute for dividends and debt in the effort to limit agency costs.

Certain elements of Hayek’s work are prominent precursors to the modern field of complex adaptive systems, including his ideas on spontaneous order, his focus on market processes, his contrast between designing and gardening, and his own framing of complex systems. Conceptually, he was well ahead of his time, prescient in his formulation of novel ways to think about economies and societies. Technically, the fact that he did not mathematically formalize most of the notions he developed makes his insights hard to incorporate unambiguously into models. However, because so much of his work is divorced from the simplistic models proffered by early mathematical economics, it stands as fertile ground for complex systems researchers today. I suggest that Austrian economists can create a progressive research program by building models of these Hayekian ideas, and thereby gain traction within the economics profession. Instead of mathematical models the suite of techniques and tools known as agent-based computing seems particularly well-suited to addressing traditional Austrian topics like money, business cycles, coordination, market processes, and so on, while staying faithful to the methodological individualism and bottom-up perspective that underpin the entire school of thought.