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The paper attempts to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a two-part tariff coordination mechanism.

To deal with this pricing conflict problems of dual-channel supply chain consisting of dominant manufacturer and a retailer, considering the fact that online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions, the authors establish some basic models and exploit them to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a profit-sharing coordination mechanism.

The results show that the optimal online direct selling price is positively correlated with product perceived quality obtained from online reviews and negatively correlated with the in-sale service. The traditional retail price is positively correlated with the in-sale service and weakly correlated with online reviews. For the manufacturer and retailer, whether decentralized decision or coordination contract, their profits increase with the increase of the in-sale service in a certain range and quality perceived from spontaneous online reviews. Online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions. Positive in-sale services and online reviews can provide consumers with a better shopping experience, thereby promoting their enthusiasm for shopping and improving their quality of life. The two-part tariff coordination mechanism improves the profits of the manufacturer and the traditional retailer, respectively, through the transfer fee.

The proposed approach can well analyze the channel conflicts and pricing problems between retailers and manufacturers with respect to product offline price and online price. The analysis and results can inform decision-making for manufacturers and retailers.

Promoting electric vehicles (EVs) is an effective way to achieve carbon neutrality. If EVs are widely adopted, this will undoubtedly be good for the environment. The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of network externalities and subsidy on the strategies of manufacturer under a carbon neutrality constraint.

In this paper, the authors propose a game-theoretic framework in an EVs supply chain consisting of a government, a manufacturer and a group of consumers. The authors examine two subsidy options and explain the choice of optimal strategies for government and manufacturer.

First, the authors find that the both network externalities of charging stations and government subsidy can promote the EV market. Second, under a relaxed carbon neutrality constraint, even if the government’s purchase subsidy investment is larger than the carbon emission reduction technology subsidy investment, the purchase subsidy policy is still optimal. Third, under a strict carbon neutrality constraint, when the cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction and the effectiveness of carbon emission reduction technology are larger, social welfare will instead decrease with the increase of the effectiveness of emission reduction technology and then, the manufacturer’s investment in carbon emission reduction technology is lower. In the extended model, the authors find the effectiveness of carbon emission reduction technology can also promote the EV market and social welfare (or consumer surplus) is the same whatever the subsidy strategy.

The network externalities of charging stations and the subsidy effect of the government have a superimposition effect on the promotion of EVs. When the network effect of charging stations is relatively strong, government can withdraw from the subsidized market. When the network effect of charging stations is relatively weak, government can intervene appropriately.

Comparing previous studies, this study reveals the impact of government intervention, network effects and carbon neutrality constraints on the EV supply chain. From a sustainability perspective, these insights are compelling for both EV manufacturers and policymakers.

To further promote application of BIM technology in construction of prefabricated buildings, influencing factors and evolution laws of willingness to apply BIM technology are explored from the perspective of willingness of participants.

In this paper, a tripartite game model involving the design firm, component manufacturer and construction firm is constructed and a system dynamics method is used to explore the influencing factors and game evolution path of three parties' application of BIM technology, from three perspectives, cost, benefit and risk.

The government should formulate measures for promoting the application of BIM according to different BIM application willingness of the parties. When pursuing deeper BIM application, the design firm should pay attention to reducing the speculative benefits of the component manufacturer and the construction firm. The design firm and the component manufacturer should pay attention to balancing the cost and benefit of the design firm while enhancing collaborative efforts. When the component manufacturer and the construction firm cooperate closely, it is necessary to pay attention to balanced distribution of interests of both parties and lower the risk of BIM application.

This study fills a research gap by comprehensively investigating the influencing factors and game evolution paths of willingness of the three parties to apply BIM technology to prefabricated buildings. The research helps to effectively improve the building quality and construction efficiency, and is expected to contribute to the sustainability of built environment in the context of circular economy in China.

Servitization of products is becoming increasingly prevalent among manufacturing enterprises. Existing research has primarily focused on exploring whether the direct impact of servitization on manufacturer performance follows a linear or a curvilinear relationship. However, the understanding of the underlying mechanisms between servitization and manufacturer financial performance remains limited. This paper aims to examine the non-linear relationship between servitization and manufacturer performance as well as the mediating process and boundary condition associated with this relationship.

Drawing on resource-advantage theory, this paper proposes a theoretical model of the U-shaped relationship between servitization and the financial performance of equipment manufacturers. Panel data of 248 listed equipment manufacturers in China during the period of 2010–2020 are used to test each hypothesis through the ordinary least square method.

The empirical results indicate that servitization follows a U-shaped relationship with service business focus and the financial performance of equipment manufacturers. Service business focus mediates this U-shaped relationship between servitization and financial performance, and digital technology application moderates this relationship.

This paper pioneers the unraveling of the potential mechanism that can explain the curvilinear relationship between servitization of manufacturers and financial performance. This mechanism is the focus of the service business, which is theoretically delineated and empirically tested. Furthermore, digital technology application enables manufacturers to achieve service business focus more effectively in the process of servitization. Thus, this study addresses the call for research on digital servitization.

Complex technology not only provides potential economic benefits but also increases the difficulty of application. Whether and how upstream technological complexity affects downstream manufacturers' innovation through vertical separation structure is worth discussing, but it has not been effectively discussed.

Through theoretical analysis and empirical testing, this article discusses the cost effect and market competition effect caused by upstream technological complexity on downstream manufacturers and further elucidates the impact of upstream technological complexity on downstream manufacturers' innovation.

Research has found that the impact of upstream technological complexity on the downstream manufacturers' innovation depends on the cost effect and market competition effect. The cost effect caused by the complexity of upstream technology inhibits the innovation of downstream manufacturers. In contrast, the market competition effect promotes the innovation of downstream manufacturers. There are differences in the cost effect and market competition effect of upstream technological complexity on different types of downstream manufacturers, so there is also significant heterogeneity in the impact of upstream technological complexity on innovation of different types of downstream manufacturers.

The conclusions of this article improve the understanding of the relationship between upstream technological complexity and downstream innovation and provide helpful implications for industrial chain innovation.

Advancements in responsive manufacturing have been supporting companies over the last few decades. However, manufacturers now operate in a context of continuous uncertainty. This research paper explores a mechanism where companies can “elastically” provision and deprovision their production capacity, to enable them in coping with repeated disruptions. Such a mechanism is facilitated by the imitability and substitutability of production resources.

An inductive study was conducted using Gioia methodology for this theory generation research. Respondents from 20 UK manufacturing companies across multiple industrial sectors reflected on their experience during COVID-19. Resource-based view and resource dependence theory were employed to analyse the manufacturers' use of internal and external production resources.

The study identifies elastic responses at four operational levels: production-line, factory, company and supply chain. Elastic responses that imposed variable-costs were particularly well-suited for coping with unforeseen disruptions. Further, the imitability and substitutability of manufacturers helped others produce alternate goods during the crisis.

While uniqueness of production capability helps manufacturers sustain competitive advantage against competitors during stable operations, imitability and substitutability are beneficial during a crisis. Successful manufacturing companies need to combine these two approaches to respond effectively to repeated disruptions in a context of ongoing uncertainties. The theoretical contribution is in characterising responsive manufacturing in terms of resource heterogeneity and resource homogeneity, with elastic resourcing as the underlying mechanism.

Previous studies have rarely integrated the financing modes of a capital-constrained manufacturer with the choices of online sales strategies. To address this gap, the authors study how a manufacturer selects optimal financing modes under different sales strategies in three dual-channel supply chains.

This paper considers three sales strategies, namely, combining a traditional retailer channel with one of the direct selling, reselling and agency selling channels, and two common financing modes, namely, bank financing and retailer financing. The authors obtain equilibrium outcomes of the manufacturer and traditional retailer and then provide the conditions for them to select optimal financing modes under three sales strategies.

The results indicate that the manufacturer’s financing decisions rely on the initial capital and interest rates, and the manufacturer selects retailer financing only if the initial capital is relatively larger. In terms of financing mode options, the retailer financing mode is more beneficial for the manufacturer under the three sales strategies. From the perspective of sales strategies, the direct selling model is more beneficial. In addition, the higher the consumer acceptance of the online channel, the more profits the manufacturer obtains.

This paper provides suggestions on how the capital-constrained manufacturer chooses financing modes and sales strategies.

This paper integrates the financing mode and different sales strategies to investigate the manufacturer’s optimal operational decisions. These sales strategies allow us to investigate the manufacturer’s optimal financing modes in the presence of both different financing modes and sales strategies.

This paper considers carbon abatement in a competitive supply chain that is composed of a manufacturer and two retailers under vertical shareholding. The authors emphasize the equilibrium decision problem of stakeholders under vertical shareholding and different power structures.

A game-theoretic approach was used to probe the influence of power structure and retailer competition on manufacturers' carbon abatement under vertical shareholding. The carbon abatement decisions, environmental imp4cacts (EIs) and social welfare (SW) of different scenarios under vertical shareholding are obtained.

The findings show that manufacturers are preferable to carbon abatement and capture optimal profits when shareholding is above a threshold under the retailer power equilibrium, but they may exert a worse negative impact on the environment. The dominant position of the held retailer is not always favorable to capturing the optimal SW and mitigating EIs. In addition, under the combined effect of competition level and shareholding, retailer power equilibrium scenarios are more favorable to improving SW and reducing EIs.

This paper inspects the combined influence of retailer competition and power structure on manufacturers' carbon abatement. Distinguishing from previous literature, the authors also consider the impact of vertical shareholding and consumer preferences. In addition, the authors analyze the SW and EIs in different scenarios.

Motivated by the real-world practice of the thriving e-commerce, manufacturers are transcending traditional boundaries of merely producing and selling directly by implementing encroachment. Concurrently, supply chain (SC) members who overlook the corporate social responsibility (CSR) sharing will be left behind, which is closely linked to their profits. This paper aims to investigate a better way to share CSR under the scenarios of manufacturer encroachment and no-encroachment.

This paper constructs game-theoretic models in a SC consisting of a manufacturer (M) and a retailer (R), where the manufacturer can sell products by retailing, and may sell directly by implicating encroachment. The manufacturer and retailer jointly consider whether to share CSR and the proportion of it by taking consumer surplus into account. Furthermore, equilibriums for each model are derived using backward induction. Then, the authors analyse the impact of CSR sharing proportion and compare the equilibrium outcomes under different scenarios. Finally, the numerical analyses are presented to verify the results.

Several interesting results are found in this paper. First, the retailer shares more CSR can benefit SC members and social welfare when the manufacturer does not implement encroachment. However, the results may change which is decided by the unit cost of encroachment when the manufacturer does so. Second, the proportion of CSR shared by manufacturer and the unit cost of encroachment has an interactive impact on equilibrium outcomes. Finally, both manufacturer encroachment and SC members share CSR may be the best for the perspective of SC members and consumers.

Based on the analytical results, this paper provides novel managerial implications to assist manufacturer and retailer in determining the optimal strategies for CSR sharing and encroachment. Furthermore, the appropriate proportion of CSR shared by manufacturer and the unit cost of encroachment may let manufacturer, retailer and consumer surplus achieve a win-win-win situation.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to explore the strategy of CSR sharing under the scenarios of manufacturer encroachment and no-encroachment.

With the rapid development of the sharing economy in manufacturing industries, manufacturers and the equipment suppliers frequently share capacity through the third-party platform. This paper aims to study influences of manufacturers sharing capacity on the supplier and to analyze whether the supplier shares capacity as well as its influences.

This paper deals with conditions that the supplier and manufacturers share capacity through the third-party platform, and the third-party platform competes with the supplier in equipment sales. Considering the heterogeneity of the manufacturer's earning of unit capacity usage and the production efficiency of manufacturer's usage strategies, this paper constructs capacity sharing game models. Then, model equilibrium results under different sharing scenarios are compared.

The results show that when the production or maintenance cost is high, manufacturers sharing capacity simultaneously benefits the supplier, the third-party platform and manufacturers with high earnings of unit capacity usage. When both the rental efficiency and the production cost are low, or both the rental efficiency and the production cost are high, the supplier simultaneously sells equipment and shares capacity. The supplier only sells equipment in other cases. When both the rental efficiency and the production cost are low, the supplier’s sharing capacity realizes the win-win-win situation for the supplier, the third-party platform and manufacturers with moderate earnings of unit capacity usage.

This paper innovatively examines supplier's selling and sharing decisions considering manufacturers sharing capacity. It extends the research on capacity sharing and is important to supplier's operational decisions.