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Objective – This chapter examines the performance of the market to discover efficient equilibrium under alternative auction designs.

Background – Auctions are increasingly being used to allocate emissions allowances (“permits”) for cap and trade and common-pool resource management programs. These auctions create thick markets that can provide important information about changes in current market conditions.

Methodology – This chapter uses experimental methods to examine the extent to which the predicted increase in the Walrasian price due to a shift in willingness to pay (perhaps due to a shift in costs of pollution abatement) is reflected in observed sales prices under alternative auction formats.

Results – Price tracking is comparably good for uniform-price sealed-bid auctions and for multi-round clock auctions, with or without end-of-round information about excess demand. More price inertia is observed for “pay as bid” (discriminatory) auctions, especially for a continuous discriminatory format in which bids could be changed at will, in part because “sniping” in the final moments blocked the full effect of the demand shock.

Conclusion – Uniform-price auctions (clock and sealed-bid uniform-price, and continuous uniform-price) generate changes in purchase prices that are reasonably close to predicted changes. There is some evidence of tacit collusion causing prices to be too low relative to predictions in most cases. The worst price tracking was observed for discriminatory auctions.

Application – Uniform-price auctions appear to perform at least as well as other auction designs with respect to discovery of efficient market prices when there are unexpected and unannounced changes in willingness to pay for permits.

In many societies, conflicts of violent nature regularly spring up that usually cause a destruction of economic and social assets and needless loss of human lives. Violent conflicts and food entitlements seem to bear mutual feedbacks: first and foremost, as violent conflicts result in destruction of economic assets, conflicts usually tell upon the cultivation of foods, procurement and storage of foods and also the distribution and marketing of foods. The disruption in the agrarian sector can lead to serious decline in food availability and consequent famines, which can exacerbate and fuel further conflicts. On the other hand, the distribution and availability of foods can trigger violent conflicts in backward societies as a means to acquire and retain food entitlements, which can in turn jeopardise the agrarian equilibrium. Thus, the relationship between food entitlements and conflicts are a double-edged sword that can lend precarious instability to a backward society. During the last five decades, governments in developing nations have kept a close vigil on their agrarian sector, yet there is a clear indication in the global economy that warns of a looming food crisis, especially in the poorer regions of our globe. Food crises can seriously challenge global peace. Conflicts and hunger are hence complex phenomena. This chapter provides a comprehensive, and possibly the first, study of the economics of food entitlements and potential threats of conflicts in the current conjuncture.

Expectations play a crucial role in finance, macroeconomics, monetary economics, and fiscal policy. In the last decade a rapidly increasing number of laboratory experiments have been performed to study individual expectation formation, the interactions of individual forecasting rules, and the aggregate macro behavior they co-create. The aim of this article is to provide a comprehensive literature survey on laboratory experiments on expectations in macroeconomics and finance. In particular, we discuss the extent to which expectations are rational or may be described by simple forecasting heuristics, at the individual as well as the aggregate level.

We develop an interactive framework to model speculation (over regulation) and regulation (of speculation) in a greenhouse gas (GHG) permits market. In our proposed model, big traders engage in speculation by strategically withholding and releasing permits to influence the temporal path of permit prices in order to maximize their profits. The national government/regulator has an incentive to stabilize permit prices by suitably manipulating stocks of permits. Thus, the GHG permits market can typically be characterized by circular interdependence in which big traders will be “gaming” the regulator to generate profits: the state of the market affects speculative behavior of traders that in turn impacts on government's behavior, which in turn impacts on the state of the market. The interactive framework explores the gaming between speculators and a regulator, or government, to shed crucial insights on the nature of equilibrium in possible global emissions trading schemes (GETS). By so doing, we are able to unravel potential pitfalls of any global trading system in pollution permits for arresting global warming. Once policy makers are aware of these pitfalls, for example, a “culture of speculation” as opposed to a culture of safety, they can devise a suitable mechanism to bypass these potential pitfalls.

This chapter uses a welfare-based conceptual framework for the assessment of costs and benefits associated with nontariff measures in the presence of market imperfections such as asymmetric information and environmental or health externalities. The framework allows for evidence-based comparative assessments of alternative regulatory approaches addressing these imperfections. The conceptual work is illustrated with an empirical case study of labeling internationally traded fish products.

This chapter focuses on the common occurrence of wholesale electricity prices that fall below the cost of production. This “negative pricing” in effect represents payment to high-volume consumers for taking excess power off the grid, thus relieving overload. Occurrences of negative pricing have been observed since the wholesale electricity markets have been operating, and occur during periods of low demand, while generators are being kept in reserve for rapid engagement when demand increases (it is expensive and time-consuming to shut down generators and then restart them, so they are often kept in “spooling mode”). In such situations power production may temporarily exceed demand, potentially overloading the system. When the federal government began subsidizing the construction of wind generation projects, with regulations in place requiring transmission grids to accept all of the electricity produced by the wind generators, negative pricing became more frequent.

Intraday volatility characteristics throughout the trading week are examined at the emerging Borsa Istanbul (BIST) stock exchange. Using five-minute (and 15-minute) intervals, accentuated intraday volatility patterns at the microstructure level are examined during the stock market open and close in the morning and in the afternoon sessions. Volatility is highest when markets open in the morning. The second highest is during the afternoon open. The third highest is before the market closes for the day. Volatility before the market close has increased in recent years. These characteristics are seen every trading day. There are also differences: Monday returns are lowest, Friday returns are highest, and Monday morning volatility is highest of the entire trading week. Day-of-the-week and intraday accentuated volatility smile anomalies are jointly investigated using the longest intraday sample period in the emerging country stock exchange literature. Investment companies and professionals can utilize the results for risk management and hedging by avoiding highly volatile opening and closing periods. Arbitrageurs, speculators, and risk takers should trade during these highly volatile periods. Heightened volatility is increased difficulty in price discovery, thus inefficiency. Market participants, exchanges, and public prefer efficient markets. The research presents evidence of trading days, and periods during the trading day, when the exchange becomes more efficient. This is the first research that explores day-of-the-week effect from intraday volatility perspective in an emerging market, and provides useful recommendations in designing risk management strategies at market microstructure level.