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The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between board of directors’ composition (independent directors’ ratio, board size, CEO-duality) and financial transparency…
The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between board of directors’ composition (independent directors’ ratio, board size, CEO-duality) and financial transparency and disclosure (T&D).
The paper analyzes board composition and financial T&D of Italian listed companies using multiple linear regression analysis.
The results of this paper show a significant link between board composition and the level of financial T&D. In particular, the authors found a positive and significant relationship between the independent directors’ ratio and the level of financial T&D and a negative relationship between board size and the level of financial T&D.
While this paper focuses on a sample of 100 Italian listed companies, the authors acknowledge the importance of extending the results to other national context and to other type of firms (e.g. non-listed firms or SMEs). Moreover, while this paper concerns the amount of information disclosed by firms, it does not look at the quality or accuracy of disclosure.
This paper reveals the importance of evaluating the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms (such as board composition) in enhancing the level of financial T&D. Indeed, the authors provide some indications to firms to improve their internal governance mechanisms (e.g. the importance of high proportion of independent directors and of small- and medium-sized boards of directors).
This paper provides interesting insights to firms which are under pressure to improve the level of information to stakeholders. Moreover, has the level of information that is not legally required vary among companies and countries, the authors shed light on a context characterized by high level of ownership concentration, where firms can experience different types of conflict of interests.
The aim of this study is to advance knowledge on family firms' entry mode choices by examining the linkage between target market context, especially in the emerging…
The aim of this study is to advance knowledge on family firms' entry mode choices by examining the linkage between target market context, especially in the emerging economies of China and India, and the dominant family firm logic of keeping ownership and control in the family.
We use an exploratory multiple case study analysis approach based on nine German family firms' internationalization endeavors. We use both primary and secondary data.
Traditionally, extant research concludes that family principals prefer foreign direct investments (FDIs) in order to exert maximum control when entering international markets. In contrast, our study finds a clear preference for international joint ventures (IJVs) as an initial entry mode of choice into unfamiliar markets. Our findings propose this decision to be rooted in cultural unfamiliarity and the complexity of the target markets' legal environment. The effect of these two factors is amplified by prior IJVs experiences.
This article offers several original insights. First, we identify the triggers of the paradoxical IJVs’ entry mode choice among family firms and thus explain the motivation for breaking with the dominant family firm logic of maximizing control. Second, we account for factors in China's and India's particular emerging market environments. In the light of family control, the unfamiliarity with these markets triggers the decision to compensate for the high level of uncertainty by engaging in an IJV partnership. Third, our study shows that family firms are indeed willing to share control if it serves the long-term survival of the firm.
The spread of corporate board quota legislation is studied in light of diffusion theory. Mechanisms of diffusion, path dependency and critical junctures can contribute to…
The spread of corporate board quota legislation is studied in light of diffusion theory. Mechanisms of diffusion, path dependency and critical junctures can contribute to explaining the spread of policy reforms, such as the corporate board quota legislation. The empirical section describes the Norwegian reform process and maps out the ongoing European and global reform processes and debates. Seven countries, in addition to Norway, have in recent years initiated legal reforms and adopted corporate board quota rules: Spain, Iceland, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Malaysia. However, the debates over the introduction of parallel legislation extend further, and are a burning issue in several other Western European countries, as well as globally. The discussion addresses why this policy spreads, and tries to understand the complexities of factors that have led to the diffusion of public debate and legal reform of corporate board quota.