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The rise of the sharing economy has brought with it a huge variety of new organizational forms and innovative business models. An integral part of these forms and models is the communities and members of sharing-economy organizations, since they significantly contribute to value creation for these organizations. Relying on community member contributions, though, is a challenge for these organizations because fluid community boundaries and voluntary membership makes it difficult to coordinate their activities. This chapter investigates the under-researched question of how sharing-economy organizations govern the actions of their community members. Following an abductive approach that included site visits, participant observations, and 67 interviews, we develop a framework that illustrates four different types of governance: pure market, pure clan, market-hierarchy hybrid, and clan-hierarchy hybrid. The framework explains differences among these types depending on the main activity (providing resources or producing jointly) and the primary aim of the community (business orientation or social orientation). This study thus contributes to research on both governance in general and to sharing-economy organizations in particular by capturing the variety and diversity of community forms, governance practices, and business-model configurations.

Massive increases in international trade and investment extend industries beyond national borders, so states and enterprises have become the two critical players in the boundary of industries. The purpose of this paper is to provide a new conceptual framework to analyze the role of states and enterprises in enhancing the industrial international competitiveness (IIC).

Being a research‐based paper, the topic is approached by theoretical analysis and conceptual development. The paper reviews IIC literature and argues for a rational study ICC in the context of global value chain. Next, the paper puts forward a two‐dimensional governance model and five typical governance systems of the industries of developing countries. Examples of typical governance system are given based the practice of Chinese industries, such as appeal, rare earths, automotive, etc.

This paper constructs an industrial two‐dimensional governance model of the developing countries in the context of global value chain based on the interaction between industry governance and market governance, and also presents five typical governance systems – free to market, public governance, industrial governance, joint governance and network governance. Different governance system reflects different roles of states and enterprises played in the global value chains and result in different IIC in the end.

The limitation is based primarily on methodology. The two‐dimensional governance model provides target‐oriented guidance for foresting international competitiveness of different types of industries. Future studies should include more in‐depth case studies on different governance system.

The paper presents a framework of the industrial two‐dimensional governance model, which emphasizes the important role of both states and enterprise in the IIC in the context of global value chain.

The paper aims to investigate how the governance practices of public-sector entities (PSEs) in Tanzania are shaped by competing institutional logics and strategies used to manage the logics.

In the paper, empirical evidence was gathered through documentary sources, non-participant observations and in-depth interviews with members of boards of directors (BoDs), chief executive officers (CEOs), internal and external auditors, senior executives and ministry officials. The data were analyzed using thematic and pattern-matching approaches.

The paper shows that bureaucratic and market logics co-exist and variations in governance practices within and across categories of PSEs. These are reflected in CEO appointments, multiple roles of CEOs, board member appointments, board composition, multiple board membership, board roles and evaluation of board performance. External audits also foster market logic in governance practices. The two competing logics are managed by actors through selective coupling, compromise, decoupling and compartmentalization. Despite competing logics, the bureaucratic logic remains dominant and is largely responsible for variations between the underlying logics and governance practices.

The findings suggest that public-sector reforms in emerging economies (EEs) must account for the fact that governance practices in PSEs are shaped by different institutional logics embedded in socioeconomic, political and organizational contexts and their corresponding management strategies.

Few previous studies explicitly report relationships between institutional logics and the governance practices of PSEs in EEs. The current study is one of few empirical studies to connect competing institutional logics and the associated management strategies, as well as governance practices in EEs in the context of public-sector reforms.

This paper aims to develop a theoretical framework based on transaction cost economics that identifies key factors shaping public agencies’ governance of supplier relationships and related performance implications.

The paper presents an extended transaction cost framework for research on public procurement (PP) with a corresponding set of propositions. Transaction cost theory and specific features of and challenges to the PP function identified in extant literature constitute the main elements of the framework.

This conceptual paper makes three sets of proposals. First, public agencies tend to rely on market governance of supplier relationships and when PP deploys non-market governance, such governance tends to be of a unilateral (vs bilateral) kind. Second, increases in purchasing competence and autonomy of PP and particularly if implemented in tandem, will reduce PP’s overreliance on market governance and increase PP’s use of non-market governance. Third, PP should perform better for less complex transactions – and when contracting complexity relates to safeguarding of specific assets rather than when complexity relates to environmental and behavioral uncertainty. Increases in competence and autonomy should increase PP’s performance, particularly for complex transactions.

Public agencies may be in a better position to align governance solutions with transaction complexities by developing their procurement competence, decentralizing procurement decisions and increasing the flexibility of national and international procurement regulations. Private companies selling to public agencies need to be aware of and able to adapt to PP practices such as extensive use of market governance and unilateral governance as the primary form of non-market governance.

The paper discusses how public agencies can improve procurement performance through better alignment of governance of supplier relationships with transaction attributes and thereby increase the quality of public services.

The paper relies on a well-established theoretical perspective, enabling identification (and, potentially, correction) of governance misalignment in the public sector.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on the characteristics, efficiencies and interaction of many alternative market governance modes, by the approach of comparative institutional experimentation.

First, a highly simplified model of market economy is developed, which is embedded in a three‐layer governance structure. Then the model is transplanted into laboratory experimentation, so the characteristics and efficiencies of different governance modes can be identified by observing the subjects' behaviors under them.

The experimental results show that the market with governance structure based on rule is more efficient than the market with governance only based on long relation and based on preference or belief, and the dynamic improvement of governance based on rule has a destructive effect on the governance based on relation and governance based on preference or belief.

These results have profound implications for the development or enhancement of market institutions in transition or developing countries.

This paper aims to analyse the governance structures of the Indonesian chilli value chain, price volatility issues across the chain and to critically explore the value chain actors' perceptions and responses to price volatility.

The authors used semi-structured interviews with 148 primary actors of the Indonesian chilli value chain. In-depth interviews with 22 key stakeholders – from local, provincial and national levels – were conducted in order to obtain additional information about their roles and the current policies and challenges in the chilli industry. The authors also conducted focus group discussions (FGDs) with farmers and support providers and held a national workshop to gather governance and price volatility risk-related information.

The Indonesian chilli value chains are long, complex and involve multiple actors. Most relationships within the value chains are based on market governance in which price regulates transactions. Most value chain actors shared a similar perception of price volatility and its causes. Under different governance structures, the value chain actors identified production, product characteristics and marketing as a major cause of price volatility. Although strategies applied by the value chain actors varied, in the main they are all aimed at minimising the impact of price volatility. Contractual arrangements are viable alternatives to minimising price risk.

This research relies primarily on qualitative data derived from purposive data collection methods, which may reduce the ability to generalise the findings. A quantitative analysis is required to validate the level of price volatility perceived by the stakeholders and to assess the cause and impact of price volatility across the chain. Future research should focus on proposing and assessing potential policy interventions that address price volatility, in order to facilitate the development of the Indonesian chilli industry.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the governance structures of the Indonesia chilli value chain, the value chain actors' perceptions of price volatility and their responses under the different types of governance in a developing country context.

The governance of capital market institutions did not receive much interest compared to their banking sector counterparts, partly due to their different ownership structures. Recent trends; increased competition, technological advances, structural changes, globalization, all had their share of impact on governance systems of capital markets institutions particularly on exchanges. Corporate governance of non-financial firms and capital markets institutions differ in several ways. Firstly the role of risk management differs since they may impose systemic risks to the financial system. Secondly well-implemented governance structures and processes are required but are not sufficient in capital markets since there are several conflicts of interests to be addressed. Therefore whether and how effectively they function is what matters. Thirdly the governance structures of such institutions exhibit different effectiveness on their decisions.The governance of FIs in capital markets is discussed in terms of board structure and management, risk governance, supervisors, shareholders, executive compensation, role of regulators, authorities and values and culture. The role of stock exchanges in corporate governance are discussed separately in terms of implementing corporate governance codes, demutualisation and its impact on regulations, transparency and accountability issues and the effects of M&As among exchanges. Market needs strong analytical tools and reliable benchmarks to assess governance risk. The corporate control and the regulation of the institutions by the exchanges when the corporations (regulated) are the competitors of the exchanges (regulators) or owned by the stockholders of the exchanges must be addressed. The risk of regulatory arbitrage, calls for the need of harmonisation among regulators. Better regulation of FIs and greater global coordination among regulators are seen as the most two important issues to prevent another crisis.

This study aims to provide an empirical test of an existing theoretical model depicting the governance modes used by international franchisors when entering international markets.

Using a unique panel data set of 222 market expansions by US firms over a seven-year period, this paper tests hypotheses regarding the factors affecting the franchisors’ choice of governance modes when entering foreign markets.

Franchisors use governance modes with lower levels of control when faced with environmental uncertainties due to corruption, economic downturns and when the geographic distance is large. Moreover, the franchise system assets and its local market assets also affect the choice of governance modes.

Firms need to balance the costs of environmental uncertainty with the need to safeguard the firm’s capabilities and resources using governance modes with appropriate levels of control. This balance changes as the franchise company gains more experience in the local market and as once-emerging markets continue to develop.

This research identified additional governance modes used by franchisors compared to previous studies. Using multiple theoretical perspectives, the study supported significant portions of the Jell-Ojobor and Windsperger (2014) model of franchisor governance mode choice.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the conceptualisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as a mode of governance in marketisation via the perspective of historical institutionalism.

The paper is based on a qualitative case study of the marketisation of Danish passenger rail from the 1990s to date where marketisation has been set on hold since 2011 due to the activities of the SOE.

The paper shows that market governance was layered on the hierarchal governance of the SOE that was later turned into a hybrid governance mode through corporatisation. This layered set-up provided the state with a double governance grip that drove marketisation until 2011. However, the SOE as a hybrid created ripple effects between the market and the hierarchy that hampered the marketisation. The hierarchical governance turned towards centralisation and market governance was put on hold. The hybridity of the SOE was endogenously displaced via closing down of commercial activities, leading to a re-conversion of the SOE towards the hierarchical mode.

The paper contributes to the discussions about hybridity and re-centralisation in post-NPM era. It presents a case on how hybridity is altered and evolves in SOEs as a hybrid mode of governance between hierarchy and market in marketisation and how this can lead to re-centralisation.

The purpose of this paper is to establish a decision‐making governance framework for transferring a product/service from one EU host market to another.

Prior research concerning the relation between marketing decision governance (centralised versus decentralised) and standardisation strategy/performance tends to focus on the home‐host scenario. This study has utilised the experience of 70 firms operating in the cross‐market scenario in the EU region – i.e. transferring a product/service from one EU host market to another – in order to establish its decision‐making governance framework. The respondents were operating in both the manufacturing and service sectors.

It was found that firms with large size and a high level of business experience, operating in a similar cross‐market environment, or in a country pair that has a difference in market potential, are more likely to pursue a decentralised governance. Firms operating in a highly different market environment and in host markets with a high variation in market potential are likely to adopt an adaptation strategy. Marketing decision governance is not suggested to be related to standardisation strategy. Decentralised governance is found to be related to profitability, while adaptation was associated with market share. Market share is related to profitability.

The research findings suggest that firms can utilise their decision‐making and standardisation strategy separately to achieve their performance objectives when operating across the EU region. The outcomes established in the study have provided a new guidance on the research concerning structure, strategy and performance.