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We investigate the extended service strategy choices of competing manufacturers and examine their impact on the retail platform.

We construct a supply chain model with a retail platform as the leader and manufacturers as the followers. Manufacturers face differential consumer preferences on the same agency retail platform, and they can sell a bundled extended service product and sell a separate product without any extended service.

The sale of extended warranty services on the retail platform leads to lower pricing of the manufacturers' products and changes in the product market structure in response to differences in consumer preferences. The retailing platform tends to provide an extended warranty conditionally. The sale of extended warranty services on a retail platform would be detrimental to the interests of the manufacturer who sells products with extended warranty services and in favor of the manufacturer who sells products without them.

The equilibrium results of the retail platform’s non-sales and sales of extended warranty services for the no-extended warranty product under the same commission rate and differential commission rate models are discussed, and the product structure of the market is investigated, respectively.

Marketing is a hot topic, and the purpose of this study is to investigate how shareholding strategies can be applied to achieve strategic synergy between firms in vertical supply chains to improve retailers’ marketing efforts from a long-term perspective.

This study constructs Stackelberg models to analyze the operating mechanisms of shareholding supply chains under forward, backward and cross-shareholding strategies. The authors analyze the effects of shareholding on prices, marketing efforts and profits, and explore the strategic preferences and outcomes of different supply chain members.

Forward/backward shareholding plays the same role as cross/nonshareholding in supply chains because the effect of the retailer’s shareholding is offset by the power status of the manufacturer, and the retailer can still profit when wholesale prices are higher than selling prices in certain cases. A manufacturer’s shareholding in a retailer can benefit consumers and improve marketing efforts by reducing retailers’ marketing costs, while a retailer’s shareholding in a manufacturer has no such effect. None of all shareholding strategies can coordinate the interests of all members; however, an effective rebate policy can resolve this problem.

The results reveal the operational mechanism of shareholding supply chains and provide reference values for managers who want to improve marketing efforts and economic performance using a shareholding strategy.

The rapid development of the Internet has led to an increasingly significant role for E-commerce business. This study examines how the green supply chain (GSC) operates on the E-commerce online channel (resell mode and agency mode) and the traditional offline channel with information sharing under demand uncertainty.

This study builds a multistage game model that considers the manufacturer selling green products through different channels. On the traditional offline channel, the competing retailers decide whether to share demand signals. Regarding the resale mode of E-commerce online channel, just E-tailer 1 determines whether to share information and decides the retail price. In the agency mode, the manufacturer decides the retail price directly, and E-tailer 2 sets the platform rate.

This study reveals that information accuracy is conducive to information value and profits on both channels. Interestingly, the platform fee rate in agency mode will inhibit the effect of a positive demand signal. Information sharing will cause double marginal effects, and price competition behavior will mitigate such effects. Additionally, when the platform fee rate is low, the manufacturer will select the E-commerce online channel for operation, but the retailers' profit is the highest in the traditional channel.

This research explores the interplay between different channel structures and information sharing in a GSC, considering price competition and demand uncertainty. Besides, we also considered what behaviors and factors will amplify or transfer the effect of double marginalization.

The purpose of this article is based on the unit patent license fee model in the closed-loop supply chain.

This paper analyzes the impact of the bundling strategy of the retailer selling new products and remanufactured products on the closed-loop supply chain under the condition that the original manufacturer produces new products and the remanufacturer produces remanufacturing products.

The results show that alternative products can be bundled, and in many cases, the bundling of remanufactured products and new products is better than selling alone.

If the retailer chooses bundling, for the remanufacturer, when certain conditions are met, the benefits of bundling are greater than the separate sales at that time; for the original manufacturer, when the recycling price sensitivity coefficient is high, the bundling is better than separate sales.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze manufacturers' production decisions and governments' low-carbon policies in the context of influencer spillover effects.

This paper investigates the impact of the social influencer spillover effect on manufacturers' production decisions when they collaborate with intermediary platforms to sell products through marketplace or reseller modes. Game theory and static numerical comparison are used to analyze our models.

Firstly, under low-carbon policies, the spillover effect does not always benefit manufacturer profits and changes non-monotonically with an increasing spillover effect. Secondly, in cases where there are both a carbon emission constraint and a spillover effect present, if either the manufacturer or intermediary platform holds a strong position, then marketplace mode benefits manufacturer profits. Thirdly, regardless of business mode used when environmental damage coefficient is high for products; government should implement cap-and-trade regulation to optimize social welfare while reducing manufacturers’ carbon emissions.

This study offers theoretical and practical research support to assist manufacturers in optimizing production decisions for compliance with carbon emission limits, enhancing profits through the development of effective influencer marketing strategies, and providing strategies to mitigate carbon emissions and enhance social welfare while sustaining manufacturing activities.

This paper addresses the limitations of prior research by examining how the social influencer spillover effect influences manufacturers' business mode choices under government low-carbon policies and analyzing the social welfare of different carbon emission restrictions when such spillovers occur. Our findings provide valuable insights for manufacturers in selecting optimal marketing strategies and business modes and decision-makers in implementing effective regulations.

The purpose of this paper is to find an incentive strategy to enhance the interests of the main manufacturer by inducing the suppliers to conflict the fixed incentive provided by the main manufacturer.

The main manufacturer‐supplier model is widely applied in the R&D procedure of complex products such as aeroplanes. Because of the uncertainty in the R&D, the effort of the suppliers has an important effect on it. Considering the dynamic interaction between the main manufacturers and suppliers, with the main manufacturers as leaders and suppliers as followers, this paper establishes a Grey‐Stackelberg model to analyze the best change of the incentive strategies of the main manufacturers and the effort strategies under incentive‐conflict of suppliers under the uncertain environment. A numeric example is also computed in the last part of the paper.

The results show that the main manufacturer can increase its benefit without damaging the interests of suppliers by controlling the fixed incentives.

The paper succeeds in establishing the Grey‐Stackelberg model by analysing the grey area among the main manufacturer and the suppliers, and helps to develop grey systems theory.

Suggests that gaps exist between the product ranges or lines offered by manufacturers and the assortments selected and stocked by retailers. Looks at the extent to which differing levels of “product volatility” affect retailers’ selectivity in stocking items from a manufacturer’s line. Provides a limited test of several hypotheses about how the degree of product volatility of the category within which a manufacturer’s line belongs might affect the number of items in the line that will be stocked by a retailer. Analysis of stock‐planning data for two retailers in each of two product categories offers some support for the hypotheses. Interprets these results in light of theories of distribution channel co‐ordination and retailer expertise. They may reflect an alternative explanation for widely observed increases in retailer power.

Cooperative advertising is intended for the mutual benefit of channel partners. Shows that manufacturers and dealers/distributors in the boating industry view this marketing activity very differently. Manufacturers see no connection between cooperative advertising and other aspects of the relationships with their dealers. On the other hand, dealers relate their views of cooperative advertising to other facets of their relationships with manufacturers. Consequently, when there is conflict over cooperative advertising, it is liable to have a negative effect on other arrangements that dealers have with manufacturers. Manufacturers may not understand how negativity creeps into other relationships between dealers and themselves.

Collaborative emission reduction among supply chain members has emerged as a new trend to achieve climate neutrality goals and meet consumers’ low-carbon preferences. However, carbon information asymmetry and consumer mistrust represent significant obstacles. This paper investigates the value of blockchain technology (BCT) in solving the above issues.

A low-carbon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer is examined. This study discusses three scenarios: non-adoption BCT, adoption BCT without sharing the supplier’s carbon emission reduction (CER) information and adoption BCT with sharing the supplier’s CER information. We analyze the optimal decisions of the supplier and the manufacturer through the Stackelberg game, identify the conditions in which the supplier and manufacturer adopt BCT and share information from the perspectives of economic and environmental performance.

The results show that adopting BCT benefits supply chain members, even if they do not share CER information through BCT. Furthermore, when the supplier’s CER efficiency is low, the manufacturer prefers that the supplier share this information. Counterintuitively, the supplier will only share CER information through BCT when the CER efficiencies of both the supplier and manufacturer are comparable. This diverges from the findings of existing studies, as the CER investments of the supplier and the manufacturer in this study are interdependent. In addition, despite the high energy consumption associated with BCT, the supplier and manufacturer embrace its adoption and share CER information for the sake of environmental benefits.

The firms in low-carbon supply chains can adopt BCT to improve consumers’ trust. Furthermore, if the CER efficiencies of the firms are low, they should share CER information through BCT. Nonetheless, a lower unit usage cost of BCT is the precondition.

This paper makes the first move to discuss BCT adoption and BCT-supported information sharing for collaborative emission reduction in supply chains while considering the transparency and high consumption of BCT.

The paper attempts to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a two-part tariff coordination mechanism.

To deal with this pricing conflict problems of dual-channel supply chain consisting of dominant manufacturer and a retailer, considering the fact that online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions, the authors establish some basic models and exploit them to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a profit-sharing coordination mechanism.

The results show that the optimal online direct selling price is positively correlated with product perceived quality obtained from online reviews and negatively correlated with the in-sale service. The traditional retail price is positively correlated with the in-sale service and weakly correlated with online reviews. For the manufacturer and retailer, whether decentralized decision or coordination contract, their profits increase with the increase of the in-sale service in a certain range and quality perceived from spontaneous online reviews. Online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions. Positive in-sale services and online reviews can provide consumers with a better shopping experience, thereby promoting their enthusiasm for shopping and improving their quality of life. The two-part tariff coordination mechanism improves the profits of the manufacturer and the traditional retailer, respectively, through the transfer fee.

The proposed approach can well analyze the channel conflicts and pricing problems between retailers and manufacturers with respect to product offline price and online price. The analysis and results can inform decision-making for manufacturers and retailers.