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This chapter investigates attributes of an unexplored actor in the contemporary industrial relations system – plaintiff-side employment attorneys – and the premise that pre-dispute mandatory employment arbitration expands employee access to justice.

It presents data from a novel survey of 1,256 employment plaintiff attorneys and the universe of employment disputes administered by the five largest arbitration providers in the United States.

I report multiple measures indicating employment lawyers hold negative views of arbitration and that arbitration acts as a barrier to employee access to justice: A majority of attorneys say employment arbitration clauses have a positive impact on their willingness to reject a case for representation and a negative impact on their willingness to accept a client under a contingency-fee arrangement, and report negative perceptions of the fairness of outcomes and the adequacy of due process protections in arbitration relative to litigation. Furthermore, attorneys report accepting potential clients covered by arbitration agreements at half the rate of potential clients able to sue in court. Finally, arbitration and litigation filing statistics reveal no evidence that low-income or low-value claimants or claims are accessing the arbitration forum.

Novel data compiled here illuminate the institutional characteristics of plaintiff-side employment lawyers and the arbitration forum. They question the assertion that arbitration is an accessible dispute resolution forum for employment disputes relative to civil litigation.

There is good collaboration and there is bad collaboration. Which one do you want to do? Through the experience of the Natural Capital Coalition, the 10 steps for good collaboration are set out to help us work with others to achieve more than we can alone.

The purpose of this paper is to offer anti‐corruption experts' personal assessments of the progress international organizations have made in fighting corruption.

This paper contains a survey of the viewpoints of a number of anti‐corruption experts who themselves are current or former staff of international organizations, or who – from their positions within the private sector or in non‐governmental organizations – are able to offer a unique and distanced perspective on the key corruption‐related issues and challenges facing international organizations today.

It is agreed that international organizations today are at a cross‐roads in their individual and collective fight against corruption. International organizations must weather the corruption scandals that have recently plagued several organizations, and must confront the question of whether their staffs, boards, and member governments indeed have the ability, will, and commitment to fight corruption. To address these challenges, international organizations must adopt proactive investigative strategies when combating corruption, seek greater cooperation with each other, and must ensure that their respective investigation units have the necessary resources and independence to effectively detect, investigate, and prevent corruption.

The paper offers a realistic prognosis on the future of the anti‐corruption movement within and among international organizations.

This study investigates the effects of organizational factors on firms' adoption and use of internal staffing strategies. In particular, we examine the different effects of firm- and branch-level factors on the adoption of internal development programs and the selection of entry-level employees. We find that firm-level factors, such as firm size and organizational prestige, are positively associated with the adoption of development programs. Branch-level factors, such as branch size and leverage ratio, are positively associated with entry-level hiring. This study offers new insight into the dynamics between different levels of organizational factors and their relationship with human resource management practices.

This chapter extends the concept of associational power into the context of online platform work. To do so, this chapter centers on platforms' underlying economic model – the multisided market – to better understand how workers may be able to collectively influence their terms and conditions of employment. In illuminating how labor's associational power functions in platform work arrangements, this model helps explain how collective action may function in the “gig economy” and provides a roadmap for future academic inquiry.

This chapter develops a model of associational power in the ride-hail industry which can be extended to markets defined by geographically specific platforms, like ride-hail, delivery, domestic work, and home healthcare workers.

This chapter finds that there is substantial promise for labor unions and other worker associations in the gig economy. Additionally, we find that even well-intended regulations can harm workers' power if the regulators do not grapple with the structure of digital platforms.

This chapter identifies the foundations of workers' associational power: network effects and multihoming. In contrast to traditional analyses of workers' power, labor's ability to withdraw its effort from a single employer is not the basis of its collective power. Instead, labor's power resides in its ability to withdraw its labor from a competitor and promise its exclusive labor to a single platform. Existing literature has explored the interaction between network effects and market power from the companies' perspective but has yet to extend this analysis to workers' perspective.