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International relations and security studies suffer from an inadequate understanding of established theories in organizational leadership and management studies. This chapter contributes to these disciplines by drawing upon such models to analyze the changes in political leadership approaches of China and the United States in their interactions over maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS). Using the transactional–transformational and directive–participative leadership paradigms as its foundation, the analysis argues (1) that contextual factors unique to the each country shape its political leadership styles and (2) the leadership styles within each case study have changed dramatically over the past decades in terms of their rhetoric and policies for managing the SCS disputes. Empirical evidence is based on the policies, leaders’ statements, and official documents of China, a claimant to SCS maritime territory, and the United States, an influential stakeholder in the disputes. In the two case studies, the chapter discusses the implications of the changing leadership styles for the understanding of political interaction in the region and the future of the SCS disputes.

Southeast Asia’s position between the continents of Asia and Oceania gave the region a distinctive identity. Over the years, Southeast Asia has witnessed several important political changes and the emergence of new security threats. Historical mistrust, enduring territorial disputes and competition for maritime claims and resources have combined to weaken the regional security structure. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether China’s growing assertive position in the region bring some fresh air in the region following Beijing’s collaborative initiatives.

Seas are a central concern for Southeast Asian countries, so it is hardly surprising that the countries in the region are strongly nationalistic in asserting and protecting their claims. Maritime policy analyst, Mark Valencia, comments, “Indeed, when countries in Asia think maritime, they think first and foremost about boundary disputes, not the protection of the deteriorating marine environment or management of dwindling fisheries […] [it] is these perceptions that must change.” This paper will explore whether China’s growing assertive position in the name of diplomatic cooperation will mellow down and bring some fresh air into the South China Sea (SCS) region following Beijing’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiatives.

The world is still unsure when it comes to SCS! It often feels like “Pengci” or the art of staging drama to get the desired outcome? Beijing has to address the increasing global fears and uncertainty about her motives and talk more about its dracoplomacy. At one point, Beijing followed Xiaoping’s famous guideline: “hide our capacities and bide our time.” But now, things have changed. China is no longer actively avoiding international limelight. The motto has become “going international.” This change was not all talk either rather it was accompanied by significant, short-term action. Since becoming president, Xi has already visited more than 40 countries with his OBOR dream! It is important for Beijing to emphasize the purpose of her massive infrastructure push. That is, to achieve economic development, rather than to satisfy her growing political ambitions on the global stage. The creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and other major geo-economic projects are signs that Beijing is using her coercive diplomacy in a subtler way. Therefore, this paper checks whether Beijing’s Silk Road spirit will be successful enough to maintain its agility and grace in the future.

This is an original piece of work, and it adds value to the special issue titled “China’s Rise and Power Shifts in Asia: Geopolitical, Socio-Economic and Historical Perspectives.”

This paper aims to fill the gaps by conducting the first large n study examining the role of third parties in the emergence of river agreements in Asia and Africa during the time period 1948-2007. There is a growing literature on what explains agreements in river disputes. However, beyond individual case analysis, little systematic study has been done on the role of third parties in settling river disputes through agreement, in particular on the regions that are mostly affected by the global climate change.

Through utilising new data on the role of third parties in river disputes, this study shows that third party involvement in the conflict management of river disputes increases the likelihood of reaching river agreements.

The findings suggest that third parties use both diplomatic and economic means to increase the likelihood of emergence of river agreements, and both strategies are equally important to induce formalised cooperation.

Yet the present study covers only two regions, and it does not delve into a discussion of the conditions under which third party interventions are successful. Rather, these are aspects that need to be explored in the future.

Given the current uncertainty around security challenges resulting from climate change, and with predictions of future water wars, this research contributes to the understanding how to peacefully manage current and potential conflicts around transboundary waters.

This study is the first large n study examining the role of third parties in the emergence of river agreements in Asia and Africa.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

Evaluates the effects of shipwrecks and peoples’ reactions following them, with regard to their feelings of preventability on someone’s part. In particular to the Erika in 1989, and the Prestige in 2002. The European Union (EU), which theretofore seemed to be neglecting maritime safety appears to have developed a maritime culture. The EU seems to have adopted the International Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) attitude regarding safety protocols, which must be a right and proper thing to do. Concludes that shipping has needed, and is now receiving, a proactive approach with regard to safety from the EU which should limit, as far as possible, disasters of both a human and ecological kind for the maritime world.