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In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, transparency became a rhetorical token used to provide a solution to financial problems. This study examines how transparency materialized in the context of the European securitization industry, which was largely blamed for the credit crunch. The authors show that although transparency was broadly associated with a political call for financial system reform, in the European securitization industry it provided the basis on which to repurpose its market infrastructure. The authors introduce the concept of transparency work to show that transparency is a market achievement organized as a standardization network of heterogeneous actors aiming at establishing a new calculative infrastructure for managing credit risk. Combining insights from information infrastructure research and Economic Sociology, the authors contribute to a distributed and networked understanding of information infrastructure development.

This chapter explores the concept of market infrastructure, which is tentatively defined as a materially heterogeneous arrangement that silently supports and structures the consummation of market exchanges. Specifically, the authors investigate the enactment of market infrastructure in the US grocery retail sector by exploring how barcodes and related devices contributed to modify its market infrastructure during the period 1967–2010. Combining this empirical case with insights from previous research, the authors propose that market infrastructures are relational, available for use, modular, actively maintained, interdependent, commercial, emergent and political. The authors argue that this conception of market infrastructure provides a powerful tool for unveiling the complex agencements and engineering efforts that underpin seemingly superficial, individual and isolated market exchanges.

Universities face incredibly difficult, complex decisions concerning the degree to which they participate in the process of commercializing research. The U.S. government has made an explicit policy decision to allow funded entities to obtain patents and thereby has encouraged participation in the commercialization of federally funded research. The Bayh-Dole Act enables universities to participate in the commercialization process, but it does not obligate or constrain them to pursue any particular strategy with respect to federally funded research. Universities remain in the driver's seat and must decide carefully the extent to which they wish to participate in the commercialization process.The conventional view of the role of patents in the university research context is that patent-enabled exclusivity improves the supply-side functioning of markets for university research results as well as those markets further downstream for derivative commercial end-products. Both the reward and commercialization theories of patent law take patent-enabled exclusivity as the relevant means for fixing a supply-side problem – essentially, the undersupply of private investment in the production of patentable subject matter or in the development and commercialization of patentable subject matter that would occur in the absence of patent-enabled exclusivity.While the supply-side view of the role of patents in the university research context is important, a view from the demand side is needed to fully appreciate the role of patents in the university research context and to fully inform university decisions about the extent to which they wish to participate in the commercialization process. Introducing patents into the university research system, along with a host of other initiatives aimed at tightening the relationship between universities and industry, is also (if not primarily) about increasing connectivity between university science and technology research systems and the demands of industry for both university research outputs (research results and human capital) and upstream infrastructural capital necessary to produce such outputs.In this chapter, I explore how university science and technology research systems perform economically as infrastructural capital and explain how these systems generate social value. I explain how the availability of patents, coupled with decreased government funding, may lead to a slow and subtle shift in the allocation of infrastructure resources.

The chapter analyses the role of smart grid technology in the German energy transition. Information technologies promise to help integrate volatile renewable energies (wind and solar power) into the grid. Yet, the promise of intelligent infrastructures does not only extend to technological infrastructures, but also to market infrastructures. Smart grid technologies underpin and foster the design of a “smart” electricity market, where dispersed energy prosumers can adapt, in real time, to fluctuating price signals that register changes in electricity generation. This could neutralize fluctuations resulting from the increased share of renewables. To critically “think” the promise of smart infrastructure, it is not enough to just focus on digital devices. Rather, it becomes necessary to scrutinize economic assumptions about the “intelligence” of markets and the technopolitics of electricity market design. This chapter will first show the historical trajectory of the technopolitical promise of renewable energy as not only a more sustainable, but also a more democratic alternative to fossil and nuclear power, by looking at the affinities between market liberal and ecological critiques of centralized fossil and nuclear based energy systems. It will then elucidate the co-construction of smart grids and smart markets in the governmental plans for an “electricity market 2.0.” Finally, the chapter will show how smart grid and smart metering technology fosters new forms of economic agency like the domo oeconomicus. Such an economic formatting of smart grid technology, however, forecloses other ecologically prudent and politically progressive ways of constructing and engaging with intelligent infrastructures.

The chapter dwells on barriers for restoration and development of country's infrastructure on the platform of individual physical and practical forces, which are peculiar for the states with developing and transitional economy, as well as for developed countries. Directions of formation of the organizational model of restoration and development of country's infrastructure on the platform of individual physical and practical forces are presented; forms of public–private partnership are studied, as well as possibilities of financing. An important aspect is finding the mechanisms of leveling the risks according to the given classification. A mechanism of organizational model of controlling development of country's infrastructure and its structural elements are provided.

The chapter is devoted to the factors aimed at optimizing the partnership of public and private sectors in the sphere of public infrastructure development. In modern conditions of economic slowdown and budget consolidation in Russia, the infrastructure has become the most important driver of economic growth and public–private partnership (PPP) – the most perspective form of cooperation of public and private investors of infrastructure projects. PPP interpretation as a structural relationship of economic system allows the authors to model optimal combination of formal and informal institutions in order to stimulate long-term economic growth. It becomes promising to model replacement of budget funds by private investment to ensure positive impact on the Russian development despite the budget consolidation. It could only be achieved in the case of formal institutionalization of appropriate conditions for private investors as to low transactional costs and attractive financial parameters. There have been determined some PPP standards connected with public infrastructure projects in order to reduce capital expenditures of the budget funds and increase the inflow of private investment. The authors have managed to obtain model estimates and graphic interpretation of government expenditures’ efficiency increase that could help to structure the fiscal conditions to induce positive multiplier effect as a result of PPP forms improvement in the public infrastructure development.

The authors analyse the development and implementation of the standard for the Legal Entity Identifier as a case of creating information-based assets through the establishment of an infrastructure that certifies the accuracy and validity of identity data. The authors term this process capitalization by certification. The findings describe a process whereby an identification infrastructure – including a non-replicable methodology for assessing data quality – is established that contributes to making the developer and controller of that methodology, an irreplaceable intermediary for users of the infrastructure; this in spite of the need for an associated reference data infrastructure to be open and widely accessible to all participants for the infrastructure to be successful. The findings indicate that in the process, assets are created on the basis of openly accessible data through certifying of a desired set of qualities to be achieved by adopters and the infrastructure. This, in turn, provides a starting point toward better understanding and theorizing of wider processes of data capitalization, encountered throughout the digital economy but which are also crucial to establishing information infrastructures that support cognitive action.

I analyze cash flow and transparency characteristics of listed infrastructure investment companies and funds and compare this unique infrastructure sample with a non-infrastructure reference group. I confirm the common hypothesis that infrastructure investments provide more stable cash flows than non-infrastructure investments. However, I do not find that investors positively value this cash flow stability. Instead, more volatile cash flows are valued with a premium. On the other hand, earnings management is valued with a discount. Together with a punishment for complex financial and governance structures this indicates a punishment for a lack of transparency by investors. My chapter also offers evidence that infrastructure investments in general are valued with a positive “infrastructure premium” that is not driven by more stable cash flows. I find additional evidence that sector specifics and regulatory risk play a significant role for the valuation of infrastructure investment companies and funds.