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Over the last years, powerful advances in the area of dynamic games have enriched game theory and made it more applicable to the modeling of real-world competitive strategies. The study of strategic behaviors of firms in an oligopoly market has received little attention, even though real firms have been shown to compete in output and in price in a single industry. The purpose of this study is to propose a game-theoretic approach to studying strategic behaviors of firms in an oligopoly market structure.

This approach was developed to study market dynamics and pricing strategic behavior of firms that have the possibility of deciding to be one of the two types (price-maker or price-taker) and reconsider the choice overtime on the basis of their current insights and knowledge and their experience. Firms try to improve their performance in the competitive market in a strategic way, by considering their steady-state profits and choosing the best type given the other firms’ types, actions and interactions.

The results of the present study confirm the previous study that the Cournot market is a stable market, where each firm can be a price-maker and enjoy individual learning as well as social learning. On the contrary, the market with price-takers only is never stable, and, therefore, the Walrasian equilibrium may not be supported in some instances. The Cournot market loses its stability as the number of firms in the market increases due to the fact that it will be more profitable for a firm to switch to price-taking when the number of firms is high enough. In such a situation, when the number of price-takers increases, there are no stable markets and price dynamics are destabilized.

The study and modeling of real-world competitive strategies would enhance the understanding of oligopoly markets. The study of strategic behaviors of firms in an oligopoly market has received little attention, even though real firms have been shown to compete in output and in price in a single industry as price-takers and price-makers.

This paper aims to propose an integrated use of balanced scorecard (BSC), data envelopment analysis (DEA) and game theory approach as an enhanced performance measurement technique to determine and rank the importance of manufacturing indicators of a steel company as a real case study.

An efficiency change ratio is defined to examine the characteristic function of each coalition which is super-additive. Then, the Shapley value index is used as the solution of the cooperative game to determine the importance of the BSC indicators of the company and rank order them.

The results reveal that “profitability rate” is the most important BSC indicator, whereas “customer satisfaction” is the least significant one. The ranking order of the importance of all BSC indicators makes it possible for the senior managers of the organization to realize the importance of each index separately and to improve the profitability and the number of customers by presenting programs according to the budget and time constraints.

The main contribution of this paper lies in the adoption of a game theory approach to performance measurement in the industrial sector that determines and ranks the importance of manufacturing indicators.

The purpose of the study is to assess manufacturing firm performance indicators using a reasonably comprehensive integrated BSC-Game model to empirically determine the importance of the perspectives and indicators under evaluation and the best combination of indicators.

After identification of manufacturing indicators of the firm, the Shapley value index is used as the solution of the cooperative game to determine the importance of the perspectives and indicators under evaluation and the best combination of indicators to facilitate the achievement of target goals.

The game theory approach is used as a technique to rank BSC perspectives of the firm's manufacturing performance. The results reveal that the customers' perspective receives the highest ranking. The knowledge sharing, new technology, customer satisfaction and sale profitability are considered as the best combination of BSC indicators.

The integrated BSC-Game framework, approach and outcomes can be beneficial to practitioners and researchers who aim to select the proper indicators’ policy in manufacturing performance field.

This paper aims to propose an integrated centralized data envelopment analysis (CDEA)-balanced scorecard (BSC) model to provide a selective approach to determine the most efficient indicators for evaluating the four perspectives of the BSC.

An integer linear programming model based on the efficiency concept of the CDEA method is presented to select the best indicators for evaluating four perspectives of the BSC. The basis for selecting indicators in this method is to maximize the overall performance of each BSC perspective. The modeling is performed on a real case. The considered model is solved using a general algebraic modeling system software for the data set of the real case.

A real-world case is solved using the proposed method. The integration of the CDEA and the BSC seems to be advantageous because it sheds more light on the complexity and tradeoffs inherent in actual performance measurement. It is important to note that there cannot be a unique and universal model of performance measurement applicable in every situation, in every organization and at any time.

The data set of a single organization in the manufacturing industry is used to show the performance of the proposed mathematical model; therefore, generalization of the results should be done cautiously. This framework is based on the Iranian community and experts’ viewpoints; therefore, different results may be obtained if it is applied elsewhere, and the importance of perspectives and their indicators might show different results in other populations and other countries. In addition, because the data is collected in a specific period of time, the results cannot be extended to other periods of time.

The main contribution of this paper lies in the adaption of a new integrated CDEA-BSC model to performance measurement in the industrial sector that technology improves the ultimate results of performance measurement and provides wider opportunities for decision-makers. This paper aids managers and decision-makers to control the efficient indicators in perspectives.

Adopting efficient marketing strategies is a challenging task in a competitive market place involving complex marketing planning, techniques and mechanisms to identify the best course of action under these circumstances and finding optimal solutions or stable outcomes. Decisions and strategies of competitors in the market influence the selection of the appropriate marketing strategy. The main purpose of this paper is to develop a mathematical methodology based on the game theory approach for planning optimal marketing-mix strategies in dynamic competitive markets, taking into account strategic foresight and interaction effects.

The game theory approach, as a decision-making tool in conflict situations, is suggested for planning and adopting optimal marketing strategy. The main intellectual attraction of the game theory is essentially a question of how to act in gaming situations against highly rational opponents A kind of static, finite and non-cooperative game analytics approach has been developed for this issue, and the proposed model has been implemented to design optimal marketing strategies for two top brands of the automotive parts market in Iran.

The findings of this study show that the optimal marketing-mix strategy for brand A is pricing and for brand B is the product strategy.

Game theory and the Nash equilibrium model can provide a practical approach to find and adopt the right strategy, know competitors' movements and strategies and get more profit.

The integration of the game theory approach into the marketing mix framework has been adopted as a generalized model for marketing strategy planning and analysis as well as to resolve some shortcomings of the marketing mix framework. The Nash equilibrium model has been used to analyze the results. The incorporation of game theory into marketing models has the potential to enrich the scope of marketing modeling.