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Mobile banking (M‐banking) involves the use of a mobile phone or another mobile device to undertake financial transactions linked to a client's account. M‐banking is one of the newest approaches to the provision of financial services through information communication technology (ICT), made possible by the widespread adoption of mobile phones even in low income countries. Emerging mobile banking (m‐banking platforms) in developing markets enable two sided markets, bringing together mobile handset users with other mobile users and commercial partners. It is the argument of this paper that the emergence of m‐banking platforms has the potential for spill‐over effects, and that these spill‐over effects will require regulatory authorities to develop appropriate policy responses.

This article derives from research on the m‐banking strategies of mobile network operators (MNOs) in developing markets, and the regulatory responses to these strategies. Field visits were made to the Philippines and Kenya where m‐banking platforms are well established, and in depth interviews took place with companies that had succeeded in launching m‐banking platforms, or were considering strategic responses in markets where competitors had launched platforms. Companies were identified from the existing body of literature, observation and personal contact. Additionally, data were collected from developing case studies.

M‐banking has the potential to bring basic banking and electronic transactions services to unbanked consumers in developing markets. But in enabling two‐sided markets, m‐banking solutions also provide specific questions for telecommunications industry regulators. Regulators need to question if the elements are in place for m‐banking networks to tip towards a single platform, especially in markets with dominant operators that hold significant market share.

Because of the multi‐homing costs inherent in most existing m‐banking platforms, these platforms introduce both economic and psychological switching costs for consumers. In turn, these switching costs can have the impact of reinforcing existing network effects in markets where the incumbent already holds significant market share for voice traffic. There are a number of options available to telecommunications regulators in responding to the emergence of m‐banking platforms, and authorities should take a measured approach to achieve optimal societal and industry outcomes.

This paper fulfils an important void in the current literature related to the growth of m‐banking platforms in emerging markets. While there has been an increasing body of literature examining the potential socio‐economic impact of m‐banking in developing markets, the purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of m‐banking for competitive dynamics between competing firms, and the related issues for regulatory authorities.

This study aims to analyze the development of digital market characteristics particularly focusing on how the strategic choices of platforms are not fully reflected in pricing. In addition, the implications for the development of theories of harm are investigated to explore the necessity of a relevant market definition in assessing infringement and evaluating the adequacy of Indonesian competition law.

This study is a legal analysis that uses statutory approaches, cases, comparative law and the development of theories of harm in digital mergers. The case approach is conducted by analyzing three cases decided by the Indonesia Business Competition Supervisory Commission. This approach provides insight into the response of Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha concerning the merger and acquisition cases in the digital era as well as the provision of different analyses in conventional markets. However, competition can be potentially damaged in digital markets and a comparative law approach is taken by analyzing digital merger cases decided by authorities in other countries.

Results reveal that the digital market has created a “relevant market” that is challenging and blurred due to multi-sided network effects and consumer data usage characteristics. Platform-based enterprises’ prices fluctuate due to the digital market’s network effect and consumer data statistics. Smartphone prices depend on the number of apps and consumer data. Neoclassical theory focusing on product markets and location applied in Indonesia must be revised to establish a relevant digital economy market. To evaluate digital mergers, new harm theories are needed. The merger should also protect consumer data. Law Number 27 of 2022 on Personal Data Protection and Government Regulation on the Implementation of Electronic Systems and Transactions protects online consumers, a basic step in due diligence for digital mergers. The Indonesian Government should promptly strengthen the notion of “relevant markets” in the digital economy, which could lead to fair business competition violations like big data control. Notify partners or digital merger participants of the accessibility of sensitive data like transaction history and user location.

The development of digital market characteristics has implications for developing theories of harm in digital markets. Indonesian competition law needs to develop such theories of harm to analyze the potential for anticompetitive digital mergers in the digital economy era.

The purpose of this study is to explore the coopetition relationships between platform owners and complementors in complementary product markets. Drawing on the coopetition theory, the authors examined the evolutionary trends of the coopetition relationships between platform owners and complementors and explore the main influence factors.

The authors used Lotka–Volterra model to analyze the coopetition relationship between platform owners and complementors, including the evolutionary trends as well as the results. Considering the feasibility of sample data collection, simulation is used to verify the effects of different factors on the evolution of coopetition relationships.

The results show that there are four possible results of the competition in the complementary products market. That comprises “winner-take-all for platform owners,” “winner-take-all for complementors,” “stable competitive coexistence” and “unstable competitive coexistence,” where “stable competitive coexistence” is the optimal evolutionary state. Moreover, the results of competitive evolution are determined by innovation subjects’ interaction parameters. However, the natural growth rate, the initial market benefits of the two innovators and the overall benefits of the complementary product markets influence the time to reach a steady state.

The study provides new insights into the entry of platform owners into complementary markets, and the findings highlight the fact that in complementary product markets, platform owners and complementors should seek “competitive coexistence” rather than “winner-takes-all.” Moreover, the authors also enrich the coopetition theory by revealing the core factors that influence the evolution of coopetition relationships, which further enhance the analysis of the evolutionary process of coopetition relationships.

The platform economy reflects the business model of some of the largest and fastest-growing firms in the economy. Platform business models emerge and thrive because of the potential profit in taking advantage of transactions cost reductions to connect people for mutual benefit, and this value creation is best understood by thinking about the epistemology of decentralized market processes. Three essential aspects of knowledge are relevant to platform business models: (1) knowledge can be private and diffuse; (2) knowledge can be contextual; and (3) knowledge may not exist outside of the economic process. After defining and analyzing the technology, economic, and institutional aspects of platforms the author defines and applies market epistemology to explore how platforms harness technological and organizational features to create value-enhancing market platforms by exploiting the epistemic benefits of technology-enabled decentralized market processes. The author concludes by using this epistemic framework to propose an electricity distribution platform business model – the retail electricity industry is undergoing a process of technological dynamism, and as a regulated infrastructure industry, evolving into a decentralized market industry is presenting challenges to which this epistemic framework can bring increased understanding.

We witness rising tensions between online gig-economy platforms, incumbent firms, regulators, and labor unions. In this chapter, we use the framework of institutional logics as an analytical lens and scheme to understand the fundamental institutional challenges prompted by the advent of the online gig economy. We view gig-economy platforms as corporations that organize and self-regulate markets. In doing so, they span two parallel markets: the market for platforms competing to provide intermediation services and the market for the self-employed competing on platforms to provide peer-to-peer services. Self-regulation by platforms also weakens the traditional roles of the state. While the corporation and market logics empower the platform, they weaken self-employed suppliers as platforms’ design constrain suppliers to grow into a full-fledged business by limiting their entrepreneurial freedom. At the same time, current labor law generally does not classify suppliers as employees of the platform company, which limits the possibility to unionize. The current resolutions to this institutional misalignment are sought in “band aid solutions” at the level of sectors. Instead, as we argue, macro-institutional reform may be needed to re-institutionalize gig work into established institutional logics.

This study aims to provide insights into Airbnb’s exit from the China market, specifically from the perspective of platform competition.

Based on the understanding of the evolution and competition of peer-to-peer (P2P) accommodation market in China and the double-edged network effects, this viewpoint article provides an in-depth discussion on Airbnb’s withdrawal from the China market.

This viewpoint paper contends that Airbnb faced increasing challenges in establishing unique competitive advantages against local rivals, who demonstrate a capacity for innovation and maintaining loyal customers in adapting to the market evolution. Consequently, this may inhibit Airbnb from attracting the mainstream market and lead Airbnb into a negative spiral, exacerbated by indirect network effects.

This study offers insights into the failure of an internationalisation process, drawing from an analysis of the competitive environment and the competition strategies of P2P accommodation platforms in China. These findings have practical implications for the implementation of international business strategies in P2P accommodation.

本观点文章旨在基于平台竞争的视角对爱彼迎退出中国的现象进行阐释

基于对中国共享住宿/民宿市场的演变和竞争、双边网络效应的理解, 本文对爱彼迎退出中国进行了深入探讨。

本文提出, 爱彼迎在建立独特竞争优势以应对本地竞争对手方面面临日益严峻的挑战, 因为本地竞争者在适应市场变化方面展现出突出的创新和留客的能力。这可能会阻碍爱彼迎吸引主流市场, 并导致其跌入由间接网络效应加剧的恶性循环中。

基于对中国共享住宿平台的竞争环境和策略的分析, 本文洞悉了一个国际化失败的案例。本文的发现对于共享住宿的国际化策略实施具有实践意义。

Este artículo de opinión pretende aportar ideas sobre la salida de Airbnb del mercado chino, concretamente desde la perspectiva de la competencia entre plataformas.

Basándonos en la comprensión de la evolución y la competencia del mercado de alojamientos P2P en China, así como en los “efectos de red de doble filo”, este artículo de opinión ofrece una discusión en profundidad sobre la retirada de Airbnb del mercado chino.

Este documento sostiene que Airbnb enfrentó desafíos crecientes para establecer ventajas competitivas únicas frente a sus rivales locales, demostrando estos últimos una capacidad de innovación y del mantenimiento de la lealtad de sus clientes al adaptarse a la evolución del mercado. En consecuencia, esto puede inhibir a Airbnb para atraer al mercado principal y llevar a la empresa a una espiral negativa, exacerbada por efectos de red indirectos.

Este estudio ofrece una visión del fracaso de un proceso de internacionalización, a partir de un análisis del entorno competitivo y de las estrategias de competencia de las plataformas de alojamiento P2P en China. Estos resultados tienen implicaciones prácticas para la aplicación de estrategias empresariales internacionales en los alojamientos P2P.

The attempt to establish a common European framework for core platforms' duties and responsibilities toward other actors in the digital environment is at the core of the recent scholarly debate surrounding the Digital Markets Act (DMA) proposal. In particular, the everlasting juxtaposition between the “data power” – as emerging from recent cases (Section 2) – that dominant tech companies enjoy and the concept of consumer sovereignty (Section 3) lies at the core of the proposal's attempt to identify digital core platforms as market gatekeepers. Accordingly, this chapter critically investigates the divide between power imbalance and consumer sovereignty in light of the architecture designed by the DMA, with a specific focus on its effectiveness in identifying gatekeepers' power drivers (Section 4). After highlighting the main critical aspects of the pertinent rules, opportunities for fruitful developments are then identified through the reframing of some of the notions considered in the proposal, and namely the role of “lock-in” effects and “data accumulation” (Section 5). Lastly, this chapter suggests that the DMA advancements – while desirable – are bound to be fragmentary in the absence of a wider appraisal of the nature of data power imbalance dynamics in the modern digital markets (Section 6).

With the rapid development of the digital economy, an increasing number of digitalized two-sided platforms have deployed the tying strategy to leverage their market power from the core two-sided product to other two-sided products in the competitive market, which transforms the competition among single platforms into that among platform ecological networks. To clarify the mechanism of the formation of the digital platform ecological networks, this paper aims to analyze the expansion and stability of platform ecology by exploring the impacts of network externalities and sellers’ heterogeneity on the tying strategy of two-sided platforms.

This paper develops a game model of two-sided platforms based on Choi and Jeon (2021), which highlights the decisive influence of non-negative price constraints (NPC) on platforms’ tying motivation. Taking the operating systems market as an example, we expand from the perspective of platform service differences to relax the NPC and explore the internal logic of platform ecosystem expansion.

Platforms have an incentive to charge lower prices or even subsidize buyers when the network externalities on the sellers’ side are relatively strong. When the product is highly differentiated and heterogenous, platforms are motivated to tie to capture more buyers with a lower price and grab excess profits from sellers. Eventually, tying is able to consolidate the two-sided platform ecological networks by excluding competitors, capturing user value and deterring entry.

In order to describe the characteristics of platform ecological network more generally, this paper extends the research based on the analyses of Choi and Jeon (2021) by (1) allowing horizontal differences between tied products and (2) relaxing the NPC. Unlike Choi and Jeon (2021), this paper allows platforms to charge users of two-sided platforms at negative prices (or to subsidize them). (3) Setting simultaneous pricing in two-sided platforms. Classical two-sided market theory stresses that the presence of cross-network externalities can give rise to a “chicken and egg” problem.

Aiming at the lack of explanatory power of traditional industrial organization theory in cross-border competition, by introducing the idea of ecological niche, the authors aim to explore the competitive situation of platform-based enterprises when they operate in multiple fields.

With the help of ecological niche theory, construct the niche width and niche overlap index of typical enterprises in the platform economy, and find out the advantages and the intensity of competition through comparative analysis.

In an environment of cross-border competition, large enterprises have significant competitive advantages, and the fierce competition is concentrated among medium-sized enterprises.

The conclusions of this paper not only provide new insights for explaining the phenomenon of cross-border competition in the platform economy, but also provide theoretical reference for the anti-trust enforcement practice in the platform economy.

The paper discusses the rationale for a widespread reliance on Codes of Conduct (CoC) in European crowdfunding through the lenses of economic theories of self-regulation. By analysing the institutional design of CoCs in crowdfunding, the paper illustrates the differences in their regulatory context, inclusiveness, monitoring and enforcement. It offers the first systematic overview of substantial rules of CoCs in crowdfunding.

A comparative case study of nine CoCs in Europe is used to illustrate differences in their institutional design and discern the economic purpose of the CoC.

The institutional design of different CoCs in Europe mainly supports voluntary theories of self-regulation. In particular, the theory of reputation commons has the most explanatory power. The substantial rules of CoC in different markets show the potential sources of market failure through the perspectives of platforms.

CoCs appear in various regulatory, cultural, and industry contexts of different countries. Some of the institutional design features of CoC might be a result of these characteristics.

Crowdfunding associations wishing to develop their own CoC may learn from a comparative overview of key provisions.

For governments in Europe, contemplating creating or revising bespoke crowdfunding regimes, the paper identifies areas where crowdfunding platforms perceive market failure.

This paper is the first systematic study of self-regulatory institutions in European crowdfunding. The paper employs a theoretical framework for the analysis of self-regulation in crowdfunding and provides a comparison of a regulatory context, inclusiveness, monitoring and enforcement of different CoCs in Europe.